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Abstract 
China began its economic reforms in 1978 and have experienced strong economic growth. 
However, economic growth is a complex phenomenon, as China’s provinces experienced 
regional disparity, where its coastal provinces grew faster compared to its underdeveloped 
interior provinces. Previous provincial-level growth studies in China do not account for spatial 
interactions, as many economic models are dimensionless in nature. This is important to 
consider, as regional disparity experienced in China can be attributed to its diverse geography 
and initial reforms that favoured the coastal provinces. Thus, this thesis examines the 
determinants of economic growth in China’s provinces, using an updated panel dataset from 
1996 to 2015, employing economic models that accounts for spatial effects. The thesis begins 
by reviewing the evolution of China’s modern economy and the determinants of economic 
growth followed by three empirical studies. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of financial development and institutional reforms on economic 
growth using dynamic panel models. This study does not account for spatial spillovers as banks 
and financial institutions in China are restricted to operate in their respective provinces. 
Although the relationship between finance and growth is well established in the empirical 
literature, there is growing evidence to suggest that the effects of financial development on 
growth is weakening and, in some cases, negative. More importantly, previous studies that 
examine finance-growth in China’s provinces have found both positive and negative effects of 
finance. Furthermore, financial development across China’s provinces is uneven, as the coastal 
provinces have benefited from the development of stock markets. Consequently, we examine 
the nonlinear effects of finance and statistically establish nonlinearity using a stringent U-test, 
providing new empirical evidence as previous studies do not formally account for nonlinearity. 
The estimated results support the literature that postulates the positive effects of finance on 
growth. However, the results also find that the effects of finance are nonlinear suggesting that 
further reforms are needed for China’s financial system.  
Chapter 5 investigates the effects of health and education expenditure on economic growth 
using a spatial autoregression model. Endogenous growth theories highlight the positive effects 
of health and education investment on growth through development human capital and 
productivity growth. There are various studies that examine the effects of human capital 
formation on growth in China’s provinces, however, most studies overlook the role of spatial 
spillovers. The spatial autoregression model accounts for spatial interaction between provinces 
 
 
and provide empirical evidence on spatial spillover effects. China’s Central government have 
delegated health and education expenditure responsibility to provincial governments; as a 
result, spatial interactions are potentially present. This study contributes new empirical 
evidence with policy implications. We find evidence that positive spatial strategic interaction 
occurs between provinces supporting the yardstick theory of competition. Furthermore, the 
results show that the effects of education expenditure are positive to economic growth and 
exerts a spatial spillover effect. However, the results on the effects of health expenditure is 
mixed, which suggests further reforms are needed in China’s healthcare system.  
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the efficiency of China’s provinces using a spatial Durbin 
production frontier with an extended dataset from 1985 to 2013. China’s geography is vast and 
diverse across the country, with the Eastern provinces that benefit from flat land and access to 
coastal seaports while its landlocked provinces are mountainous and lack infrastructure to 
international markets. Thus, it is important to consider the spatial efficiency spillover effects 
of the respective provinces, as they face varying production opportunities. This study 
contributes to the literature as it is the first study that examines the provincial-level transient 
and persistent efficiency and spatial efficiency spillovers in China, providing important policy 
implications. Previous studies that examine the productivity and efficiency in China have 
suggested that efficiency gains have been exhausted. However, we find evidence of persistent 
inefficiency and show that a one-fifth increase in output can be realised, if inefficiency issues 
are addressed. Policymakers should identify sectors that require further reforms, such as the 
healthcare system, in order to maximise the efficiency of resources. We also show that spatial 
efficiency spillovers are positive, which allows provinces to benefit from its neighbouring 
provinces. 
Keywords: China; Economic Growth; Economic Development; Regional Growth; Finance; 
Financial Development; Human Capital; Health; Education; Productivity; Efficiency; 
Nonlinear; Panel Models; GMM; Spatial Autoregression; Spillovers; Spatial Spillovers 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Since its economic reforms in 1978, China has gone from one of the weakest economies in the 
world to the second-largest economy, behind the United States. Over the past 40 years, China 
has maintained a high level of growth and has consolidated its position in the world economy. 
China’s economic reforms and transition have attracted considerable attention from researchers 
and policymakers alike, as the country has experienced a unique reform path that differs from 
other transitioning countries. While many transitioning countries have reformed abruptly, 
prompting the term ‘shock-therapy reform1’, China began its economic reforms incrementally 
and experimentally, restructuring its economy in the rural areas and gradually opening its 
economy to foreign trade and investment. This gradual approach allowed China to avoid the 
difficulties that many transitioning countries experience during the initial stages of reforms, 
avoiding sharp inflationary shocks as a result of artificial price controls leading to lower 
productivity and income, which was experience in transitioning economies such as Poland 
(Berg and Sachs, 1992). More interestingly, China managed to reform into a market-oriented 
economy without changing its Communist political system.  
As a result, China was able to focus on economic reforms as it was able to maintain political 
stability. Equally important, China managed to attract vast amounts of foreign investment, 
despite having a weak legal and financial system. Although in recent decades the government 
has addressed the weak legal and financial system, this puzzling feature has fascinated many 
researchers. China’s strong economic growth can be observed in Figure 1.1, where prior to 
reforms in 1978, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) did not achieve much growth compared to 
its GDP post-reforms. As China continues to integrate itself into the world economy and 
consolidate its position as a global leader in trade, the government has established various 
regulations and institutions to develop and strengthen its economy.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Shock-therapy refers to the sudden economic liberalisation usually in the form of the release of price and 
currency controls, trade liberalisation and privatisation of publicly owned assets. See Lipton and Sachs (1992) 
and Popov (2007). 
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Figure 1.1: Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China (1960–2018) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
Consequently, in recent decades, much research has been conducted to understand China’s 
growth. In general, many researchers have attempted to explain China’s growth using 
traditional economic theories. Earlier studies have attributed China’s early productivity gains 
to labour market reallocation, which led to structural changes in the agriculture and non-state 
sector, despite the sector’s limited capital accumulation. Many financial resources have been 
diverted to the state sector, as China suffers from a repressed financial system. Furthermore, 
studies have emphasised the pivotal role of informal institutions and social networks for many 
entrepreneurs to overcome this hard budget constraint. However, many non-state enterprises 
have begun to rely on foreign investment as a source of capital as China has begun to open its 
economy to foreign trade and investment.  
Thus, the study of economic growth is itself complex, especially in the case of developing 
countries such as China. While traditional economic growth theories emphasise the role of 
capital, labour, and human capital, understanding other fundamental determinants of economic 
growth provides a deeper insight into the development path that countries experience. This 
insight provides policymakers with essential information for future reforms and provides a 
basis for informing decision makers. Other fundamental determinants of economic growth 
include financial development, the role of governments, urban and physical geographical 
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factors, international trade and openness to trade, and legal frameworks and political 
institutions. These all play a pivotal role in the transition and development of China’s economic 
growth. The historical account and investigation of China’s reforms is reviewed in Chapter 2, 
and a comprehensive review of economic growth theories and the determinants of economic 
growth is presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
More importantly, despite experiencing successful economic reforms and strong economic 
growth, there are concerns of regional disparity. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, we 
observed that during the early stages of economic reforms, China’s Open Door Policy was 
initially implemented in Guangdong and Fujian and gradually extended across the coastal 
provinces, after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, before being implemented throughout the 
nation (Lin, 1995; Yao and Yueh, 2009; Yueh, 2010). These reforms allow the coastal 
provinces to benefit from first-mover advantages and was naturally more attractive for foreign 
firms to invest in, as they provide geographical advantages from excellent transport links to 
international waters (Gallagher, 2002).  
Figure 1.2: Average real GDP in China’s Provinces (1978–2018) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
China’s regional disparity can be observed in Figure 1.2, which presents the average real GDP 
in Chinese provinces from 1978 to 2018. It can be seen that China’s coastal provinces have 
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benefited from strong growth and have led to a widening income gap between the Eastern 
coastal provinces and inland provinces. Furthermore, in Chapter 2, we observe that the Central 
government have provided strong support for the state-owned sector, which led to further 
inequality between the provinces, as industries begin to agglomerate in coastal provinces with 
developing urban industrial centres (Chow, 2004; Lin et al., 1996; Zhang, 2002). Meanwhile, 
the study of economic growth in China is well researched, however, there are various 
opportunities to extend the scope of the work particularly in the context of China’s provinces.  
There are 31 provinces in China and economic development vary greatly across the provinces. 
Where Guangdong has the largest total GDP among the provinces, producing nearly 100 times 
more GDP than Tibet. The varying levels of development highlight the need to examine 
China’s provinces rather than China in aggregate, as the provinces face different production 
opportunities. Although Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin are Municipality Cities, 
which are under direct control of the Central government, these cities are given the same 
administrative ranks as provinces.Further details on the characteristics of the respective 
provinces are outlined in the Data Appendix in Appendix A1.  
In Chapter 3.4, we provide a review on the importance of geographical factors in economic 
growth. It is suggested that geographical factors can have profound effects on productivity, 
technological diffusion and human capital formation (Fujita et al., 1999; Sachs, 2003). In 
addition, in Chapter 2, we observe that the Central government have implemented reforms in 
a gradual and incremental way, where policies are initially implemented in several provinces 
before implementing policies throughout the nation. Thus, China’s incremental reforms have 
benefited its coastal provinces, where rapid economic development in these regions can 
potentially provide positive spillover effects into neighbouring inland provinces. 
In consideration of the regional disparity experienced in China’s provinces, this thesis 
examines the determinants of economic growth in provincial-level China with focus on the role 
of spatial spillovers. More specifically, this thesis investigates the following issues: 
1) The role of financial development and institutional reforms on economic growth in 
provincial-level China. 
2) The spatial spillover effects of health and education expenditure on economic growth in 
provincial-level China. 
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3) The spatial efficiency2 spillover effects in provincial-level China and its implications on 
economic growth. 
In Chapter 4, we examine the nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth 
in China. This study does not consider the role of spatial spillovers as finance and banking 
activities take place within provinces and cross-provincial lending is restricted by the People’s 
Bank of China (Hasan et al., 2009). The finance-growth nexus is well established in the 
literature since the seminal studies of Goldsmith (1969) and King and Levine (1993). Many 
studies have provided vast empirical evidence to suggest that financial development has a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, in recent years, a number of studies have 
suggested that the effects of financial development on economic growth is weakening 
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011), and in some cases even negative to growth (Breitenlechner et 
al., 2015; Samargandi et al., 2015). In the case of China, financial sector was lagging behind 
other economic reforms as China initially established four state-owned banks in 1978 (Allen 
et al., 2005) and gradually reformed and permitted private and foreign banks to establish 
commercial business only in preparation for its entry into the World Trade Organisation (Yao 
and Yueh, 2009). Consequently, China’s repressed financial system has resulted in hard budget 
constraints for non-state enterprises in most provinces.  
Furthermore, the coastal provinces have benefited from the establishment of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen (in Guangdong) Stock Exchange in 1991 (Berger et 
al., 2009). Previous studies that examine the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in China have found both positive and negative effects of finance. Generally, 
studies that examine the relationship of finance and growth in China have found a positive 
relationship (Hao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012), however recent empirical studies have suggested 
finance to be negative towards economic growth (Liu and Zhang, 2018; Zhang and Bezemer, 
2016). In Chapter 4, we employ a dynamic generalised method of moments estimator and test 
the nonlinear relationship of finance and growth in provincial-level China using the stringent 
U-test proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010). Many previous studies examining the nonlinear 
effects of finance on growth in China’s provinces do not formally account for nonlinearity 
using statistical methods. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, we also examine the effects of 
institutional development, such as the rule of law, the level of innovation and the size of the 
                                                          
2 In this thesis, I refer to efficiency with the production function in mind and thus focus on allocative efficiency. 
Allocative efficiency refers to the optimal distribution of goods and services considering consumer preferences. 
Furthermore, I calculate efficiency using the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis methodology. 
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private sector on economic growth in provincial-level China. Again, China provides an 
interesting case study for institutional changes, as the Central government has adopted many 
experimental and gradual reforms.  
Although financial development fosters channels to growth through capital accumulation and 
technological innovation, it may be pragmatic for policymakers to focus on long-term 
sustainable growth by concentrating on social development goals that can encourage 
technological progress. Thus, in Chapter 5, we examine the spatial spillover effects of public 
health and education expenditure on economic growth in China. Previous studies have provided 
empirical evidence that highlight the positive effects of health and education investment in 
stimulating economic growth through developing human capital formation and fostering 
productivity growth (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Sianesi and Reenen, 2003). Additionally, 
several studies examining health and education in China find that human capital investment to 
be positive and significant to economic growth (Chi, 2008; Li and Huang, 2009; Song et al., 
2000). However, previous studies that examine the role of health and education expenditure on 
economic growth in provincial-level China do not consider the role of spatial spillover (Chen 
et al., 2014; Li and Huang, 2009).  
Spatial spillovers are important to consider, as one of the strategies that China adopted during 
its economic reforms is the decentralisation of fiscal responsibility to provincial and local 
governments (Jiang, 2015; Ma and Mao, 2018). This shift in responsibility includes the 
decentralisation of health and education expenditures to provincial governments. Meanwhile, 
the theory of yardstick competition postulates that fiscal decentralisation fosters competitive 
behaviour between provincial governments, resulting in positive welfare gains (Shleifer, 1985). 
As a result, public expenditure on health and education investments should lead to spillover 
effects on consumption, as agents do not have to save for future investment in health and 
education. Hence, in Chapter 5, we employ the spatial autoregressive model to examine the 
effects of health and education expenditures on economic growth, as it captures spatial 
dependency between provincial governments, reflecting strategic spatial interaction, while the 
decomposition of spatial partitions identifies the extent of local and global spatial spillover 
effects.  
Finally, it may be practical to examine the efficiency of China’s provinces and the role of 
spatial efficiency spillovers between provinces for a number of reasons. China’s geography is 
vast and diverse across the county, with Eastern provinces that benefit from access to coastal 
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seaports and flat land in contrast to the mountainous landlocked provinces that lack 
infrastructure and transportation links to international markets (Bao et al., 2002). As a result, 
the Central government naturally focused its efforts on developing these coastal provinces (Lin, 
1995; Yao and Yueh, 2009; Yueh, 2010). For example, the Open Door Policy was initially 
established as the Special Economic Zones policies for the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, 
before extending it to the coastal provinces (Coastal Development Strategy) and subsequently 
across the nation. Similarly, Eastern provinces benefit from more financial development as the 
two stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen (in Guangdong) in the early 
1990s (Berger et al., 2009). Thus, it is interesting to examine the production factors of the 
respective provinces as they face different and varying production opportunities. 
In Chapter 6, we examine the efficiency of China’s provinces using a spatial Durbin frontier 
model that allows us to decompose and identify the extent of spatial efficiency spillovers and 
differentiate transient and persistent efficiency in China’s provinces. Previous studies that 
examine productivity in China have suggested that the economy have grown through an 
increase in capital inputs (Ezaki and Sun, 1999; Krugman, 1993) and through productivity 
growth (total-factor productivity) via disembodied technological progress and convergence 
(Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014; Wu, 2000). However, many studies do not take into 
account the wide and varying geographical features that respective provinces face which can 
potentially affect production opportunities such as transportation costs. The spatial Durbin 
model captures the effect of geographical distance, which is essential in the examination of 
provincial-level China. Few studies have accounted for spatial effects on China’s productivity 
and efficiency levels; Zhu et al. (2008) examine spatial total factor productivity convergence 
while Scherngell et al. (2014) focused on the spatial spillover effects of knowledge capital on 
total factor productivity growth. We provide novel estimates by providing empirical 
estimations of spatial efficiency spillovers using Glass and Kenjegalieva’s (2018) spatial 
Durbin stochastic frontier model that also provides estimates for transient and persistent 
efficiency which can have important implications for policymakers. 
1.2 The Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the growth determinants in provincial-level China focusing on the role of 
spatial spillovers. As a result, this thesis seeks to contribute and extend the existing literature 
by providing new empirical evidence examining provincial-level growth in China using novel 
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methodology and an updated dataset that seeks to contribute new knowledge to the literature 
and inform policymakers. As previously mentioned, many studies do not account for the role 
of geography and spatial effects in provincial-level economic growth in China. This is 
important to consider in the case of China as varying geography can have important 
implications on production opportunities. Understanding the role of spatial spillovers provides 
new empirical evidence to the existing research on the evolution of China’s modern economy 
and can inform policymakers on how China can extend and sustain future growth as there are 
concerns of slowing growth in China. Although there are a number of provincial-level studies 
on economic growth in China, this thesis considers the role of geography which is the most 
important contribution of this thesis, particularly in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Secondly, this study uses an updated dataset that focuses on 1996 onwards. Many previous 
studies that examine China’s reforms focus on the effects of the immediate post-reform era of 
1978. Although this is important, initial reforms in China were gradual and implemented 
experimentally. These policies have important implications on growth and may provide 
estimates that are not reflective of China today. Furthermore, the 1990s were an important 
turning point for China, as it follows the symbolic Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping in 1992. 
Thus, using updated data from 1996 onwards allows us to focus on China during a time where 
reforms were more pragmatic and consistent throughout the nation. Additionally, in Chapter 6, 
we use a novel dataset of capital stock in provincial-level China. This additional dataset is 
obtained from Wu (2015) as the Chinese Statistical Yearbook does not provide capital stock 
data. Wu’s (2015) estimation of capital stock follows the conventional perpetual inventory 
method and follows the seminal paper of Chow (1993) on estimating provincial-level capital 
stock in China. 
Focusing on the empirical chapters, we make a number of empirical contributions extending 
the literature on economic growth in China and the respective fields of studies. In Chapter 4, 
we offer new evidence concerning the empirical evidence on China’s finance-growth literature, 
by considering the nonlinear effects of finance on growth in China’s provinces using a stringent 
U-test to establish nonlinearity formally. Previous studies that examine nonlinearity in China 
do not statistically test for this and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
statistically establishes the nonlinear effects of finance. Furthermore, this study contributes 
further evidence to the debate concerning the weakening relationship between financial 
development and economic growth as in recent years, a number of studies have found the effect 
9 
 
of finance to be insignificant, and at times even negative. In Chapter 5, we offer new evidence 
of strategic interaction between provinces, highlighting the positive effects of government 
decentralisation. Previous studies that examine the role of fiscal decentralisation in China uses 
the spatial error corrected model (Brehm, 2013) and the spatial lagged model (Jiang, 2013). 
We employ the spatial autoregressive model and focus on health and education expenditure 
and more importantly, decompose the model to estimate spatial partitions which to the best of 
our knowledge is the first to do so. As a result, this study presents new evidence of spillover 
effects from health and education through estimating indirect and total effects as well as 
identifying global spillover effects. This can inform policymakers on the effects of 
decentralisation of public health and education responsibilities to provincial and local 
governments in China and for other policymakers examining regional economies. Finally, in 
Chapter 6, we offer new empirical evidence on provincial-level estimates of efficiency in China 
using a spatial Durbin production function model. Previous studies generally employ non-
spatial models with parametric and non-parametric methodology while studies that examine 
spatial effects on provincial-level China’s productivity and efficiency focuses on spatial 
convergence and knowledge capital spillovers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that employs the spatial Durbin stochastic production function. This model contributes 
new estimates on spatial efficiency spillovers as it the model takes into account geographical 
distance. This model also provides further new empirical estimates as it allows for the 
decomposition of transient and persistent efficiency that can inform policymakers whether 
short-term solutions or long-term policy changes are required to improve efficiency.  
1.3 The Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 reviews the progression of China’s 
economic reforms and the determinants of economic growth, setting the general tone of the 
thesis. More specifically, in Chapter 2, we provide a historical account of China’s economic 
reforms. The chapter begins by reviewing the initial gradual reforms that took place, followed 
by the overhaul of the inefficient state sector and ends by assessing China’s sources of growth. 
Chapter 3 examines theories of economic growth and empirical studies that examine growth, 
providing a context on the determinants of economic growth.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are empirical chapters that re-examine China’s economic growth using 
provincial-level data employing different econometric methodologies. Chapter 4 examines the 
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nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth. The relationship between 
financial development and economic growth in recent years have been re-examined as recent 
studies have provided evidence against the positive effects of finance on economic growth. 
Chapter 5 examines the spatial spillover effects of human capital formation on economic 
growth. This chapter focuses on the role of provincial governments in allocating resources in 
promoting human capital formation and can potentially engage in spatial strategic behaviour. 
Chapter 6 examines the transient and persistent efficiency of Chinese provinces while 
considering spatial elements using a spatial production function. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes 
by summarising the main findings of the thesis and offer some directions for future work.  
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Chapter 2: The Evolution of China’s Modern Economy 
2.1 Introduction 
Forty years ago, Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms in China to depart from Maoism, 
leading to the gradual implementation of numerous experimental and unique reforms that have 
shaped China’s ambitious growth path (Hofman and Wu, 2009). China’s ascension to its 
present economic status has not been a smooth journey, however; although prior to the 18th 
century Imperial China was once a dominant economic nation, it later began to stagnate and 
decline (Maddison, 1998). China was not successful in industrialising during the time, 
compared to the British and European countries, and it was constrained by a lack of sovereignty 
in its political framework to pursue economic development (Richardson, 1999). This constraint 
led to the downfall of Imperial China’s Qing Dynasty, when failures to industrialise made the 
country vulnerable to the power-hungry and foreign imperial mindset of Western countries, 
reducing China to a semi-sovereign country (Ch’en, 1980). China’s dire situation was 
aggravated when the British and European military imposed unequal treaties that resulted in 
two Opium Wars, burdening the government with high and unproductive expenses (Lu, 2000). 
Furthermore, China’s economy suffered prior to 1949 from the harsh effects from the 
subsequent World War II, and as a result, the nation began to adopt changes to revolutionise 
its economy.  
The chapter begins with a historical background on China’s experience of its planned economy 
and subsequent reforms. This provides a perspective on the direction and style of reform that 
China undertook, which differed to the approach adopted by other transitioning countries in 
Central Eastern Europe (Lipton and Sachs, 1992). Furthermore, the chapter offers an insight 
into the structure of China’s economy during the period, as the Central government focused on 
reforms on either the state or non-state sector. Subsequently, China’s economic reform began 
to extend to other crucial sectors, in the form of financial system reforms and increasing 
openness to international trade. The review focuses on the economic reforms beginning with 
the pre-reform era in 1949. Finally, we offer a brief discussion on the sources of China’s 
economic growth, which provides some insight into the direction of reforms that China 
undertook. 
The rest of the chapter reviews some of the essential reforms that China implemented in its 
quest to achieve economic growth. Section 2.2 reviews China’s reforms and policies alongside 
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the structural changes that its economy has experienced. This section critically reviews the 
historical development that has shaped China’s reforms and economy. Section 2.3 analyses 
China’s economic growth from the perspective of classical and neoclassical growth models, 
appraising China’s policies and how they promote economic growth. Section 2.4 concludes the 
chapter by identifying China’s options for future economic growth. 
2.2 Pre-Reform China 
The People’s Republic of China succeeded full control and sovereignty of China in 1949, 
during a time when China was one of the most impoverished countries in the world (Naughton, 
2006). The government adopted a centrally planned economy under Mao Zedong, with the 
intention of transforming China into a modern socialist country. The Communist Party assumed 
that the socialist planning framework through central ruling, was deemed superior and more 
efficient than the market system, in addition to supporting the Chinese traditional culture in 
order to gain public support (Lin, 1995). Initially, the economy had limited resources for 
production, due to the aftermath of the war, with many factories and industries destroyed and 
with disruptions in agriculture production. As a result, the government implemented a 
commune system and became the central administrator of all core production activities, 
directing all economic output and production while controlling for prices and resources 
throughout the economy.  
One of the earliest reforms implemented by the Communist government was the 
collectivisation of large farming communes in agriculture (Brandt et al., 2014). Many 
farmlands were distributed to farming communes consisting of several households working 
mutually as a team. The objective of agriculture reforms was to produce sufficient goods and 
allow the economy to be self-sufficient in order to support rapid industrialisation. In the 
beginning, the planned production model was successful, as agriculture production increased 
rapidly and as the early introduction of Soviet technologies boosted productivity, prompting 
the government to focus its efforts on industrialisation (Naughton, 2006). The system of 
farming communes, however, became an issue, as many farmers lacked incentives to work, as 
there is no reward system in place. This became a serious issue, as China had the world’s largest 
population with a scarce food supply. 
Furthermore, other critical issues from central planning began to emerge, as the government 
diverted massive amounts of resources from agriculture. The early productivity gains from 
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agricultural reforms prompted Mao Zedong to launch the Great Leap Forward Movement3 in 
1958, which rallied and enthused the nation at the beginning of the movement (Li and Wang, 
2005). The Communist government, however, overstated the gains made by the economy 
leading to planning errors as the government diverted resources towards industrialisation. This 
misallocation of resources resulted in one of the most devastating famines across China; grain 
output fell consecutively in 1958 and 1959. Although the tragedy can be blamed partly on bad 
weather, central planning led to systemic problems as central decisions have nationwide 
consequences (Naughton, 2006). In addition to diverting resources from the agricultural sector, 
the government procured excessive amounts of food to support industrialisation from farmers 
who lacked incentives; this led to the collapse of the agricultural industry as a result of the 
government’s stockpiling efforts (Brandt et al., 2014). To make matters worse, China was a 
closed economy during the period and rejected any international assistance from foreign 
countries.  
Figure 2.1: Pre-Reform China Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita (1950–1978) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
                                                          
3 The Great Leap Forward Movement was an economic and social campaign initiative by Mao Zedong aimed to 
rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a socialist economy driven by industrialisation. It 
began in 1958 and ended abruptly in 1961 due to systemic failures and widespread famine (Li and Wang, 2005). 
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The Chinese experience with socialism was unsuccessful despite the government’s capability 
to rapidly develop structural changes and mobilise resources across China’s vast geography. 
Central planning diminished the country’s efficient use of resources and suppressed local 
development. As seen in Figure 2.1, China’s planned economy was characterised by sudden 
fluctuations in economic growth. China’s planned economy met early success, through early 
initiatives in the agricultural sector and through disembodied technological progress from 
Soviet assistance, but issues with central planning emerged as their gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita fluctuated, leaving China further behind other countries in the world. It has 
been suggested that China had actually narrowed the gap with Western countries during the 
1950s but fell behind in technology in the late 1970s as China focused on recentralisation and 
further experimentation with central planning, particularly during the years following the Great 
Leap Forward Movement (Lin, 1992). When the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, Deng 
Xiaoping led several reformers to progressively restructure China’s economy through reforms, 
beginning the growth China has since experienced. 
The decision to adopt socialism was a result of past experiences with foreign imperialism and 
the colonist behaviour that many Western countries had, which resulted in China’s humiliation 
as they lost full sovereignty (Lu, 2000). Although it can be argued that the downfall of Imperial 
China can be attributed to the lack of initiative to industrialise, China’s adoption of socialist 
policies was a result of a natural distrust of Western policies that shaped China’s growth path 
in subsequent years. As such, economic growth in post-reform China provides an interesting 
case study, as China managed to achieve high growth while maintaining a socialist market 
economy with elements of both planning and market economy (Nolan, 1994). Furthermore, 
understanding the transitionary policies that China undertook allows one to appreciate the 
incentive mechanism and its impact on China’s growth. 
2.3 Reforms and Structural Change 
The reforms that China undertook to transition from a socialist economy to a market-oriented 
economy differ distinctly from other transitioning countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Most former Soviet countries reformed radically and abruptly, in a manner sometimes 
described as shock therapy; new economic policies hastily removed price and currency 
controls, along with trade restrictions, while implementing privatisation across publicly owned 
assets (Lipton and Sachs, 1992). It was suggested that many of these reforms were suitable for 
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countries such as Russia, which has a strong industrial structure and could benefit from a 
market-based economy. Although some of the transitioning countries may have benefited from 
abrupt change, many of these countries suffered from sharp rises in unemployment and 
inequality, as the economies lacked sufficient infrastructure, an absence exacerbated by a weak 
legal system (Popov, 2007).  
On the contrary, China gradually began its transition to a market-based economy through 
gradual and incremental reforms. To some degree, the historical events leading to the downfall 
of Imperial China affected the political ideology of the Communist Party and the public. The 
Communist Party retained a strong distrust and doubt towards the market-policies prescribed 
by the West, and thus, progressive transition policies allowed China to transition and 
implement key economic policies that aligned the interest of the public and the central 
government and thus, overcome political resistance. In addition, the Party continued to address 
economic issues in a rational manner, such as the introduction of a dual-track price-system and 
identify institutions that are culturally suited to its transition (Hofman and Wu, 2009). The 
government understood that political resistance to the reconfiguration of China’s institutions 
was a challenge to overcome and hence focused on experimenting with different institutions 
with incentive mechanisms. Thus, China’s reforms were unique in the sense that the country 
took elements both of capitalism and of socialism. 
2.3.1 Initial Reforms 
China initiated its gradual reforms in the rural areas, focusing on the agricultural industry. The 
failures stemming from the Cultural Revolution had left China in a dreadful condition, as the 
Chinese were poor and predominantly agricultural people with an unproductive industrial 
sector (Naughton, 2006). As a result, China began reforms in the agriculture sector, which was 
its largest industry and the backbone of its economy. The Household Responsibility System 
was introduced to address two issues in agriculture policies; the introduction of a dual-track 
pricing system based on both market and planned system, while providing autonomy towards 
farmers as incentives to produce more output (Lin, 1992). The collective system of farming 
was abandoned, and the government assigned individual households to farm based on 
contracted output quantities to the state at determined prices. 
The Household Responsibility System allowed individual households to produce quantities 
beyond the contracted planned quantities, that could be sold to the state at higher prices or to 
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rural markets, thus gradually providing self-sufficiency to households. In addition, the 
government introduced a dual-track pricing system, where the state would determine prices for 
a specified amount and then allowed the market to determine the prices for the additional 
output. The agricultural reforms were successful, overcoming the incentive issues the collective 
farming system had suffered, and as households began to increase grain output, agricultural 
procurement prices increased (Hofman and Wu, 2009). Previously, under the collective 
farming system, any additional output from the farmers would be shared among them, reducing 
incentives to produce output beyond the state quota. The Household Responsibility System 
effectively de-collectivised the farming communes and rewarded farmers who produce output 
beyond the state quota, allowing them to reap rewards by selling the additional output. As seen 
in Figure 2.2, prior to the reforms, GDP in the primary sector was stagnating, and then it 
gradually increased after the reforms, reflecting the successes of the changes. Furthermore, it 
was found that investment in agriculture declined and did not technologically progress after 
economic reforms beginning in 1978; the output and productivity gains were made through the 
introduction of incentive structures and the gradual decentralisation of agricultural production 
(Lin, 1995).  
Figure 2.2: Value-Added Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Primary Industry 
(1970–1985) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
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The effective implementation of the Household Responsibility System was crucial for China’s 
future reforms, as it laid the foundation for China’s economy through the provision and supply 
of sustenance and, more importantly, by overcoming the political resistance towards a market-
based economy (Chow, 2004). Despite the introduction of market-oriented reforms such as the 
Household Responsibility System, the government continues to observe socialist policies, as 
they have not allowed private ownership of land for the farmers (Nolan, 1994). The government 
did not allow for the establishment of private property, and the village community retained 
ownership of farmlands and provided equal land access to farm households. This was an 
informal mechanism that was successful as the farmers never owned land, which theoretically 
should have disrupted the incentives to produce. Similarly, public ownership in the secondary 
and tertiary industries were still central during early reforms. Nonetheless, the government was 
still committed to experimentalism and gradualism in ownership reform, particularly following 
the successful agriculture reforms.   
Figure 2.3: China’s Composition of Employment by Industry (1952–2017) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
As seen in Figure 2.3, China had a large proportion of employment in the primary sector, where 
reforms initially began. Figure 2.3 also highlights the changing composition of China’s 
economy, as it began to focus on industrialisation and gradually focusing on its tertiary 
industry. Prior to economic reforms in 1978, the agriculture industry was a crucial part of 
18 
 
China’s economy, employing over 80% of the labour market during the 1950s. There was a 
sharp decline in the employment of the agriculture industry during 1958–1961, during the Great 
Leap Forward Movement that resulted in systematic failures and widespread famine. However, 
the Central government focused its efforts back into developing the agriculture industry where 
initial reforms began. After economic reforms in 1978, it can be observed that the composition 
of employment in the agriculture industry is declining as China focused on industrialising. 
The need for China to reform its state-owned enterprises was essential in the next phase of 
China’s reforms. Inspired by the successful implementation of agriculture reforms, the state 
introduced the Contract Responsibility System in 1983 (Chow, 2004). Likewise, the Contract 
Responsibility System intended to provide incentives for state-owned enterprises to become 
more efficient and productive, as they were given autonomy in production and investment. 
Moreover, state-owned enterprises were given more financial independence, as they were 
allowed to keep profits after paying a fixed amount of tax to the Central government. The 
establishment of the various responsibility systems allowed China to gradually transition into 
a market system without political resistance, as China retained socialist elements of control 
(Hofman and Wu, 2009). The initial approach was successful as China avoided the sharp 
inflationary shocks that many transitioning countries experience, as the government addressed 
price changes with a dual-track pricing system (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995). On the other 
hand, these large state-owned enterprises did not respond adequately to the reforms, as political 
intervention led to rent-seeking behaviour and widespread corruption (Lu, 1994). In addition, 
inefficiencies and losses continue to escalate, as many state-owned enterprises in different 
provinces invest in similar projects that other provincial and local governments assumed. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the dual-track market system was more effective in stimulating 
the agricultural sector during the early stages of reforms. 
Despite the poor performance of the state-owned enterprises, China’s economy benefited from 
its rural sector and the growing significance of the non-state sector, especially the establishment 
of township and village enterprises. Figure 2.4 emphasises the essential role that the rural 
economy had, in maintaining social stability, as it maintained a high share of employment of 
labour in the economy. Township and village enterprises were initially established during the 
pre-reform era, as Mao pushed China to industrialise in both urban and rural areas with the 
objective of creating independent and sustainable communes (Lin, 1992). The downfall of the 
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Cultural Revolution4 left many state-owned enterprises in the rural countryside that were later 
put to use. More importantly, the township and village enterprises were unrestricted from state 
planning and can produce output at will. As a result, these rural non-agriculture enterprises 
began to develop light manufacturing goods that were in short supply, especially after years of 
heavy industrial manufacturing from Mao’s state planning era (Ding and Knight, 2011). 
Figure 2.4: China’s Composition of Employment by Urban and Rural (1952–2017) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
Thus, township and village enterprises in rural areas were re-established with the support of 
local governments. These enterprises were highly successful, as they generated great wealth. 
Moreover, they benefited from other policies, which led to a positive feedback cycle. First of 
all, the successes of agriculture reforms allowed the rural economy to accumulate finance that 
was reinvested into the township and village enterprises (Chu and Song, 2015). Secondly, the 
central government decentralised fiscal responsibility towards provincial and local 
governments by introducing the Budgetary Responsibility System in 1980, promoting the 
development of the township and village enterprises (Bouckaert, 2007). The enterprises 
benefited from local governments as they obtained credit through the close connections of local 
                                                          
4 The Cultural Revolution Movement began in 1966 and ended in 1976, following the failures of the Great Leap 
Forward Movement (1958–1961). The Cultural Revolution was implemented to persevere communism and purge 
western capitalist ideologies (Lin, 1992). 
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governments with rural cooperatives and the Agricultural Bank of China, while also benefiting 
from tax advantages (Xu, 2011). Additionally, the growth of the township and village 
enterprises provided local governments with increased income from taxation that was 
reinvested into the enterprises, thus creating a positive feedback loop. Thus, China’s rural 
reforms have indirectly benefited from fiscal decentralisation policies.  
Meanwhile, during the early stages of reforms, China employed a number of policies to 
progressively open its economy for international trade as pre-reform China was a closed 
economy that was restricted from international trade and financial transactions. China’s Open 
Door Policy was first established as four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian, 
with the aim of attracting foreign investors, as these zones provided investors with preferential 
tax advantages and property ownership (Lin, 1995). Many of the earlier foreign investments 
were allocated in low-technology and labour-intensive products, as China benefited from their 
large labour workforce. However, this raises concerns that the economy might fall into the trap 
of exporting low value-added goods. In addition, the majority of the foreign investors were 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs with local family ties in Taiwan and Hong Kong and wanting 
to take advantage of China’s cheap and abundant labour (Brandt et al., 2014). However, during 
the early phases of reforms prior to 1984, free trade measures and internationalisation policies 
were not as successful as agricultural and rural reforms, which were instrumental in 
kickstarting economic reforms during the time (Yueh, 2010). The establishment of Special 
Economic Zones, however, laid the foundation of foreign investment in China years after the 
initial economic reforms (Hou, 2011). 
The development of the township and village enterprise was an example of a successful 
transitional institution, as they were successful in creating employment in the rural economy 
while expanding production. In fact, the rural economy in China was the fastest-growing part 
of its economy during the 1980s (Nolan, 1994). The reforms allowed the rural economy to 
bridge the gap and transition towards a new market economy without significant distortion 
towards the rural economy. However, the development of the non-state sector, such as the 
agriculture sector and the rural economy, have further deteriorated the performance of state-
owned enterprises. The strong gains attained by the rural economy have diverted resources 
from state-owned enterprises, and other state projects have resulted in further reforms in 
property rights, foreign investment, labour markets and the banking sector in order to revive 
the deteriorating state enterprises (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). The state sector needed to finance 
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these loss-making enterprises in order to avoid a sharp rise in unemployment and prevent 
massive distortions in the economy, as they accounted for almost 70% of fixed investment and 
bank credit (Borensztein and Ostry, 1996). Furthermore, the government was committed to 
maintaining employment as a result of the past ideologies of socialism (Chu, 2010). This 
commitment was initially financed through cheap credit provided by state-owned commercial 
banks. However, this method of support was becoming unsustainable, encouraging state-
owned sectors be financed from elsewhere (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). Hence, China began a 
series of reforms to curb the deterioration of the state-owned sector. 
2.3.2 The Evolution of the State Sector 
The banking and financial sectors lagged behind in reforms. Prior to its economic reforms, 
China’s financial system consisted of a mono-bank, the People’s Bank of China, which carried 
out both central and commercial functions, such as the issuance of currency and loans and 
accepting deposits from the public (Chow, 2004). The People’s Bank of China issued loans 
based on policy as opposed to commercial viability, resulting in a repressed financial system. 
As economic reforms began, the government initially established three state-owned 
commercial banks in 1979 with the responsibility of credit provision: the Agricultural Bank of 
China and rural credit cooperatives to allocate resources in the rural economy, the Bank of 
China to be responsible for foreign exchange funds and deposits, and the People’s Construction 
Bank of China for fixed capital investments. Meanwhile, the declining performance of the 
state-owned enterprises meant that the government needed to provide support to the state sector 
(Nanto and Sinha, 2002). In response to China’s transition to a market economy, the 
government established a fourth state-owned commercial bank in 1984, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, to oversee all commercial operations and provide credit to 
enterprises. The People’s Bank of China was relieved of its commercial functions and was 
responsible for monetary policy and central banking functions. The state-owned enterprises 
took advantage of these reforms, as they received excessive and cheap credit that surpassed the 
credit target of the Central Bank, in order to support employment in the state sector. This 
political interference resulted in a repressed financial system. Furthermore, the financial system 
needed to adopt low-interest rates to provide cheap credit (Lin et al., 1996). Thus, support for 
the state sector became costly, and state-owned commercial banks accumulated a large volume 
of non-performing loans, as the state sector continued to perform poorly and suffer from 
distorted incentives (Allen et al., 2005). 
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The government’s attempt to reform the state sector was unsuccessful, as many state-owned 
enterprises continue to accumulate heavy losses despite continual support through government 
subsidies and cheap credit from state-owned commercial banks. More importantly, the non-
state sector suffered from these policies, being faced with hard budget constraints, through the 
political interference of the state-owned enterprises’ influence on the financial system (Feng 
and Yao, 2009). In fact, towards the end of the 1980s, the credit issued by the state-owned 
commercial banks to the state sector amounted to more than 90% of the total amount of formal 
credit in the economy, signalling the poor performance of the banking system, as it suffered 
from inflation as well (Lardy, 1998). Despite the implementation of reforms to incentivise 
state-owned enterprises, the principal-agent problem restricted the efficiency of the state-
owned enterprises, as they suffered from rent-seeking (Ding and Knight, 2011). Consequently, 
the unsuccessful state-owned sector reforms led to public anger, as the Chinese people 
protested against high inflation and rampant corruption. These protests culminated in the events 
in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Hou, 2011). In response to social unrest, Deng Xiaoping 
embarked on a ‘Southern Tour’ or Nan Xun (inspection visit) of the coastal regions in 1992, to 
demonstrate the Central government’s commitment to reform and restructuring, assuring the 
general public (Zhao, 1993).  
The subsequent reforms were more systematic and aggressively implemented nationwide, as 
opposed to the experimental and gradual approach that was favoured during initial reforms 
(Brandt et al., 2014). However, the government needed to reduce political resistance from hard-
line party members who refused to change their stances, as many of the reforms administered 
were related to the prescribed policies of the West, as the government completely turned away 
from socialist policies (Hou, 2011). Deng Xiaoping addressed these hard-liners by focusing on 
pragmatism as opposed to ideology with his famous speech, expressing his views with his 
famous words of Kai Fangi or Open Up, that proved to be significant for China in the upcoming 
years (Cheung, 1998). Additionally, Deng Xiaoping’s stance on pragmatism was emphasised 
through his speech hēi māo bái māo zhuāzhù hàozi jiùshì hǎo māo, which roughly translates 
to, ‘It does not matter whether a cat is black or white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat’. This 
stance allowed the Communist Party to adopt a market economy with Chinese characteristics. 
This period marked a revitalised and motivated China to begin sweeping reforms towards a 
market economy. 
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China’s Open Door Policy and its Special Economic Zones were extended across all provinces, 
and other forms of free trade measures were established as well, such as the Coastal 
Development Strategy, to attract foreign investment in technological sectors and in research 
and development, fostering China’s export market (Yueh, 2010). In a similar vein to 
decentralising fiscal responsibility, the Central government decentralised decision-making 
over foreign investment policies by allowing provincial and local governments to undertake 
foreign investment projects. In fact, the Communist government exhibited characteristically 
capitalist behaviours, as many provincial and local governments took advantage and rushed to 
attract foreign investors through special treatment such as tax breaks. As such, foreign 
investment was instrumental in the transformation of the state sector, as the inflow of funds 
strengthened the repressed financial system and allowed it to support and transform the state 
sector (Chow, 2004). Figure 2.5 displays the dramatic inflow of foreign direct investment into 
China, particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992. The expansion of the Open 
Door Policy has made China into one of the countries that receives the most foreign investment, 
highlighting the effective implementation of its policies (Yao and Yueh, 2009).  
Figure 2.5: China’s Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (1982–2017) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (Various Years) 
However, China’s implementation of free trade measures was puzzling to many researchers 
and policymakers, as China attracted more foreign investment than any other developing 
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country since the early 2000s, despite maintaining authoritative control in its economy 
(Gallagher, 2002). In addition, the government effectively separated foreign-invested 
enterprise from the domestic economy, which allowed foreign investors to enjoy stronger 
property rights and reduced risk. Hence, the successful implementation of foreign direct 
investment policies and other free-trade measures paved the way for privatisation reforms and 
the development of China’s domestic private sector, as foreign investment became China’s 
source of external capital, benefiting its repressed financial system (Hofman and Wu, 2009). 
Liberating restrictions on foreign investment provided new economic and social opportunities 
for the economy while increasing competition for profitability and skilled labour among the 
enterprises. However, the massive inflow of foreign funds aggravated social issues across the 
regions, as China began to experience a widening income gap, in particular between the coastal 
and inland provinces, which benefited from geographical advantages (Gallagher, 2002). 
Similarly, inequality between the urban and rural economy began to widen, as industries began 
to agglomerate in urban industrial centres (Zhang, 2002).  
As well as extending the Open Door Policy across provinces, the government continued to 
commit to marketisation and reforming its state sector. The government recognised that the 
non-state sector had driven China’s growth over the last few decades and despite being 
financially repressed by the banking system, it still managed to reallocate resources away from 
state-owned enterprises (Hsieh and Song, 2015). With the grave realisation that the state sector 
needed to be overhauled, the government introduced privatisation policies that demonstrate the 
government’s commitment to marketisation. In 1996, the zhuanda fanxiao policy was 
introduced, which translates to ‘grasp the large, let go of the small’, where the government 
permitted small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to go bankrupt, get privatised or 
be sold (Yueh, 2011).  
The introduction of the Company Law in 1993 signified the beginning of stronger 
marketisation as they allowed for mixed ownership and thus, the economy began to restructure 
and privatise (Yueh, 2010). As such, the policy effectively reallocated resources to the non-
state sector, which was more efficient and productive. More importantly, the government 
merged large state-owned enterprises into industrial conglomerates, such as the Bao Steel 
Group, and maintained control over these national champions (Brandt et al., 2014). These large 
state-owned enterprises were accountable for their performance, as the government envisioned 
these conglomerates to maximise profit. In 1998, more than 80% of state-owned enterprises 
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were shut down, and many were restructured with private ownership; by 2007, nearly half of 
all state-owned enterprises were registered as private firms (Hsieh and Song, 2015). Foreign 
investment played a significant role in the acquisition and privatisation of many state-owned 
enterprises, demonstrating the government’s commitment to opening up and adopting market 
measures (Gallagher, 2002). Consistent with zhuanda fanxiao, the majority of privatised firms 
were small and mid-sized state-owned enterprises, hence, successfully transforming the state 
sector. The state-owned sector began to improve its performance as corporate governance was 
enhanced, and assets were reallocated more efficiently as a result of greater competition from 
private and foreign firms. 
In addition, China continued to reform its financial and banking sector in various ways. Many 
of the reforms adopted were in preparation for China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), as it intended to strengthen its financial system (Yao and Yueh, 2009). As with China’s 
marketisation and Open Door Policy, the government projected reforms to promote the 
profitability and viability of banks, while consolidating the independence of its Central Bank, 
which was previously prone to political interference (Brandt et al., 2014). As a result, the 
government established three additional policy banks in 1994 to relieve the state-owned 
commercial banks of policy-lending responsibilities: the State Development Bank, the China 
Export-Import Bank and the China Agricultural Development Bank. As the government began 
to focus its efforts on privatisation, it introduced the Commercial Banking Law in 1995, which 
forced the state-owned commercial banks to operate on a commercial basis, accumulating 
profit and losses (Nanto and Sinha, 2002). Furthermore, in the same year, the Central 
government introduced the Central Bank Law, acknowledging the independence of the Central 
Bank, alongside other bankruptcy laws (Chow, 2004). In addition, the number of commercial 
banks began to increase, alongside the entry of foreign banks through joint-ventures in 1994 
(Das, 2012). The number of private and foreign banks increased dramatically after the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, as the large state-owned commercial banks became heavily burdened 
with non-performing loans from state-owned enterprises, which led to further banking reforms. 
Meanwhile, China also began to develop its capital market system to modernise the economy, 
with the formation of two stock exchange markets: the Shanghai Stock Exchange, in 1990, and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, in 1991 (Yao and Yueh, 2009), indicating the government’s 
commitment towards a reformed economy.  
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Additionally, China’s economic reforms had influences on its social infrastructure policies. 
When the Communist Party took over China in 1949, the education system was centralised, 
and all private schools and universities were nationalised (Naughton, 2006). The system was 
ineffective, however, as the government pushed its ideology and was keen on ending academic 
intellectuals to disseminate research, in an effort to reduce inequality. However, as economic 
reforms began, the government decentralised its education system, providing more decision-
making authority to provincial and local governments and allowing foreign education 
institutions to cooperate with government-sponsored programmes (Chow, 2004). Furthermore, 
the public was eager for new ideas and knowledge, as prior to the economic reforms they were 
restricted to do so. Thus, the decentralisation of education policies was similar to the 
decentralization of economic reforms and was essential in the development of China’s social 
infrastructure. Similarly, the Central government decentralised its health care system and 
developed modern health insurance programmes. However, these programs were ineffective, 
as years of socialist rule had made the public dependent on public health care (Hou, 2011).  
In addition, the Central government issued an open letter in 1980 encouraging member couples 
to conceive no more than one child, leading to China’s controversial One-Child Policy (Yao et 
al., 2013). The One-Child Policy, as a result of economic reforms, affected social welfare, as 
the government was keen on reducing unemployment through controlling the population and 
on reducing their use of natural resources. China’s emphasis on industrialisation has also 
resulted in high rates of urbanisation (Zhang, 2002). This may have been encouraged when the 
Central government began to relax its hukou household registration policy in 1992, which 
restricts labour to work in either rural or urban areas (Wing Chan and Buckingham, 2008). In 
addition, China’s rate of urbanisation also began to accelerate, as foreign investment in coastal 
cities increased labour demand, increasing the rate of urbanisation (Zhang, 2002). Figure 2.4 
demonstrates the structural changes in the composition of employment between the rural and 
urban economy, as China began to industrialise and experience higher rates of urbanisation.  
China’s reforms have resulted in rapid economic growth, but the gradual and experimental 
approach towards reforms has also produced some shortcomings. China’s growth is found to 
be cyclical and suffered from accelerating inflation and contractions as the economy 
experiences structural changes, resulting in a boom–bust feature (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). In 
addition, experimental reforms have made policymakers reactive to issues, as they implement 
new policies and only address problems when they arise, which resulted in social unrest-such 
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as was the case in the Tiananmen Square protests, due to low expectations and confidence 
among the public (Lin, 1995). However, China’s economic reforms have effectively 
transformed China from a poor agrarian economy to one of the largest economies in the world. 
One of the unique features of China’s reform processes was the early, gradual and experimental 
approach towards economic restructuring, as China initiated reforms in the agricultural sector 
and as its leaders recognised that the country needed to improve its self-sufficiency through its 
food production (Hofman and Wu, 2009). 
The experimental approach allowed China to become market-oriented with Chinese 
characteristics that enable China to gradually transition from a socialist ideology to a more 
pragmatic approach (Chow, 2004). This orientation allowed China to maintain political 
stability throughout its reforms. Furthermore, the economy benefited from China’s agrarian 
past, and as a result, once policies and incentives were in place, agricultural productivity rose 
rapidly and became China’s foundation towards economic restructuring. It has been suggested 
the successes of the non-state sector and the rural economy was the main engine for economic 
growth during the early phases of reforms (Huang, 2011). In a way, the Central government 
pragmatically allowed the non-state sector to gain momentum and outgrow the state sector to 
accumulate resources before addressing the issues of further reform (Lin, 1995). As the 
economy progressed, state enterprises were vital for maintaining employment levels for the 
government and thus remained essential to the state. However, as marketisation policies began 
to come into play, these state-owned enterprises began to face stiff competition from the 
privately owned and foreign-transnational corporations that began to dominate the Chinese 
economy (Hart-Landsberg, 2011). China has consolidated its position in the world economy at 
the turn of the century, as it was relatively unaffected by the recent 2007 global financial crisis, 
where China actually supported the economic recovery of other countries as Chinese demand 
continued to grow (Das, 2012). Furthermore, the government has continued to commit towards 
marketisation and move decisively away from socialism, as demonstrated by the recent ‘anti-
corruption campaign’ initiated by President Xi Jinping (Zhang, 2018). 
2.4 China’s Sources of Growth 
Examining the historical development of China’s reforms is interesting, as the country 
reformed in an experimental manner. Although the reforms are unique, they loosely follow the 
policies of conventional economics, where policymakers identified policies to incentivize 
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agents and allowed the economy to progressively open up for trade, establish legal and property 
frameworks and reforming its repressed financial system. Furthermore, China’s growth path 
followed traditional growth patterns, as the economy initially began its reforms in agriculture 
and only then focused its efforts in the industrial and services sector, demonstrating a sectoral 
shift (Zhu, 2012). Thus, this section systematically reviews China’s development, considering 
the traditional channels for economic growth (e.g., capital, labour and human capital) and 
examining the effects of China’s economic reform policies on productivity and technological 
progress.  
Traditional neoclassical growth models emphasise the importance of factor accumulation 
through capital and labour, while technological progress allows an economy’s growth rate to 
increase (Solow, 1956). The structural changes that China has experienced, however, altered 
the traditional sources of growth, as the economy reallocated inputs such as the labour 
workforce from various sectors in the economy, shifting the accumulation of capital through a 
repressed financial system. Furthermore, it is suggested that relatively poor countries benefit 
from catching up and converging to wealthier economies, as poorer economies benefit from 
economic backwardness and technological transfer, thus increasing the economic growth rate 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). However, these converging economies need to develop within different 
institutional settings that can allow them to converge effectively. As such, the policies adopted 
by China played an important role in providing these institutional settings for economic growth, 
and thus, the Central government’s intervention was necessary for growth. China’s economy 
can be considered a form of market socialism or a market economy with Chinese 
characteristics.   
China began its reforms in the agricultural sector, providing incentives to farming households 
by introducing the Household Responsibility System, which became the foundation of its 
development and supported township- and village-level enterprises. The introduction of the 
dual-track pricing system provided farmers with strong incentives and increased productivity 
growth in the agricultural sector, as the rural economy began to take shape (Lin, 1992). 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the dual-track pricing system produced Pareto 
improvements to the economy (Yao, 2008). In addition to price reforms, as the government 
provided favourable treatment to state-owned enterprises, the hard budget constraints imposed 
on the agriculture and non-state sector provided the non-state enterprises with market 
conditions which forced the rural economy to operate more efficiently (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). 
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Zhu (2012) has suggested that total factor productivity (TFP) grew rapidly in both the 
agriculture and the non-state sector during the initial reforms. The hard budget constraints 
forced the agriculture sector to become more productive, reallocating labour away from the 
agriculture sector to the township and village enterprises and boosting the rural economy. As 
briefly mentioned earlier, the hukou household registration system restricted the rural labour 
workforce from working in the state-owned enterprises, mainly based in industrialised urban 
centres (Wing Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Hence, the rural labour workforce was dispersed 
into township and village enterprises, as the non-state sector’s excess capacity in production 
allowed it to absorb additional labour.  
Figure 2.6: Urban and Rural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1978–1998) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
Similarly, the non-state sector was imposed with hard budget constraints that provided 
incentives in the form of stronger market discipline and competition (Ding and Knight, 2011). 
The non-state sector was under no obligation to provide goods for the Central government and 
was decentralised to the local and provincial governments, where they indirectly benefited from 
the Budgetary Contract System, as they obtained credit through local government connections 
and social networks (Yueh, 2010). As such, the productivity in the agricultural sector and the 
subsequent reallocation of labour to the non-state sector developed the rural economy. The 
productivity gains made, however, began to level as TFP rates remained constant between 4 to 
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5% during the 1990s (Zhu, 2012). Figure 2.6, which presents China’s urban and rural sector 
GDP during the first 20 years of reforms, demonstrates that the rural sector contributed to the 
economy more than the urban sector before it exhausted its productivity gains. The role of 
agriculture in economic growth has been emphasised in development economics, as it allows 
an economy to undergo structural transformation (Schultz, 1953). The adjustment of prices and 
incentives, however, provided the economy with a one-off productivity gain through factor 
reallocation in the rural economy during the initial reforms. 
Financial sector reforms in China lagged behind in restructuring, as the government established 
only four state-owned commercial banks and relieved lending responsibilities from the Central 
Bank. Although this lag may be considered an adverse development for the economy, financial 
repression had positive overall effects on the economy. The absence of a liberalised banking 
and market system meant that the economy had very few options to channel savings (Prasad 
and Rajan, 2006). The repressed financial system actually provided the state-owned 
commercial banks with further credit expansion, as the economy funnelled its savings to the 
financial system and provided the banks with increased liquidity. Other research attributed 
China’s accumulation of savings to the rising ratio of male to females, resulting in marriage 
competition and thus raising China’s household savings rate (Wei and Zhang, 2011).  
Figure 2.7 demonstrates that prior to 1978, the ratio of deposits to GDP was low. However, 
after the economic reforms were initiated, the financial development began to increase and has 
seen significant growth as financial sector reforms and development continued. As a result, 
financial repression yielded high savings rates that promoted capital accumulation. Much of 
the financial resources, however, was redistributed to inefficient state-owned enterprises, as 
government was adamant about maintaining employment, thus leading to inefficiencies in the 
state sector, which had soft budget constraints (Yueh, 2011). Nonetheless, local and provincial 
governments fostered the development of the township and village enterprises as they provided 
cheap credit through rural cooperatives and the Agricultural Bank of China. In addition, pre-
reform China adopted a fixed exchange rate that overvalued the Yuan as a part of Mao’s import 
substitution policy, as the government intended China to be independent of imports, while 
purchasing imported goods at a lower price (Zhang, 1996). China gradually transitioned into 
the foreign exchange market by progressively easing controls on current accounts and trade, 
and finally it fixed its currency against the US dollar in 1995 and revalued it again in 2005 
(Prasad and Rajan, 2006). The Central Bank’s decision to maintain a fixed exchange rate is a 
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part of the economy’s export-led strategy that gave rise to China’s dominant position in 
international trade, as the Yuan was kept at a low and stable rate (Yao, 2014). 
Figure 2.7: Ratio of Total Deposits in Financial Institutions to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (1950–2017) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
Trade liberalisation was a crucial part of China’s export-led strategy, in addition to the nation’s 
cheap and abundant labour and capital accumulation through the economy’s high-savings rate 
(Zhu, 2012). China has become one of the nations that receives the most foreign direct 
investment, as compared to other developing countries, and such investment has enabled the 
economy to benefit from capital accumulation through foreign investment and to absorb and 
deploy superior foreign technology, resulting in a higher growth rate (Brandt et al., 2014). In 
Figure 2.8, it can be seen that China’s level of openness (the ratio of exports and imports over 
GDP) has increased consistently since economic reforms were initiated. Various examinations 
have emphasised the role of openness in promoting economic growth, such as the transfer of 
superior technology and knowledge. As such, many foreign firms have viewed China as a 
source of economical labour, while China has recognised the value of foreign firms, benefiting 
from capital inflow, managerial knowledge and superior foreign technology that can be 
absorbed, allowing the economy to benefit more than through simple capital formation (Liu, 
2009). This approach echoes the Heckscher–Ohlin theory of specialising in labour-intensive 
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and light manufacturing goods (Samuelson, 1949), as China had an abundance of labour. It 
was suggested that manufacturing goods accounted for the majority of goods exports due to 
China’s labour cost advantage and spare capacity in production (Knight and Wang, 2011).  
Figure 2.8: Total Exports and Imports over Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1950–2017) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
Furthermore, the level of openness has stimulated competition in the domestic economy, 
especially since the recognition of patent and protection law in the 1990s, as it encouraged 
Chinese firms to devote more resources to innovative activities leading to technological 
progress (Hu and Jefferson, 2009). Innovation activities and knowledge creation are essential 
elements in a number of endogenous growth models (Romer, 1986), and thus, increased 
openness incentivises the domestic economy to devote resources to knowledge creation, 
ultimately leading to economic growth. Similarly, it is suggested that many provincial and local 
governments compete for foreign investment, resulting in a positive regional spillover effect, 
as knowledge sources embodied in foreign investment and imports had positive and significant 
impacts on regional economic growth (Kuo and Yang, 2008).  
China’s trade liberalisation policies, however, resulted in undesirable effects on regional 
inequality, as much of the foreign investment was concentrated in the coastal regions, crowding 
out the less developed interior regions (Wen, 2007). Nonetheless, foreign direct investment 
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still played a significant role in China’s economic performance, as it increased its TFP. China’s 
development, however, has led to macroeconomic imbalances, as the economy’s high savings 
rate has lowered consumption, while foreign investment and other reform policies have resulted 
in rapid capital accumulation and high investment (Knight and Wang, 2011). In addition, 
Knight and Wang (2011) suggested the Yuan is undervalued, which will be problematic for the 
Central Bank to manage, in particular due to surges in liquidity. Furthermore, China’s current 
account surplus has raised concerns for its trading partners, particularly the US, which has 
begun to impose tariffs on Chinese imports (Liu and Woo, 2018). The economy must reform 
its financial system further and provide more independence to its Central Bank in conducting 
monetary policy to address these macroeconomic imbalances (Prasad and Rajan, 2006). 
The fascinating aspect of China’s reforms was the absence of property rights alongside a weak 
legal and banking system, in particular during the early stages of reforms (Allen et al., 2005). 
Traditional economic theories have stressed the significance of clear property rights and low 
transaction costs to facilitate efficient transactions (Coase, 1937). Furthermore, a number of 
studies, particularly for transitioning countries, have highlighted the rule of law as relevant to 
growth, since it forms the foundation of socio-economic development in a market economy 
(Glaeser et al., 2004). China’s experimental reforms, particularly during the early stages in the 
agriculture and non-state economy, have produced poorly defined property rights, despite 
strong economic growth (Yao and Yueh, 2009). The absence of institutional and contractual 
rights, however, has been fulfilled by informal institutions that originate culturally (Yueh, 
2010). For example, farming households in the rural economy did not have formal ownership 
of farmland; however, they did realise the implicit ownership of the land as they continued to 
produce for the economy and benefited from the dual-track policies (Yao, 2013).  
Similarly, China’s repressed financial system resulted in hard budget constraints for non-state 
enterprises (Allen et al., 2005). These constraints cultivated kinship-based social networks or 
guanxi, as credit-constrained entrepreneurs tapped into their friends and family as sources of 
credit (Evans and Leighton, 1989). The informal mechanism operated through the 
characteristics of the Chinese culture of trust, based on Confucianism (Cheng, 1990). Likewise, 
as the township and village enterprises suffered from hard budget constraints, they invested in 
political capital, fostering the close relationship between the local and provincial governments’ 
relationships with Agricultural Bank of China and rural cooperatives (Zhou, 2009). In the same 
way, the absence of a robust legal framework should have discouraged foreign direct 
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investment, yet China provided foreign investors preferential treatment and implicit privileges, 
outside of the formal legal system (Huang, 2006). Furthermore, many of the foreign investors 
during the early stages of reforms were entrepreneurs from Taiwan and Hong Kong with 
relatives in China. Thus, the enforcement of informal institutions during the early stages of 
reforms diminished the functions of formal institutions, as the economy worked through social 
networks (Greif, 1993).  
The role of formal legal and financial frameworks played an increasingly important role as 
China begins to integrate into the world economy. The increasing relevance of these 
frameworks was evident as increasing competition from private and foreign joint-venture 
enterprises began to consolidate their position in the economy at the expense of state-owned 
enterprises (Choo and Yin, 2000). More importantly, China was required to establish various 
formal international laws and rights, especially the recognition of private property, as part of 
the membership in the WTO, which China entered in 2001 (Yueh, 2011). In terms of financial 
restructuring, China agreed to open up its economy to foreign banks as part of its entry into the 
WTO (Nanto and Sinha, 2002). Various studies have found that the presence of foreign banks 
has produced positive spillover effects, improving the efficiency of other Chinese banks 
through enhanced corporate governance and risk-management (Berger et al., 2009). Similarly, 
other research has found that institutional development in China from the mid-1980s through 
its entrance into the WTO, played an essential role in stimulating economic growth (Hasan et 
al., 2009). Hence, China’s initial incremental and gradual approach was effective, as it was 
essential for the economy to restructure while focusing on social and political stability. On the 
contrary, as China begins to integrate itself in the world, formal legal and financial systems 
play a crucial role in corporate governance and regulation, especially for private and foreign 
enterprises.   
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
China’s transition from a planned to a market economy has been successful, relative to 
comparison to other transitioning countries. The economy has managed to lift itself from being 
one of the poorest countries in the world to becoming the second-largest economy; in 
consequence, poverty has been reduced across the country. Its rapid growth, however, has come 
at the cost of rising income inequality across its regions, transforming China from a classless 
socialist society to an unequal one (Ward, 2016). As China begins to consolidate its position, 
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local and provincial governments must increase productive spending to allow for human capital 
formation, such as health and education investments. Such spending may increase 
consumption, as households will not have to spend on such investments. Nonetheless, China’s 
economic growth has been rapid, and the country is on its way to a dominant position in the 
world economy, a position it held during the rise of the Ming Dynasty (Maddison, 2006).  
In this chapter, we begin with a historical review of China’s transition into the Socialist system, 
providing some insight into the approach that the country had towards Western ideologies. 
China’s planned economy, however, was not as successful, since centralised decisions caused 
systematic failures, as famine ravaged the country; China thus became one of the poorest 
countries in the world. In 1978, a group of reformers led by Deng Xiaoping began restructuring 
and reforming the country, enabling China’s growth since then. The policy reforms impacted 
the economy and produced structural changes that benefited it. Initial reforms were focused on 
ensuring China’s self-sufficiency in sustenance through implementing agricultural policies 
such as the Household Responsibility System. This system allowed China to operate with both 
a free market and a planned economy, as the policy introduced a dual-track pricing system that 
gradually introduced market elements into the economy. The growth of township and village 
enterprises was essential, as they absorbed labour surplus in the rural economy while producing 
a substantial amount of goods for the economy. Additionally, the growth of the rural economy 
was due in part to most of the enterprises not being obligated to the Central government. 
Instead, these enterprises fostered a close relationship with local and provincial governments, 
which provided them with credit. The state-owned enterprises, however, were plagued with 
poor performance and political interference, which led to rent-seeking, to corruption and, 
eventually, to the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In response, the Central government 
committed to further economic reforms and began to establish formal legal frameworks, a 
robust financial system and trade liberalisation that paved the way for China’s economic 
ascendancy. 
Several themes can be reflected on from this chapter. Incidentally, a large part of China’s 
growth has derived from capital accumulation, with a quarter from labour and human capital 
and from productivity gains (Chow and Lin, 2002). This growth stems from the fact that China 
experiences many one-off gains through structural adjustments as a result of policy changes. 
The role of capital accumulation in economic growth, however, will diminish over time, and 
the one-off efficiency gains from structural changes may already be exhausted (Zheng et al., 
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2009). The diminishing role of capital emphasis the role of human capital formation in 
stimulating economic growth through technological progress, which is important if China 
wants to sustain its growth in the future. As China begins to establish formal institutions in the 
economy, it becomes possible to examine the role of financial and institutional development in 
China. This can provide a deeper understanding whether the development of the formal 
financial system and other institutional development can stimulate economic growth. This 
investigation may result in policy implications in the form of further reforms of China’s legal 
and financial system, as well as further reforms in the government sector to rebalance and 
reduce distortions in the economy. Finally, China’s incremental and experimental approach to 
reforms has generated deficiencies that may have profound effects for its long-term efficiency 
and productivity that can provide policy implications. 
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Chapter 3: The Determinants of Modern Economic Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
Economic growth and understanding the wealth of nations has always been an important 
research agenda. Economic growth is a questionable concept as earlier theories do not always 
capture economic welfare5 (Shearer, 1961). In the early theories, there is a tendency to perceive 
growth as a quantitative value, ignoring other issues such as inequality and welfare. Inquiry 
into economic growth, however, has advanced and now addresses these issues, contributing to 
the development of new theories. This chapter reviews the development of economic growth 
theories, emphasising the importance of physical capital, labour and human capital. The growth 
theories introduced, however, identify only the proximate determinants of economic growth, 
which may be problematic for policymakers in developing countries. These countries generally 
experience distinct growth paths that may be explained by other fundamental determinants of 
economic growth such as the role of financial development in an economy or the openness to 
international trade of a country.   
Neoclassical theories of economic growth revolve around the concepts introduced by classical 
economists. The Solow (1956) model is one of the most prominent models used in 
understanding economic growth. Solow emphasises the role of savings and population growth 
alongside the role of technological progress and developing a dynamic general equilibrium 
model. As with many neoclassical models, Solow focused on the equilibrium between two 
agents (i.e., firms and households) and two factors of production (i.e., capital and labour) to 
determine supply and demand. The model introduces substitutability between the factors of 
production that leads to steady-state growth with exogenous technological progress. However, 
the model is limited, as it suggests that policies will have no effect on growth. This suggestion 
may not be applicable for many developing countries, whereby policies that affect investment 
decisions can significantly impact growth. As a result, endogenous models were developed to 
address these issues (Lucas, 1990). Endogenous models employ Solow’s (1956) production 
model, but they introduce the concept of human capital in addition to physical capital and 
labour. For example, Rebelo (1991) allows capital to be composed of human and physical 
capital that is substitutable, resulting in a linear technological frontier. Other theories 
                                                          
5 Quality of living that are measured by other factors such as happiness and quality of life as well as considering 
environmental issues, such as pollution 
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incorporate Arrow’s (1962) learning-by-doing framework, where knowledge generation is 
favourable to economic activity and thus allows growth to be sustained by human capital 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Lucas, 1990; Romer, 1986). Hence, while neoclassical models 
assumed that improvements in human capital contribute to technological progress as a one-off 
increase, the endogenous growth theory suggests that human capital formation can have 
persistent productivity gains. As a result, the addition of human capital endogenizes 
technological progress.  
Despite the extensive theoretical and empirical contributions of economic growth, many 
economists still debate the determinants of economic growth. The process of economic growth 
is a complex phenomenon, as some countries have amassed much wealth, while others are 
poor. Thus, the inquiry into economic growth for developing economies remains a priority. 
Although physical capital, labour and human capital are important determinants of economic 
growth, in developing economies these determinants are affected by policies and other 
fundamental determinants of growth. Many neoclassical theories of growth assume stable 
growth independent of policies (Renelt, 1991), which is not applicable for developing 
economies, as they suffer from a number of disequilibrium factors. Many developing countries 
undergo structural changes through various reforms and deregulation. Identifying these 
determinants is important; Acemoglu (2009) suggested, for instance, that ignoring these factors 
is similar to treating a disease without understanding what causes it. As such, an endogenous 
framework is more applicable when examining developing and transitioning economies, where 
transitional dynamics can have profound impacts on economic growth (George et al., 2003). 
The previously introduced models provide the basic framework to consider endogenous growth 
in a general equilibrium model. However, this model lacks the information policymakers 
require to grow an economy. Hence, in this section, we emphasise our discussion on the 
theoretical background on economic growth, focusing specifically on the proximate 
determinants of economic growth that do not consider the policies and political environment 
in developing economies.  
The rest of the chapter examines the fundamental determinants of economic growth and is 
organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. The section begins by introducing the theoretical background and seminal 
research that helped shape the field, followed by empirical research that examined causality 
and differences in financial systems. It ends with a discussion of the existence of a nonlinear 
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relationship between the two. Section 3.3 examines the role of governments in supporting 
economic growth, providing some theoretical and empirical evidence. The section also 
provides some explanation of the contrasting results between government size and economic 
growth. Geographical factors and their influence on economic growth are discussed in Section 
3.4, providing a detailed explanation of the impact of physical and urban geography on 
economic performance. Section 3.5 provides a brief background on trade policy and openness. 
The section provides a background on export-led strategies, trade barriers and foreign direct 
investment that may enhance economic growth. Finally, Section 3.6 demonstrates the role of 
institutional development in supporting economic growth through indirect channels that can 
have a positive effect on other determinants of growth. Section 3.7 summarises the main 
findings in the literature and specifies several possible avenues of research. 
3.2 Financial Development  
Financial development and the economic growth nexus (or finance–growth nexus) have been 
debated for decades. Early theoretical work by Schumpeter (1911) highlighted the importance 
of financial development in spurring economic growth, suggesting that the banker authorises 
people on behalf of society. This understanding implies that finance is needed for 
entrepreneurship to flourish and develop in an economy. This view is known as the supply-
leading hypothesis, positing a causal relationship from financial development to economic 
growth (Patrick, 1966). Empirically, the supply-leading hypothesis has found support in 
seminal cross-country regressions by Goldsmith (1969) and King and Levine (1993)—thus 
paving the foundation for finance–growth nexus theory, where various academics such as 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) have argued that 
financial institutions can positively affect growth.  
Various empirical works have found that finance is linked to economic growth, regardless of 
causality or direction. Financial systems are essential due to the functions they perform within 
the economy. Market frictions, such as information and transaction costs, are among the main 
reasons for the need for financial systems. These systems consist of intermediaries and markets 
that carry out the functions of mobilising resources that provide an impetus for growth (Levine, 
1997). These functions promote growth by acquiring information, facilitating risk sharing and 
mitigation, mobilising savings, facilitating exchange and exerting corporate governance. 
Acquiring information is essential to financial systems, as information asymmetry can lead to 
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adverse selection. Adverse selection, where one party has more relevant information than the 
negotiating party, can lead to poor decisions. Thus, adverse selection can lead to credit 
rationing, reducing the amount of funds channelled towards investment (Capasso, 2004). 
Corporate governance is also crucial in the financial system, as it both reduces agency problems 
that can cause misallocation of resources and diminishes political influence that can affect 
capital markets and institutions (Morck et al., 2005). Thus, financial systems promote two 
channels of growth—namely, capital accumulation and technological innovation—and provide 
a sound theoretical basis that financial systems can nurture economic growth.  
Although the initial results showed that finance is a good predictor of economic growth, cross-
country analyses, upon which early works in the field of the finance-growth nexus are based, 
are criticised on the basis that data from different countries can suffer from incompatibility. 
Cross-country analysis assumes that all countries exhibit similar patterns of growth over time. 
Thus, this causal interpretation from such cross-country analysis must be treated cautiously 
(Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). Consequently, the causality of finance and growth is 
validated based on averages. Thus, time-series analysis was suggested to avoid the 
incompatibility problems that cross-country analysis experience. Time-series analysis was used 
in various works that contributed to the empirical debate on the finance–growth nexus. 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) provided some evidence supporting the supply-leading 
hypothesis and found the relationship between finance and growth to follow a bidirectional or 
demand-following hypothesis. The demand-following hypothesis was developed by Robinson 
(1952), who suggested that financial development would arise only as a response to economic 
growth. Theoretically, the demand-following hypothesis postulates a causal relationship, from 
economic growth to financial development. This suggests that the financial system of an 
economy would develop in order to meet the demands for the growing real economy. Other 
time-series analyses yielded results similar to those of Demetriades and Hussein (1996), 
supporting the demand-following hypothesis and bi-directionality: for example, Luintel and 
Khan (1999) and Shan et al., (2001).  
The literature has suggested that identifying causality is crucial, as it is linked to policymaking, 
particularly in developing and emerging markets. If the supply-leading hypothesis holds, 
policies should be aimed at financial liberalisation, and in the case of demand-following, 
policies should be aimed at other growth-enhancing policies (Calderon and Liu, 2003). On the 
other side of the debate, some academics discussing the issue of economic development do not 
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mention financial development at all, while others dismiss the importance of finance with 
regards to economic growth and development (Meier and Seers, 1984). The vast theoretical 
and empirical research, however, finds support of the view that financial development plays an 
important role in economic growth. 
Financial systems consist of intermediaries and markets that carry out functions, such as 
transactions and the exchange of money between borrowers and lenders. Levine (1997), 
particularly suggested that the functions that financial systems carry out can provide channels 
to growth. However, the argument on financial systems have led to the argument over to 
whether financial markets carry out essential functions that promote economic growth more 
effectively than do intermediaries: the bank-based versus market-based debate. The main 
contribution to this strand of the literature came from Levine and Zervos (1998), who suggested 
that financial institutions and markets are important for long-term growth. They ran regressions 
including both bank and market factors and found that coefficients for the two are significantly 
positive, suggesting that banks and markets carry out different services yet provide similar 
functions that promote growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998). However, Levine (1997) claimed 
severe analytical problems in linking financial structure to economic performance, as such a 
connection does not quantify the structure of the financial system. In other words, it does not 
really capture financial development’s central role, which is to enhance channels of growth 
rather than to find a more efficient structure. As empirically shown by Levine and Zervos 
(1998), both financial structures are shown to be significantly and positively related to 
economic growth. In addition, some academics have suggested and shown that the stock 
markets may be able to contribute to economic growth, albeit less significantly than does 
banking development, which is able to promote long-term growth (Arestis et al., 2001).  
On the one hand, recent research has lent support for stock market development at promoting 
economic growth, particularly for countries at high levels of development (Peia and Roszbach, 
2015). Studies have suggested a threshold level of finance where the impact of the banking 
sector is less effective in promoting growth, whereas stock markets would benefit developed 
economies more. Abdmoulah and Jelili (2013) have suggested that countries with developed 
financial systems are more dependent on equity markets due to their higher incomes and the 
availability of more investment alternatives such as raising finance through shares. One of the 
most important functions of stock markets is to provide support for innovative, young 
companies, as well as investment in research and development (Brown et al., 2009). This role 
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supports the five functions of financial systems that lead to capital accumulation and 
technological innovation (Levine, 1997). Various researchers, however, have shown that stock 
market development may not benefit countries with weak institutions. Peia and Roszbach 
(2015) have suggested, furthermore, that a number of countries have a reverse causal link 
between economic growth and bank development, and Beck (2008) has proposed that banks 
disproportionately help the growth of small firms, implying that banks can foster 
entrepreneurship, echoing Schumpeter’s view6. Although various studies have shown the 
merits of bank-based and market-based systems, a common theme of threshold effects or 
nonlinear relationship arises between the system and its effect on economic growth, where 
developed countries would benefit from a market-based system, while less developed countries 
would gain more from a bank-based system. In addition, both sides argue for governments to 
support the growth of small firms or innovative young companies, indicating the importance 
of entrepreneurship that can lead to technological progress (Beck, 2008; Brown et al., 2009).  
Small firms usually face multiple constraints, particularly in developing countries, as they face 
severe information asymmetries to access credit from formal financial institutions (Beck et al., 
2015). In particular, banks in developing countries seem to support the growth of more 
prominent firms (Du and Girma, 2012). This is an issue, as entrepreneurship from small and 
medium-sized firms has a positive effect on growth (Li et al., 2012). These constraints can 
adversely affect the performance of small firms; for example, in China many smaller 
companies have reported that they did not receive adequate support from the financial system 
which results in opportunity cost (Du and Girma, 2012). This hampers their access to finance 
and, in return, stifles the development of entrepreneurship, which is found to be positively 
related to economic growth. Policies aimed to make access to finance more inclusive can 
reduce the constraints small firms face. It is vital to adopt these policies, as small firms create 
jobs and are dynamic, innovative and essential ingredients in promoting economic growth 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Governments and other formal institutions help promote 
entrepreneurial activity. One example of microenterprises supporting economic growth was the 
post-1978 reforms in China, where small firms, such as the township-and-village enterprises, 
were key drivers of economic growth despite relying on informal finance and governance 
mechanisms (Du and Girma, 2012). Furthermore, recent studies have also shown that 
government influence and ownership of banks can promote long-term growth, as governments 
                                                          
6 “The banker … authorizes people, in the name of society as it were, to …[innovate]”, (Schumpeter, 1911, p. 74) 
43 
 
can reduce the excessive risky strategies that maximises short-term gain, and instead focus on 
the societal aspects of financing entrepreneurial activity (Andrianova et al., 2012) In many 
transitional countries, entrepreneurs can act alongside reforms as they innovate new ways to 
conduct business; this kind of action is crucial, as many of these countries have state-owned 
enterprises. 
In addition, some academics have found the varying effects on the structure of financial 
systems, bank-based or market-based, depending on the country’s’ level of economic growth 
(Abdmoulah and Jelili, 2013). Thus, the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth seems complex and nonlinear rather than straightforward and simple. 
Furthermore, the significance of financial structures during different phases of economic 
development suggests that a threshold effect may be crucial in policymaking, where developed 
countries benefit more from market-based financial systems while less developed countries 
benefit more from bank-based ones. The existence of a nonlinear relationship and threshold 
levels is critical to acknowledge, as financial systems globally have grown larger, both in 
absolute terms and terms relative to the size of their real sectors, especially in less developed 
countries that are catching up to the advanced economies (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). 
Recent findings have suggested strong evidence of a nonlinear threshold relationship between 
financial development and economic growth (Huang et al., 2010; Law and Singh, 2014). 
Simply put, the nonlinear and threshold effect suggests that below the threshold, finance exerts 
a positive effect whilst above the threshold, the effect of finance becomes negative (Law and 
Singh, 2014). The effect of financial development is suggested to be weakening due to an 
increase in the frequency of financial crises (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). This suggestion is 
supported by Law and Singh (2014), who point out that the 2007–2008 financial crisis has 
exacerbated the finance–growth nexus, implying that finance is not always better and that an 
optimal level of finance is crucial, alongside strengthening the quality of finance to promote 
long-term growth. This recommendation echoes Jayaratne and Strahan’s (1996) argument that 
lending quality rather than lending volume is responsible for growth. Recent research has 
suggested that the beneficial effect of financial development has diminished since the 1990s 
(Valickova et al., 2015), whilst Breitenlechner et al. (2015) similarly confirms that an inverse 
U-shape relationship between financial development and economic growth. Furthermore, 
during crises, the size of a financial structure negatively impacts growth, suggesting contagion 
in larger financial systems (Breitenlechner et al., 2015). 
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Furthermore, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) suggest that a country’s infrastructure must be well 
developed prior to financial development and liberalisation. This proposed requirement may 
explain why advanced economies benefit more from market-based financial structures than do 
less developed economies, where banking system depth has a greater effect on growth, due to 
lack of access to finance (Abdmoulah and Jelili, 2013). However, the differences in threshold 
effects and nonlinearity by a country’s economic level still do not explain the relationship 
entirely. The country’s institutional development and legal framework may be a suitable 
explanation as to why a country benefits from a particular structure or why threshold levels 
exist (Beck et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 2008).  
The existence of nonlinearity and threshold levels also leads to the question of whether further 
financial development is beneficial, as the quality of lending matters to growth more than 
volume. Volume can adversely affect growth, as a larger financial sector size can increase 
growth volatility. A substantially larger financial sector can lead to increased volatility in both 
developed and developing countries (Beck et al., 2014a). The emphasis on increasing volume 
can be partly blamed on the excessive leveraging and risk-taking that new banking models have 
utilised due to the availability of complex financial instruments and excessive deregulation of 
the financial system (Beck et al., 2014b). Therefore, optimal financial development is needed 
for optimal growth performance (Samargandi et al., 2015). For example, Boswoth and Collins 
(2008) have suggested that China is faced with an excess of capital accumulation that could 
disrupt growth through over-investment, but in India’s case, despite an increasing savings rate, 
its constrained public sector deficit needs greater capital accumulation. As the impact of 
financial development varies due not only to financial structure, but also to economic structure 
and institutional quality, policymakers should strengthen the appropriate type of quality of 
finance (Samargandi et al., 2015). Thus, the weakening evidence supporting financial 
development leads to policy-making implications regarding excessive financial liberalisation 
and ultimately economic growth. 
3.3 Government Spending 
The role of the government in the economy is actively debated, with valid points on both sides 
of the spectrum. In the context of neoclassical growth theories, governments can allow 
productive transactions to increase by easing fiscal policy, as lower taxation affects GDP by 
creating a distortion in supply and demand. This distortion results in an opportunity cost on 
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taxation. Similarly, in the context of endogenous growth theory, the distortionary effects of 
taxation are more significant, as their productions functions do not specify diminishing returns 
(King and Rebelo, 1990). Yet, proceeds from the opportunity cost arising from taxation can be 
spent on productive government spending such as health care and education that promotes 
human capital formation and economic growth.  
Hence, governments can encourage economic growth. On the other hand, the supportive role 
of governments in the economy has recently come under fire, with the aftermath of the 
Eurozone debt crisis. Countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain were heavily 
indebted and struggled to pay their debts, as they did not generate enough economic growth 
(Lane, 2012). This foreshadows the complexity of government spending, which can either be 
productive to the economy or can retard economic growth (Irmen and Kuehnel, 2009). As such, 
some theoretical and empirical evidence supports both the positive and the negative effects of 
large governments. This section briefly reviews the literature on the role of government in 
stimulating economic growth. 
Theoretically, some perspectives suggest that the fundamental functions of a government can 
drive economic growth. The idea that there is a positive relationship between the two is not a 
new one, as Wagner (1893) introduced the need for governments to be accountable in the 
administrative and protective functions of the nation. For example, government spending on 
defence and policing provides safety to society and harmonises potential conflicts between 
private and social interests, while the establishment of the judicial and institutional systems can 
protect citizens from foreign enterprises (Aschauer, 1989). As such, the administrative and 
protective functions that governments fulfil provide a basic foundation for stability (Armey, 
1995) and encourage societies to focus on productive activities that can encourage economic 
growth. In addition to providing stability, the government can also enter into the production 
function through government expenditure. For example, productive government spending on 
transportation and education provides a country with a solid foundation for the development of 
an economy (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). It is widely recognised that the development of 
human capital and reliable infrastructure raises the economic potential of an economy (Canning 
and Pedroni, 2008). More importantly, investments in human capital are argued to contribute 
to long-term growth despite the short-term nature of fiscal instruments (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Roubini, 1998). They argue that governments play an essential role in providing these 
productive investments, as the public may have only partial incentives and lack the means due 
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to credit imperfections (Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003). Thus, governments can increase the total 
output of an economy in the long-term by providing the basic needs of society alongside 
productive investment.  
On the other hand, large governments can retard economic growth and can be detrimental to 
the allocation of resources (Brennan and Pincus, 1983). Governments usually impose 
regulatory burdens, alongside fiscal and monetary policy that can distort the supply and 
demand of an economy, lowering productivity (Arnold et al., 2011). For example, China’s 
Central Bank is a good example, as the government continues to focus on an export-led growth 
strategy and thus, continues to maintain a fixed currency rate. As government spending needs 
to be financed, these revenues are usually raised in the form of taxation or borrowing. A larger 
public sector, at the expense of higher taxation and a significant budget deficit, can crowd-out 
the private sector, slowing economic growth (Wahab, 2004). Hence, in the context of growth 
theories, the distortionary effects of taxation negatively impact the capital-to-labour ratio 
employed in the production function, reducing the potential for growth (Mendoza et al., 1997). 
As such, the excess burdens associated with transfer mechanisms are unproductive and hinder 
growth (Grossman, 1988). In addition to the distortionary effects of taxes, larger governments 
are prone to ‘rent-seeking’ activities and corruption, whereby officials are rewarded for 
approving projects or acquiring rights. Again, this was observed in the case of China, when the 
government introduced the Contract Responsibility System, that led to rent-seeking activities 
and unproductive spending by the state-owned enterprises. Similarly, some theoretical models 
suggest that political incentives produce suboptimal policies, potentially creating a drag from 
taxation (Ghate and Zak, 2002). As such, these rent-seeking activities are unproductive, as they 
can divert resources to inefficient firms, thus lowering economic activity.  
Empirical research on the debate, however, is mixed, and no consensus seems to have been 
made. On the one hand, a number of investigations have found that government spending is 
positively associated with growth (Evans and Karras, 1994; Ram, 1986; Wahab, 2004). Still, 
many academics also find that government spending and taxation distort the economy and leads 
to lower growth (Brennan and Pincus, 1983; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; Grossman, 1988). 
Despite the negative relationship between the two, many studies emphasise the role of 
productive investment, such as government spending in health care and education that leads to 
social development (Mo, 2007). Similarly, Hansson and Henrekson (1994) highlight the 
distinction between productive government expenditure, unproductive government transfers, 
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and consumption. More importantly, human capital investment and infrastructure are found to 
be robust to economic growth across many countries (Colombier, 2009). Other empirical works 
have focused on the effects of taxation; where some researchers have found that corporate 
taxation negatively affects economic growth (Lee and Gordon, 2005), others find that income 
tax retards growth, while taxation in domestic consumption seems to be growth-friendly 
(McNabb, 2018). Investigating taxation, however, must be done cautiously, as individuals and 
firms are forward-looking and can change their behaviour, particularly after announcements in 
taxation changes are made. 
The contrasting results from previous examinations imply that the relationship between 
government expenditure and growth is a non-monotonic one (Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 
2016). Barro (1990) and Armey (1995) were the first to establish the existence of a U-shape 
curve between the two variables, as productive government spending is usually offset by the 
distortionary effect of taxation. Recent research has evidenced a threshold effect by which 
investment in human capital is offset due to the rent-seeking activities of individuals, which 
results in unproductive capital (Wadho and Ayaz, 2018). In addition, the nonlinear relationship 
may be dependent on the level of development of an economy. Government sectors are 
generally smaller in poorer countries, and public expenditure can ensure stability and increased 
productivity. The role of government spending becomes more complex as an economy 
develops, however, suggesting cross-country differences in institutional and political structures 
(Bergh and Henrekson, 2011; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). Large private and corporate sectors 
are typical characteristics of many developed economies, and as such, distortionary taxation 
and rent-seeking activities are more pronounced (Churchill et al., 2017). It is imperative for 
any government that the optimal level of government spending and taxation be identified, as it 
can be essential to economic growth.  
On the other hand, it may be logical for governments to increase public spending during a 
recession, as an instrument to counteract a slow-down and stimulate aggregate demand, which 
can also result in an inverse U-shape relationship (Wahab, 2004). As seen in recent years, many 
governments introduced fiscal packages as a response to the global economic slowdown after 
the onset of the financial crisis. There is a growing need for independent institutions to be 
established to monitor the harmful activities associated with governments and ensure they do 
not retard economic growth. This observation raises a potential issue in asserting the role of 
governments as the sole determiners of growth, as the performance of governments can be 
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affected by institutional development and the political stability of an economy (Facchini and 
Melki, 2013). Hence, it is important to examine other fundamental determinants of economic 
growth that can complement the positive effects of government expenditure. 
3.4 Geographical Factors 
Geographical factors and their impacts on economic growth can be examined into two 
branches: physical geography and urban geography (Economic Geography)7. In the context of 
neoclassical growth theories, both physical and urban geography play an important role in 
influencing transport costs, determining resource endowments, and promoting knowledge and 
technological diffusion, which have profound effects on productivity and human capital 
formation, thus affecting economic growth (Fujita et al., 1999; Sachs, 2003). Additionally, 
geographical factors can influence demographic trends and other policies through urban 
geography, which ultimately affects economic growth. This section reviews the influence of 
physical geography on economic growth and the benefits attained from agglomeration 
economies and industrial clusters. 
Physical geography focuses on the natural conditions that shape regional territories, such as the 
landscape, climate, and the compositions of territories. Natural conditions affect the 
distribution of endowments and influence demographic trends through human settlements 
throughout history. For example, it is well established that many tropical countries have lower 
productivity growth compared to other countries, as they suffer from many disadvantages that 
arise from natural physical conditions, in addition to other burdens such as diseases (Bloom 
and Sachs, 1998). The harsh conditions arising from the tropical heat, intense rainfall, and lack 
of colder temperatures can negatively affect agricultural productivity, as compared to that of 
the many temperate countries that benefit from suitable conditions for a variety of plant crops 
(Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). Bloom and Sachs (1998) provide a compelling argument concerning 
Africa’s slow economic performance due to unfavourable climatic conditions that affect 
nutrition through constrained agriculture and infectious diseases, such as malaria. Agricultural 
productivity is an essential aspect of growth from the perspective of developing and emerging 
                                                          
7 Economic Geography examines economic activities taking into account conditions associated with production, 
location, distribution, consumption, and exchange of resources (Fujita, 1999). Physical geography deals with the 
processes and patterns in the natural environment that can affect the distribution of resources. Urban geography 
focuses on the changing composition of cities and urban processes that can lead to agglomeration economies. 
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economies, and as a result, geographical location can disadvantage some economies as 
compared to others (Nordhaus, 2006).  
In addition, the natural conditions of a country can affect transportation costs, which can affect 
factor mobility in the context of a production function. Firstly, it is suggested that many coastal 
countries benefit from access to international markets through ocean-navigable waterways, as 
opposed to their landlocked counterparts (Gallup et al., 1999). As a result, many coastal 
countries are more prosperous than landlocked countries. Secondly, despite having access to 
international waterways, some countries are disadvantaged by being distanced from markets 
(Naudé, 2009). For example, Bloom and Sach (1998) suggested that Africa as a region is 
disadvantaged due to their isolation from many major world markets in the northern temperate 
countries, thus increasing their transportation costs in trade. Hence, natural geography can 
constrain agricultural productivity and can be detrimental to isolated countries that lack access 
to the international market.  
The issues of geographic advantage are well documented in history. A number of early 
civilisations built settlements around fertile rivers such as the Nile, Indus and Tigris, which 
allowed their societies to benefit from agricultural productivity, as transportation and 
communications were too expensive (Landes, 1998). The advantages gained from locational 
features, implies that geography can also affect population trends, as migration increases in 
areas that have high economic growth, and these demographic transitions can profoundly 
impact an economy’s supply of labour and capital (Gallup et al., 1999). These early 
civilisations, however, were disadvantaged by technological progress because they were 
isolated and lacked access to international markets. suggesting that geographical advantages 
may comprise first-mover advantages. Thus, settlements built around a coastline may be able 
to benefit advantages beyond geographical ones. Coastal settlements can benefit from 
increasing returns to scale in the form of infrastructure networks and can attract highly skilled 
labour, allowing cities and industrial clusters to form within the country (Fujita et al., 1999). 
These industrial clusters benefit from agglomeration economies due to costs advantages, 
signifying the complementary nature of physical geography and urban geography.  
Agglomeration and industrial clustering offer possible advantages. Theoretically, shared costs 
for infrastructure, the build-up of the labour force, transaction efficiency, and knowledge 
spillovers leads to firms learning and innovating (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002). More 
specifically, agglomeration or localisation leads to the development of a local labour market 
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for specialised skills, developing human capital formation with positive feedback effects 
(Malmberg and Maskell, 2002). These local labour markets arise due to population or 
demographic transitions through urbanisation creating localisation economies (Marshall, 
1920). Thus, local labour markets arguably function better, from the point of view both of firms 
and of employees, if there are several similar and related firms around (Krugman, 1991). In 
addition, many large cities consist of industrial clusters, a hallmark of many economies 
(McCann and Shefer, 2005). These clusters may have arisen due to transportation costs, where 
closer geographic proximity between firms can lead to a reduction in costs. Transportation 
costs are reduced through agglomeration, as firms need to continually contact others to 
facilitate tacit information exchange, leading to the development of an industrial cluster 
(Glaeser, 1998). Hence, closer geographic proximity between firms can benefit from reduced 
transportation costs and the development of knowledge spillovers. There are concerns, 
however, about the diminishing effects of agglomeration, as some studies find that excessive 
agglomeration and increased knowledge transaction diminish the benefits of knowledge 
externalities (Antonelli et al., 2011). As a result, agglomeration economies and industrial 
clusters are beneficial, up to a certain threshold with diminishing returns. Thus, in the context 
of endogenous growth theories, agglomeration and clustering allow for the formation of new 
ideas leading to knowledge spillovers; human capital accumulation can increase productivity 
and economic growth.  
The effects of physical and urban geography on economic growth can also be viewed as 
absolute and relative locational advantages. Relative location examines the effects of a region 
with respect to other neighbouring regions; for example, physical distance that can benefit from 
transportation cost advantages (Arbia et al., 2010). In addition, relative location also examines 
multidimensional space affected by social factors, which can influence urbanisation and foster 
agglomeration economies. For example, social distance and interactions between agents can 
encourage individuals to behave with similar incentives (Akerlof, 1997). These incentives 
create a social network that can promote knowledge diffusion and spillovers through spatial 
externalities in education and wealth (Bénabou, 1996). On the other hand, absolute location 
refers to the effects of a region due to its particular location in space and independent of any 
neighbouring regions. These effects may arise through trading blocs and other bilateral 
cooperation and agreements that countries have. The rapid gains in technology have allowed 
many countries to benefit from improvements in information, communication and innovation 
that can foster cross-country cooperation and agreements across larger geographical areas 
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(McCann and Shefer, 2005). Such expansion can be observed with the rise in global and 
regional agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which includes 
countries from around the world. These agreements have implications for absolute location 
advantages as the features of relative location, such as a shared common border, may be less 
important in shaping economic performance (ibid.). In this case, geography plays an indirect 
role affecting institutional development and trade that can have pronounced effects on 
economic growth.  
Similarly, the environmental constraints imposed by climate and natural physical conditions 
can also impact population growth (Galor and Weil, 2000). As mentioned, early civilisations 
and settlements inhabit locations with agricultural advantages, but technological progress and 
the emergence of cities also impact population dynamics. On the one hand, excessive 
population growth can be detrimental to an economy, as it reduces GDP per capita gains and 
leads to unsustainable development (Yao et al., 2013). Consequently, several countries have 
implemented policy prescriptions to limit population growth such as a child tax policy (Fanti 
and Gori, 2014). China implemented its one child-policy during its economic reforms, and 
countries such as Vietnam and Iran have policies in place to limit population growth, while 
countries such as Japan and Singapore encourage population growth. In theory, population 
growth leads to an increase in consumption, resulting in a Malthusian trap, where consumption 
leads to less investment in capital formation (Coale and Hoover, 1958). Many developed 
economies, however, suffer from a drop in fertility which reduces the amount of economically 
active labour to retired people (Fanti and Gori, 2014). In the context of endogenous growth 
theories, this reduces the amount of labour input and human capital into the production function 
and as a result can decrease economic growth (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). The effects of 
population growth on the economy are complex and may be dependent on other country-
specific factors. However, the point made here is that geographical factors can influence 
demographic transitions which can have further policy implications. 
The role of geography in economic growth is complex, as it can influence trade, demography, 
institutions, industrialisation and agricultural productivity, which all have profound impacts on 
economic growth. This suggests that both geography and institutional development is vital for 
the growth of an economy (Bosker and Garretson, 2009). As geography is endogenous to these 
other determinants, policymakers must consider the influential role of geographical factors. If 
countries are landlocked and disadvantaged by their access to international waters, 
52 
 
policymakers should prescribe policies that improve infrastructure alongside trade agreements 
that lessen the effects of national borders to diminish the drawbacks of certain geographical 
factors.  
3.5 Trade Policy and Openness 
The process of globalisation over the last few decades has rapidly increased, affecting the level 
of trade, capital and investment in many economies around the world. The increased movement 
of trade in the global economy has sparked various theoretical and empirical studies to examine 
the aspects of trade policy and openness, in particular for developing countries. There are a 
number of trade policies and openness initiatives that countries can adopt, such as employing 
export-led strategies, a reduction in trade barriers, openness through increasing imports and 
exports and promoting foreign direct investment. The rise in international free trade has 
accorded with the ideologies commended by the Washington Consensus, alongside the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, pushing trade to be liberalised with fewer 
restrictions, foreign direct investment through reducing barriers of entry for foreign firms, 
adopting privatisation reforms alongside many others (Williamson, 1993). Additionally, the 
need for global trade to be liberalised has always been an overarching agenda for many 
countries, which has resulted in global trade agreements such as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 or the WTO today (Read and Parton, 2009).  
Despite the significant political support in favour of free trade, the empirical and theoretical 
literature has had less consensus, as there are contradictory findings especially for developing 
countries. On the one hand, much empirical evidence suggests the positive effects of 
international trade and economic growth, as an open economy can achieve rapid productivity 
gains (Parente and Prescott, 2000). On the other hand, some argue that export-led strategies are 
detrimental to development and welfare, as it can worsen an economy’s terms of trade 
(Bhagwati, 1958). This section reviews the potential gains and channels to growth from trade 
policies as well as the difficulties that developing countries experience, potentially making 
trade detrimental to their economy. 
Trade liberalisation policies allow an economy to be more open and receptive to other 
economies. One policy that countries can adopt is the export-led strategy. The export-led 
strategy postulates that the growth of exports of a country can stimulate growth across the 
economy, through technological spillovers and other externalities (Marin, 1992). In particular, 
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economies that focus on exporting high-technology and skill-intensive products learn rapidly 
from technological progress through learning-by-doing (Young, 1991). Learning-by-doing is 
essential for exporters to gain valuable knowledge and expertise about the international market 
through practical experience, rather than being passive (Chuang, 1997). In addition to learning-
by-doing, exports can also contribute to economic growth through the foreign trade multiplier, 
where a surplus in exports can result in an expansionary effect (Stolper, 1947). In general, 
many studies, both recent and historical, have found that openness and trade liberalisation are 
beneficial for economic growth (An and Iyigun, 2004; Darko and Yeboah, 2018; Kessides, 
1991). Grossman and Helpman (1991) have suggested that export-led policies benefit from 
knowledge transfer through imported intermediate goods. This advantage can increase labour 
productivity and facilitate knowledge and technological spillovers through imports that are 
domestically unavailable. Similarly, other research has suggested that export-led policies 
encourage exporters to become more efficient in their investments, causing productivity 
spillovers (Edwards, 1993).  
On the other hand, examinations of developing countries find trade openness to have no 
positive relationship with economic growth (Sarkar, 2008). Young (1991) argues that 
liberalising trade can be detrimental to some countries, as it forces the countries to focus on 
developing extraction and exploration of primary goods, which lacks the potential for long-
term sustainable growth. Moreover, the inconsistent findings imply the underlying nature of 
developing countries, which are characterised by years of inwardly oriented policies prior to 
liberalisation (Love and Chandra, 2005). These protectionist policies are biased toward 
developing domestic industries through subsidies and import substitution. In addition, 
developing countries may not benefit from openness, as they suffer from political instability 
that can counteract the positive effects of trade liberalisation policy adjustments (Wacziarg and 
Welch, 2008). Equally important, developing countries lack the infrastructure to support 
transportation and markets, and they lack crucial resources to exploit international trade (Read 
and Parton, 2009). This can possibly lead into the trap of exporting low-value-added goods due 
to cheap labour in developing countries. As such, it is unsurprising to find that the countries 
that benefited from post-liberalisation are successful prior to liberalisation, implying that the 
benefits are conditional (Kneller et al., 2008). 
Others examine the effects of trade barriers on economic growth. Removing trade barriers can 
lead to more efficient markets through the law of one price. This concept assumes identical or 
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near-perfect prices of goods and services in any location, taking into account currency 
exchanges, and it eliminates any opportunities for arbitrage, as there are no financial frictions 
arising from trade barriers (Isard, 1977). Theoretically, eliminating trade barriers can increase 
a country’s level of trade openness, as it encourages more imports and exports between 
countries (Madsen, 2009). Various empirical studies have found a negative relationship 
between trade barriers and economic growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 
1995). Thus, eliminating tariff barriers can benefit an economy in a number of ways. Firstly, 
exporting firms can become more competitive through international exposure, leading to 
efficiency gains through a larger market segment and economies of scale, which has positive 
spillover effects (Baldwin and Gu, 2004). International exposure can also benefit firms through 
productivity gains gained from export-led learning and product specialisation (Reppas and 
Christopoulous, 2005). However, these findings may be conditional, as Baldwin and Gu (2004) 
find that many exporters were innovative before and after export markets, suggesting that these 
firms were naturally competitive beforehand. Furthermore, many of these firms in developed 
countries benefit from political stability and deep institutional development that may have 
positive spillover effects, which may not be present in developing countries.  
In addition to increased growth, trade openness can benefit a country through increased 
investment following liberalisation (Papageorgiou et al., 1991). Such benefits may come in the 
form of foreign direct investment from multinational firms, which can increase the amount of 
capital stock thus promoting economic growth, as foreign investment can substitute for 
domestic capital investment (Tekin, 2012). However, in the long-term, these investments 
converge to a steady state due to the diminishing returns to capital as suggested by neo-classical 
growth theories. On the other hand, foreign investment by multinational corporations in 
developing countries can benefit from technological diffusion and knowledge gains 
(Borensztein et al., 1998). The accumulation in knowledge can lead to sustained growth 
through technological progress in many endogenous growth models. Technological diffusion 
from foreign firms can occur through backward and forward linkages between domestic and 
foreign firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999), the mobility of labour from foreign to domestic 
firms (Markusen and Trofimenko, 2009) and through demonstration and competition effects 
(Gorg and Greenaway, 2004). As a result, many developing countries have developed policies 
to promote foreign direct investment during the 1990s. For example, trade policy reforms and 
liberalising foreign direct investment was an essential part of India’s reforms and allowed it to 
increase its total volume of investment in the economy (Ahluwalia, 2002). Similarly, foreign 
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direct investment in China promotes access to the accumulation of technology and management 
skills. This is a crucial channel for growth, as it promotes capital accumulation and 
technological transfer arising from trade liberalisation (Kotwal et al., 2011).  
Various academics have empirically linked foreign investment to economic growth, with 
mixed results. Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) have questioned whether openness to trade and foreign 
investment is necessary for rapid growth, as they find that Mexico’s growth is modest 
compared to China’s growth during economic reforms. This may arise from the fact that China 
had a much lower economic level during its initial reforms, than did Mexico, so the conditions 
for convergence are more accessible for China. In addition, Mexico may be unlucky in terms 
of exporting goods similar to those that China sells (Hanson, 2010). Similarly, other research 
has also shown mixed results. Alfaro et al. (2004) have found that lack of development of local 
financial markets can adversely limit an economy’s ability to take advantage of foreign direct 
investment, implicitly suggesting that both policies of financial liberalisation and policies of 
economic growth are mutual and imply the importance of institutional development.  
Developing countries may not realise the benefits of trade, as their economies have different 
development strategies and growth paths. It is well established that not all trade reforms have 
been useful, as there are other important factors to consider (Singh, 2010). For example, 
Krueger (1998) emphasises that developing countries undergo various structural changes and 
are reliant on labour-intensive services that have implications on an economy’s production 
function. Additionally, there may be a number of institutional conditions that a country must 
establish in order to attract foreign direct investment, such as adopting privatisation policies to 
stimulate inward foreign investment or implementing tax and legal reforms with incentives for 
foreign investors (Lansbury et al., 1996). Furthermore, in the context of growth theories, many 
developing countries lack the human capital development that would allow them to absorb the 
full benefits of superior foreign technologies (Kneller et al., 2008). These issues imply that 
developing countries lack the deep institutional development by which they could fully seize 
the benefits from trade.  
3.6 Institutional Development 
The determinants of economic growth discussed in the previous sections suggest that the link 
between the determinants and economic growth is unclear, as contradictory findings emerge 
especially in the context of developing countries. A common contributor to the complex 
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relationship between these determinants can be traced to the quality of the institutions within 
the countries examined. The quality of institutional development in a country, both formal and 
informal, can be a significant driver of economic growth as it aligns the incentives of private 
and social returns together, thus affecting the role of financial development, trade and other 
growth-enhancing policies (Acemoglu et al., 2001; North, 1987; Rodrik et al., 2004). Others 
examine the persistent long-term effects of institutions throughout history, such as the effects 
of colonialization or legal origins, and they find that it has profound impacts on current 
institutional settings and economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Tabellini, 2000). Although institutional development in general can be beneficial, developing 
countries may benefit from specific institutional settings. In this section, we provide a 
background of various institutional factors that can affect economic growth. 
“Institutions” is a loose term, as it includes financial banks and markets. As the role of financial 
development has already been discussed, the term “institutions” here refers to other institutions 
that do not include banks and financial institutions such as shadow banks, insurance 
corporations and so forth. Institutions can be defined as humanly devised constraints that 
structure humanly devised interaction, made up of formal and informal constraints and 
enforcement characteristics (North, 1987). Similarly, Greif (2006) defines an institution as a 
system of social factors that conjointly generates a regularity of behaviour. This regularity of 
behaviour is crucial in understanding the channels that institutional development exert on 
economic growth, as it aligns incentives of private and social returns together. This alignment 
implies that institutions can directly and indirectly affect economic growth, and as a result, one 
must understand the channels it promotes. For example, some academics encourage the 
development of market-oriented institutions and policies which are strongly related to 
economic growth, such as the protection of property rights, competition, appropriate incentives 
and sound money to promote economic growth (Haan et al., 2006).  
Additionally, market-oriented institutions may be related to economic freedom that promotes 
free personal choice and the freedom of exchange. The protection of private property or 
property rights allows investment in research and development to be productive, thus 
encouraging technological progress for long-term economic growth (Park and Ginarte, 1998). 
In such a way, the protection of property rights incentivises individuals or firms to pursue 
innovation from both domestic and foreign resources, without the expropriation of private 
property. This allows individuals and firms to obtain super-normal profits that can be 
57 
 
reinvested. Thus, property rights affect economic growth indirectly, through knowledge 
accumulation and innovation. 
Property rights must be enforced, however, with an effective legal and judicial system. A well-
functioning and reliable legal system are crucial in enabling property rights and many other 
institutions to perform adequately for economic growth (Berggren and Jorhahl, 2005; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). Legal institutions have been found to be a crucial condition for economic 
growth in many previous and recent studies (Anderlini et al., 2014; Cross, 2002; Haggard and 
Tiede, 2011; Rodrik et al., 2004). The channels through which legal institutions affect 
economic growth are indirect, as they allow other institutions to perform effectively. 
Interestingly, some academics find that legal institutions affect innovation, as they can 
influence the technological development of goods and services. For example, many products 
and services are bounded by the legal safety requirements imposed on them. Thus, technology 
and legal rules are suggested to coevolve (Anderlini et al., 2014). In fact, it is claimed that a 
flexible legal system can encourage further technological progress, as rigid legal systems can 
lead to opportunity cost and excessive research and development costs (ibid.).  
The channels through which the legal system affects growth are endogenous, as it affects 
property rights. Similarly, legal systems perform an influential role in the financial system. 
Levine et al. (2000) have suggested that different legal and accounting systems can vary in 
financial development. The legal environment is vital to financial development and economic 
growth, as it endogenously affects them by the enforcement and strengthening of property 
rights (Levine et al., 2000). Similarly, previous empirical work on the transitional economies 
of Central Eastern Europe has shown that rule of law and legal enforcement have an 
endogenous effect on economic growth via an increase in financial intermediation (McNulty 
et al., 2007). In the context of economic growth, stricter protection for outside investors’ rights 
and higher levels of trust between citizens increases the depth, breadth and efficiency of the 
economy, thus indirectly affecting economic growth.  
The historical roots of institutions can also profoundly impact current economic growth. Legal 
differences, such as Civil or Common Law8, and investor protection are today derived from 
                                                          
8 Common Law is suggested to have greater judicial independence than Civil Law, which is suggested to be 
associated with stronger government interference and regulation. As a result, countries that employ Common Law 
is suggested to have more secure investor rights, less regulation and more efficient governments. See La Porta et 
al. (2008). 
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relatively few legal families and have been suggested to shape the economy, causing real 
consequences for growth (Fergusson, 2006). Likewise, La Porta et al. (2000) and Beck et al. 
(2014a) have suggested that legal foundations and frameworks matter for financial 
development. La Porta et al. (2000) claim that common law countries have enjoyed economic 
outcomes superior to civil law countries, and thus this distinction is regarded as a determinant 
of growth today. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the institutional foundations of 
prosperity were laid in the 19th century, where historic differences caused growth in income, 
industrialisation and financial development. Other research in the history of economics 
examines the influence of ancestry on a person’s income. For example, having ancestors from 
individualistic cultures can affect whether a person is self-employed and research-oriented 
(Hansen, 2013). Nevertheless, the interpretation of legal origins has evolved over time and that 
the economic consequences of legal origins may be proxies for other causes (La Porta et al., 
2008). The impact of globalisation may lead to a faster exchange of ideas, including the transfer 
of legal knowledge rather than referring to the basic idea of civil law versus the market support 
of the common law. Thus, there is scope to further understand whether legal origins influence 
economic growth through legal rules and, if so, which legal rules and regulations are likely to 
move forward.  
The incentives of an agent can also be affected by informal institutions that are deeply rooted 
in culture. Culture is an important aspect of institutions, as some view culture as a more 
primitive phenomenon embodied in values and preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). These 
customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit do not change 
drastically from generation to generation, so they can substantially influence institutions (Guiso 
et al., 2006). This observation has been supported by Greif (2006), who suggests a subset of 
rational cultural beliefs that captures people's expectations with respect to actions. Informal 
institutions played an important role in China’s early reforms, particularly during the 
implementation of the Household Responsibility System, where famers did not own any land 
yet continued production. However, the interpretation of culture may evolve over time, and the 
rapid transmission and exchange of ideas, due to globalisation, can affect its evolution.  
It may be more realistic to consider both formal and informal institutions, as growth is a 
complex phenomenon (Fergusson, 2006). In fact, formal and informal institutions may 
complement one another. A stark example of such coordination can be found during the early 
stages of economic reforms in China, where the economy relied on both formal and informal 
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financing sources to spur economic growth. As mentioned earlier, culture may play a 
significant role here, as according to Allen et al. (2005), family and friends were the most 
common source of funds during early stages of the business, emphasizing the family-oriented 
culture of China. This possibility echoes a similar view by MacLeod (2007), who suggested 
that parties may rely upon informal reputation mechanisms for enforcement rather than the 
legal system. In this case, trust and reliance affect economic development, individual 
performance, financial development, participation in financial markets and innovation in place 
of the formal legal system. Furthermore, Alesina and Giulano (2015) suggest that culture and 
institutions interact in complementary ways that can determine the wealth of nations. 
Understanding the interaction and channels of formal and informal institutions is vital, as these 
can vary across cultures.  
In addition to informal institutions, the more formal political landscape can substantially impact 
economic growth. For example, corruption is a symptom of low-quality institutions and can 
adversely affect growth (Ugur, 2014). He emphasised that corruption is a symptom of 
underlying institutional weaknesses that enable the political elite to bribe. Corruption is 
suggested to include taxes on individuals or firms, as it reduces incentives to invest, creating 
opportunity costs (Rivera-Batiz, 2002). Similarly, corrupt government officials may increase 
spending on unproductive capital that facilitates rent-seeking as opposed to increasing 
productive investments in health and education (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999). Thus, reducing 
corruption can encourage technological change through investment in productive capital. Other 
researchers have examined the role of democracy on economic growth. On the one hand, 
democratic processes are associated with improved governance, allowing for more favourable 
external conditions for growth (Plümper and Martin, 2003). Yet, a number of studies find that 
democratic processes can increase macroeconomic stability (Yang, 2011), particularly for 
developing countries, and can actually negatively impact economic growth as it shifts resources 
from long-term investments (Assiotis and Sylwester, 2015). Hence, the effects of the political 
landscape can be beneficial for creating economic growth through making governments 
accountable to the general public.  
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Economic growth has always been an important research agenda. This chapter begins by 
introducing theories of economic growth emphasising the importance of physical capital, 
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labour and human capital as well as technological progress. The identification of the proximate 
determinants of growth remains inadequate for policymakers to stimulate economic growth, as 
there are vast differences in income across countries. The chapter systematically reviews the 
fundamental determinants of economic growth that may foster growth through the proximate 
determinants of growth. Financial systems are responsible for various functions, such as 
acquiring information and exerting corporate governance, that can nurture economic growth 
through capital accumulation and technological innovation. Similarly, governments perform 
an important role in economic growth by fostering human capital formation with productive 
investments in health and education, as well as by developing a conducive environment for the 
economy through assurance of safety and infrastructure investments. In addition, geographical 
factors such as physical geography indirectly affect economic growth, as it can provide 
geographic advantages while the growth of cities and urbanisation has fostered the 
development of industrial clusters and agglomeration economies. Furthermore, the rise in 
international trade has encouraged many countries to be more open towards import and export 
markets, leading to an increase in knowledge diffusion and technology transfer across countries 
as well as facilitating foreign investment. Finally, institutional development indirectly affects 
the aforementioned fundamental determinants of economic growth as it aligns the incentives 
of private and social agents within the economy, which can stimulate economic growth. Despite 
the weight of evidence for these determinants of growth being fundamental, another common 
finding is that these policies are country-specific and dependent on a host of factors. This 
stipulation implies that the examination of economic growth in individual countries is more 
productive, as economic growth is a complex phenomenon and all countries experience 
different growth patterns. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. The exclusive examination of China 
benefits from individual country examination and avoids the assumptions of cross-country 
regression, such as controlling for endogeneity between countries. Additionally, conducting 
research on China seems to offer the opportunity to examine an emerging country with 
numerous reforms in both the banking and financial sector, as covered in Chapter 2. Banking 
reforms which began in 1978 led to the development of both banking and capital markets as 
various foreign banks entered the Chinese financial system, as well as to the establishment of 
Shanghai Stock exchange in 1990 and Shenzhen in 1991 (Berger et al., 2009). Although the 
general consensus seems to suggest financial development causes economic growth, the 
relationship between the two is suggested to be complex and nonlinear.  
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Thus, identifying a nonlinear relationship between financial development and economic 
growth may provide a deeper understanding of China’s reforming financial system, which is 
dominated by state-owned banks. Additionally, many reforms cohere to institutional 
development and, thus, provide another avenue of research, such as the identification of 
relevant institutions which affect economic growth. China provides an interesting case study 
for institutional changes, as the government has adopted many experimental and gradual 
reforms. Decentralisation reforms were an integral part of China’s successful reforms, as the 
Central government gradually delegated responsibility to the provincial governments to be 
more accountable. This experimental reform may be interesting, as the government created 
institutions that were China-specific and allow the Central government and provincial 
governments similar incentives. In a way, China institutionalised its governments to be more 
accountable, so examining provincial government expenditures may offer interesting insights. 
Finally, China’s geography, large and topographically diverse with both coastal and landlocked 
regions, may have implications in the context of productivity, as geographical factors can affect 
factor mobility between provinces. Examining the production function while considering 
spatial distances can provide interesting inferences. 
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Chapter 4: Examining the Nonlinear Relationship Between Economic 
Growth and Financial Development in China’s Provinces 
4.1 Introduction 
“The Chinese growth miracle” is a phrase that refers to the economic performance post-reform 
China has achieved. China’s financial system is relatively underdeveloped, however, despite 
its 40 years of successful reforms (Allen et al., 2015). Countries with better developed financial 
systems tend to enjoy a sustained period of growth as finance drives economic growth (Levine, 
1997). China’s financial system, however, is dominated by four large state-owned banks which 
are directly controlled by the government. These state-owned banks are relatively inefficient 
compared to the other partially privatised and foreign banks that operate in China, raising 
concerns regarding the efficient reallocation of resources to productive firms (Berger et al., 
2009). Furthermore, these state-owned banks typically provide financial resources to state-
owned enterprises, denying resources to more efficient, private enterprises (Liu and Zhang, 
2018). In addition, the development of China’s stock and bond market is not comparable to 
that of the banking sector. Although the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange have seen significant growth and progress, they may not be as effective in allocating 
resources in the economy (Allen et al., 2015). In spite of these imbalances, China’s 
dysfunctional financial system has played a major role in surviving past financial crises, such 
as the Asian financial crisis and the recent global financial crisis, where the government cleared 
non-performing loans using its foreign reserves (ibid.). The history and development of China’s 
financial system and reforms provide an interesting case study to examine the impact of 
financial development on China’s economic growth.  
There is consensus that financial development promotes economic growth, demonstrated by 
the early seminal works of Goldsmith (1969) and King and Levine (1993). Financial systems 
exist to ease market frictions, such as information and transaction costs, where intermediaries 
and markets can mobilise savings, allocate resources, and facilitate risk management that can 
promote capital accumulation and technological progress (Levine, 1997). These channels to 
growth are well established in the literature, as traditional growth models highlight the 
importance of capital accumulation, which leads to steady-state growth (Lucas, 1988), and of 
technological progress, which allows new production processes or goods to shift the frontier 
(Romer, 1990). On the other hand, however, over the last few decades, the world has 
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experienced a number of financial crises. Financial crises are caused in part by unstable and 
weak systems and may have adverse effects on a country’s economy, such as contagion (Law 
and Singh, 2014). It is no surprise that recent empirical work examining the role of financial 
development in promoting economic growth suggests this role is weakening, as there may be 
other factors, such as institutional quality or inflation levels, that influence the effects of finance 
on growth (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). Similarly, a number of empirical studies have 
suggested that a threshold exists at which the effects of financial development start to disappear 
or become negative to growth after a certain threshold (Breitenlechner et al., 2015; Samargandi 
et al., 2015). In other words, the positive effects of the reallocation of financial resources may 
become less conducive to growth over time, providing diminishing returns (Zhang and 
Bezemer, 2016). Furthermore, oversized financial sectors may be costlier, as financial depth 
makes financial crises more likely (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). The recent weight of 
evidence against the effects of financial development and the dominance of state-owned banks 
in China’s financial system makes it a compelling case study for the examination of the 
relationship between finance and growth or the finance–growth nexus. 
In this study, we examine the role of financial development on economic growth in China’s 
provinces using dynamic panel models from 1996 to 2015. More importantly, in this study, we 
examine the nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth using the U-test 
proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010), that statistically tests for nonlinearity. The test examines 
the sufficient conditions for the existence of a U-shape curve. This study contributes to the 
literature, as to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that statistically tests for the 
nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth in provincial-level China as 
previous studies do not formally account for nonlinearity (Liu and Zhang, 2018; Zhang and 
Bezemer, 2016). Additionally, this study contributes empirical evidence to the growing 
literature suggesting the weakening relationship of finance and economic growth 
(Breitenlechner et al., 2015; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Samargandi et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, in this study, we use an updated and extended dataset that covers the period after 
the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, 
contributing further empirical evidence to the finance-growth literature in Chinese provincial-
level studies. In addition, in this study, we also examine the effects of institutional 
development, measured by the effects of private investment, the level of innovation and the 
rule of law, that is generally overlooked in previous studies that examine finance-growth in 
provincial-level China. In Chapter 2, we observe that economic reforms with regards to the 
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legal aspects in China can have profound impacts on growth in the economy (Yao and Yueh, 
2009). Moreover, in Chapter 3, it is suggested that institutional development, in terms of the 
establishment of the judicial and institutional system, can provide significant impact on the 
economy and spillover to other sectors of the economy (Aschauer, 1989). 
Previous studies that examine the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth in China have produced mixed findings. Studies examining China during the early 
reform periods observe that financial development did not play a large role in promoting 
economic growth as it depended on informal finance (Allen et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
finance-growth examinations on China from the 1990s onwards generally tend to find a 
positive relationship between the two, as China was gradually reforming its financial system 
(Cheng and Degryse, 2010; Hao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012). Recent empirical findings, 
however, indicate that financial development impedes the growth of the real economy (Liu and 
Zhang, 2018; Zhang and Bezemer, 2016). In addition, province-level studies avoid the issue of 
cross-country panel studies, which assume that all countries follow the same balanced growth 
path; thus, this study benefits from examination of an individual country and allows for the 
identification of country-specific policies (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). Furthermore, the 
analysis employs dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators to control for 
endogeneity. In addition, in order to dampen the influence of short-term fluctuations and 
business cycles, all considered variables are averaged over three-year periods in order to focus 
on the long-term relationship (Hao, 2006). Equally important, the use of averaged data reduces 
the endogeneity problem found in the finance-growth literature (Hasan et al., 2009; Levine et 
al., 2000). This empirical study attempts to determine whether previous financial crises have 
affected the ability of financial development to spur economic growth, particularly within the 
setting of China, where state-owned banks are inefficient because they preferentially lend to 
larger corporations and state-owned enterprises and have cleared non-performing loans as a 
result of past financial crises. 
The estimated results show that financial development has a positive and significant impact on 
economic growth. This result contrasts the recent evidence that find financial development to 
be negative to economic growth (Liu and Zhang, 2018; Zhang and Bezemer, 2016). One must 
be wary, however, as it is important as well to note that the differences in estimations may 
result from the choice of financial development variables. Nonetheless, the estimated findings 
also support the view of a weakening finance–growth nexus, as financial development exerts a 
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significant nonlinear inverse U-shape effect on economic growth. The presence of nonlinearity 
passes the stringent Lind and Mehlum (2010) test that formally establishes that an inverse U-
shape exist. Thus, this chapter offers further evidence in the debate over the weakening effects 
of financial development on economic growth. It may suggest that excessive financialisation 
in China may lead to investment that may not be productive and it may suggest that the effect 
of capital inputs is converging towards its steady state. Furthermore, recent evidence may also 
suggest that fast credit growth in China may have been affected by the leading effect of housing 
prices (Shen et al., 2016). Investments in real estate are usually risky; even though they 
generate capital gains, they do not increase future output, as these investments does not directly 
increase the efficiency and productivity of an economy (Mazzucato and Wray, 2015). 
Furthermore, the obvious suspects in the excessive financialisation in China are the four state-
owned banks that have dominated the financial system plus China’s Central Bank, the People’s 
Bank of China, which has been biased towards the development of these four state-owned 
banks. These observations may suggest suboptimal allocation of resources through China’s 
financial system, which leads to a lower level of economic growth (Zhang and Bezemer, 2016). 
The estimated results provide policy implications for further reforms. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief literature review on 
the relationship between economic growth and financial development. This section focuses on 
the development of the literature and the recent issues on the finance–growth relationship. 
Section 4.3 reviews the development of China’s financial system and highlights previous 
empirical research examining the finance–growth relationship in China. Section 4.4 describes 
the data sample, variables, and econometric specifications. Section 4.5 presents this study’s 
results and discussion. This chapter concludes in Section 4.6 with policy implications and 
avenues for future research. 
4.2 Economic Growth and Financial Development 
Financial development plays an important role in producing economic growth, as financial 
systems allocate funds from unproductive uses to productive ones. Early empirical work on the 
relationship between finance and growth has highlighted the positive relationship between 
financial instruments and their development, on the one hand, and economic development, on 
the other (Goldsmith, 1969). However, Goldsmith (1969) cautiously concluded the existence 
and development of the financial system is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
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economic growth. The issue of determining a causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth is complicated, and the possibility of other factors 
influencing economic growth must be accounted for or controlled for. Following the work of 
Goldsmith (1969), various empirical studies have shed more light on the relationship between 
finance and growth. For example, in a cross-sectional examination of 77 countries, King and 
Levine (1993) extend empirical research on the finance–growth nexus and find a positive 
association between financial development and economic growth. Furthermore, the role of 
stock markets in promoting economic growth has provided positive results in Levine and 
Zervos (1998), who reported that both banking and market-based indicators are positively 
related to economic growth. Moreover, Levine (1997) emphasises that legal systems and 
institutions matter for the evolution and development of an efficient financial system that can 
foster growth. Despite the weight of evidence suggesting the positive effects of financial 
development on growth, these studies suffer from weaknesses through the use of cross-
sectional examinations that are prone to endogeneity issues, namely because of the omitted 
variable bias. 
A more formal methodology to illustrate causality would be the use of time-series analysis. 
This econometric methodology was utilised in various empirical works that contributed to the 
empirical debate on the finance–growth nexus. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) provided some 
evidence supporting both the supply-leading hypothesis and a bidirectional or demand- 
following hypothesis. The demand-following hypothesis suggests that financial development 
occurs as a result of economic growth, while the view that finance promotes growth is known 
as the supply-leading hypothesis (McKinnon, 1973). Subsequent analysis of time series yielded 
similar results (Luintel and Khan, 1999; Shan et al., 2001). Time-series econometrics examine 
countries on an individual basis, allowing for more comparative studies between countries. 
Therefore, time-series examination benefits from a more formal methodology of causality and 
provides an in-depth understanding of financial development and the environment of individual 
countries. However, there are problems with time-series data, such as the need for a relatively 
extended data period, which can be an issue particularly in the context of a developing or 
emerging country—the focus of this study. Time series data from developing countries is often 
limited and faces issues of missing data. Such a problem may not allow accounting for optimum 
lags into account. As a result, recent empirical work on the finance–growth nexus employs 
panel estimation techniques, as it considers both the cross-sectional element and the dimension 
of time. Similarly, early studies using panel econometrics to examine the finance–growth nexus 
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generally support the view that financial development promotes economic growth (Calderón 
and Liu, 2003; Fung, 2009; Rioja and Valev, 2004). 
The burgeoning empirical literature on the role of financial development on growth provides 
vast evidence supporting the positive effects of finance on growth. However, recent research 
has found contrasting evidence against the finance–growth nexus. Over the last few decades, 
financial systems in the world economy have developed rapidly. Financialisation, however, 
may have come at a cost, as the world has seen an increase in the frequency of financial crises 
over the last few decades (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Consequently, some have suggested 
that the effect of finance on growth is a weakening one, due to an increased incidence of 
financial crises; this suggestion implies that a country’s infrastructure must be well developed 
before financial liberalisation (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). Furthermore, some claim that 
economic recessions are prolonged when accompanied by excessive financialisation, thus 
creating a negative feedback loop (Jordà et al., 2013). Other empirical studies have found that 
financial development can be negative and non-monotonic to economic growth, demonstrating 
that the effect of financial development on growth exhibits a nonlinear inverse U-shape 
(Breitenlechner et al., 2015; Samargandi et al., 2015). Similarly, Law and Singh (2014) provide 
empirical results indicating that there is a finance threshold above which the impact of finance 
on growth will become negative. As a result, re-examining the role of finance is essential, 
particularly during periods of excessive financial development. 
Logically, the view that financial development decreases growth may seem counter-intuitive, 
as the role of financial systems is to mobilise savings and to efficiently reallocate funds to their 
most productive use. However, this relationship may not always hold true for many developing 
countries, which lack the institutional infrastructure and development to support strong 
governance and protect investors (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). In addition, some have 
suggested that financial deepening may be insignificant for low-income countries, as they lack 
a certain threshold of capital accumulation to contribute to productivity growth (Rioja and 
Valev, 2004). It is observed that many developing countries are characterised by less developed 
and more inefficient financial systems (Samargandi et al., 2015). Furthermore, claims have 
recently been made that financial development has supported financing capital gains through 
real estate and financial asset markets (Jordà et al., 2014). Other empirical research has found 
similar trends by which financial development has moved towards reallocating finance to 
productive investment and innovation (Bezemer et al., 2016; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2013). 
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Although financing real estate and financial asset markets can generate capital gains, they are 
susceptible to bubbles and speculation and do not directly enhance the efficiency or 
productivity of firms (Werner, 2012). As China’s financial system is dominated by the four 
state-owned banks, it may be interesting to observe whether financial deepening and the 
reallocation of resources improves productivity and enhances growth.  
4.3 Financial Development in China 
China’s financial system has experienced drastic changes and reforms over time, transitioning 
from a centrally planned economy to one of the powerhouses of the emerging market. One of 
the puzzles that surrounds post-reform China is that its economy experiences strong growth 
despite having a relatively underdeveloped financial system. Prior to its reform, Mao Zedong 
nationalised a number of capitalist firms and institutions and allowed the People’s Bank of 
China as the only central and commercial bank of its financial system in 1950 (Hess, 2014). 
Thus, the Chinese economy was centrally planned, and the government inefficiently directed 
and allocated resources to its state-owned enterprises (Berger et al., 2009). Later on, when 
China began its reforms in 1978, the People’s Bank of China became independent from the 
Ministry of Finance and was established as China’s Central Bank (Allen et al., 2015). 
Meanwhile four other state-owned banks were put in place to handle commercial transactions: 
the Bank of China, specialising in foreign trade and investment; the People’s Construction 
Bank of China, to focus on fixed investment; the Agriculture Bank of China, to deal with rural 
transactions; and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, to assume any commercial 
activities that previously remained with the People’s Bank of China (Yao and Yueh, 2009).  
Although the four state-owned banks dominated the financial system throughout the 1980s, a 
number of smaller regional banks, rural and urban credit cooperatives were also established 
during this period (Allen et al., 2005). On the other hand, the independence of the People’s 
Bank of China, its Central Bank, is at question, as interest rate policies were always biased 
towards state-led development leading towards financial repression (Lu and Yao, 2009). In 
fact, these state-owned banks were so large and dominant that they accounted for more than 
90% of the total amount of formal bank credit in China during the 1990s (Bai et al., 1999). In 
addition to the dominant nature of these banks, the banking sector also suffers from extensive 
corruption, which contributed to its financial repression (Chen and Feng, 2000). As a result of 
these issues, during the 1990s China implemented further reforms to the financial system, 
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introducing two domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, as well as reforms promoting competition through decentralisation to provide 
local banks with more profit incentives (Allen et al., 2015). Furthermore, in 1994, China 
established three policy banks to assume the responsibility of policy lending from the state-
owned banks, reducing its influence in the economy (Zhang et al., 2012). China’s financial 
reforms during its entry to the WTO in 2001 saw an increase in the presence of foreign banks 
and further interest rate liberalisation, alongside increased regulation and supervision (Hao, 
2006). These changes meant further development of cost-efficient banks as well as substantial 
improvements regarding management and corporate governance as China established the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2003, increasing the regulation of its financial 
system (Berger et al., 2009).  
It is evident that China’s gradual reforms of its financial system meant that throughout its 
reforms, China had a relatively weak financial system that may have been lacking in 
governance. China was unique in the sense that it experienced high growth during the reforms, 
as many developing countries generally suffer from a relatively weak legal and financial system 
(Allen et al., 2005). Some argue that China’s financial repression actually contributed to 
China’s growth, as it helped maintain financial stability during reforms (Li, 2001). 
Furthermore, several empirical researchers have found that financial intermediation positively 
impacts economic growth and promotes efficient capital allocation in China (Cheng and 
Degryse, 2010; Hao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012). However, it has been suggested that the 
efficient allocation of funding through China’s formal financial system might be unnecessary, 
as foreign money and capital continues to flow into China. In contrast, a number of empirical 
studies have found that financial development is insignificant or negative with respect to 
economic growth (Boyreau-Debray, 2013; Liu and Zhang, 2018; Zhang and Bezemer, 2016). 
China’s dependence on foreign funds, moreover, may not be sustainable in the long-term, and 
there is a need for China to address this dependency (Guo and Huang, 2010). While both sides 
may have offered valid arguments and provided empirical evidence to support their claims, 
there are no studies, to the best of our knowledge, that formally address nonlinearity in China’s 
finance–growth nexus. As the role of financial development in China is continually evolving 
due to the gradual reforms it implements, the role of finance may not be as linear as one would 
expect; thus, investigating the nonlinearity of China’s finance–growth nexus may deepen our 
understanding of China. 
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4.4 Empirical Methodology 
This section discusses the econometric model employed in this study and describes and justifies 
the variables used. 
4.4.1 Dynamic Panel Regression 
The literature has demonstrated that there are various approaches to examining the effects of 
financial development on economic growth. In this examination of China’s provinces over the 
sample time-period, the data collected is in panel form, thus making panel analysis suitable. 
However, there are various panel methodologies that can be employed to control for 
endogeneity, focusing on controlling for fixed and random effects or differencing the equation. 
In this chapter, the first-difference GMM and the system GMM estimation are employed. Many 
previous empirical studies that have used panel data to examine the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth employ a Barro (1991) styled regression 
augmented with financial-development indicators.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜐𝑖𝑡 
𝜐𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐
2)            (4.1) 
Equation (4.1) presents a generic growth regression. In each cross-section, there are i provinces 
that operate over t sample time-period. Vector 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the proxy for economic growth, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector of independent variables, such as financial development, and other control variables. 
Vectors of parameters are 𝛽, and the error term 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is composed of 𝜇𝑖, the province-specific, 
time-invariant effect errors that are fixed over time, and the time-varying random error 𝜐𝑖𝑡, 
which is independent and identically distributed. Estimating a regression by employing a 
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) may result in omitted variable bias, as 𝜇𝑖 is unobserved 
and may be correlated with one of the independent variables because it is fixed over time, 
causing serial correlation. Thus, controlling for 𝜇𝑖 requires more efficient estimation 
techniques.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡             (4.2) 
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Moreover, a dynamic panel estimation includes the lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, on the 
right-hand side as shown in Equation (4.2) and 𝛾 as a vector of parameter. This approach may 
result in endogeneity and violates the condition of exogeneity. Therefore, the fixed-effect, 
random-effect and first-difference estimators cannot be used, as they require an assumption of 
exogeneity. Furthermore, a relatively small time-period can lead to bias, as the number of 
observations increases since the fixed-effect estimator depends on t as 𝛾 (Nickell, 1981). 
Similarly, as the random-effect model leads to correlation and bias due to quasi-demeaning 
between the transformed lagged dependent and error term. The first-difference residual will 
also lead to bias, since 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 depends on 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 when first-differenced, yet at the same time 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is also a function of the explanatory variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). In this 
case, the first-difference estimation is unsuitable for the dynamic panel, as the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term. 
A number of econometric models are suitable for dealing with the endogeneity that arise with 
dynamic panels. The GMM requires a set moment conditions based on the underlying 
assumption of the econometric model (Imbens et al., 1998). Thus, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggest using a GMM approach building on the first-difference estimator and its conditions, 
where the first-difference of Equation (4.2) is taken to eliminate province-specific effects 𝜇𝑖, 
producing Equation (4.3): 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝛾Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  +  Δ𝜇𝑖𝑡,               (4.3) 
as there are no instruments at period t = 1 or t = 2 and as there is a total of 
(𝑇−1)(𝑇−2)
2
 moment 
conditions for Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1. The instruments here deal with the endogeneity of the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and the 
serial correlation caused by the new error terms, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 −  𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 = Δ𝜇𝑖𝑡. The first-difference 
GMM estimator uses the following moment conditions based on the assumption that 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is not 
serially correlation and that 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is weakly exogenous. The first-difference GMM moment 
conditions are presented in Equation (4.4). 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠, (𝜇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1)] = 0              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 ≥ 2;  𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇 
𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠, (𝜇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1)] = 0              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 ≥ 2;  𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇                 (4.4) 
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The Arellano-Bond estimator is known as a first-difference GMM and refers to the instruments 
for regressions in levels which are the lagged differences of the chosen variable, and the 
instruments for regression in differences are the lagged levels. Furthermore, the moment 
conditions can be described through the transformation of Equation (4.5) in matrix form. 
Δ𝑦𝑖. = 𝛽′Δ𝑋𝑖.  +  𝛾Δ𝑦𝑖.,−1  +  Δ𝜇𝑖. 
Δ𝑦𝑖. =  [
Δ𝑦𝑖2
Δ𝑦𝑖3
⋮
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑇
] , Δ𝑋𝑖. =  [
Δ𝑥′𝑖2
Δ𝑥′𝑖3
⋮
Δ𝑥′𝑖𝑇
] , Δ𝑦𝑖.𝑡−1 =  [
Δ𝑦𝑖1
Δ𝑦𝑖2
⋮
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑇−1
] , Δ𝜇𝑖. =  [
Δ𝜇𝑖2
Δ𝜇𝑖3
⋮
Δ𝜇𝑖𝑇
]     (4.5) 
Equation (4.5) produces the following corresponding matrix of instruments for the lagged 
difference, with the moment conditions presented in Equation (4.6). 
𝑊𝑖 =  [
𝑦𝑖1
0
⋮
0
0
𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2
⋮
0
…
…
⋱
…
0
0
⋮
𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇−2
] 
𝐸(𝑊𝑖
′Δ𝜇𝑖) =  0           (4.6) 
Thus, the GMM estimator then applies the formulated moment conditions in Equation (4.7), 
where ?̂?𝐺𝑀𝑀 is a function of [𝛾𝐺𝑀𝑀?̂?𝐺𝑀𝑀]
′
, G is a function of (Δ𝑦−1, Δ𝑋) and Z is a function 
of (𝑊, Δ𝑋). In addition, 𝑆𝑁 is the optimal weight matrix, calculated from initial estimates in 
which ?̂?𝑖. refers to the residuals from the initial estimates. The conditions impose in Equation 
(4.7) is known as the two-step GMM estimator which is considered to be asymptotically more 
efficient than the one-step estimator which only takes the dynamic structure of the error term.  
?̂?𝐺𝑀𝑀 = (𝐺′𝑍𝑆𝑁𝑍
′𝐺)−1𝐺′𝑍𝑆𝑁𝑍′Δ𝑦 
𝑆𝑁 = (∑ 𝑍𝑖.
′𝑁
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑖.?̂?𝑖.
′ 𝑍𝑖)
−1       (4.7) 
On the other hand, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out a major 
weakness in the first-difference GMM test, as first-difference variables are often poor 
instruments. This weakness is more prevalent when variables are close to a random walk or 
persistent over time. Thus, using weak instruments can lead to biases in its samples, as it 
influences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of first-difference estimator 
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(Arellano and Bover, 1995). To deal with this potential problem, Arellano and Bond (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a system in which the regressions are with both 
differences and levels, where the instrument for the estimator is based on the first-difference 
GMM and the instruments for the regressions are the lagged differences of the corresponding 
variable. The system GMM estimator holds when there is no correlation between the 
differences of the variables and province-specific effect 𝜇𝑖. The additional moment conditions 
of system GMM are presented in Equation (4.8). 
𝐸[(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−1)(𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖,𝑡)] = 0              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 1 
𝐸[(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−1)(𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖,𝑡)] = 0              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 1               (4.8) 
This chapter employs the two-step dynamic panel estimators from Equation (4.2), imposed 
with the difference GMM conditions in Equation (4.4) and system GMM conditions in 
Equation (4.4) and Equation (4.8). Both estimators are employed to check for the robustness 
and sensitivity of findings, as both estimators should report broadly similar results. Moreover, 
this analysis examines the robustness of the instruments by reporting the Sargan’s J test of 
instrument validity and over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958). In addition, the Arellano-
Bond test of no serial autocorrelation is reported to satisfy the moment condition, as the 
consistency of the moment condition estimator is based on the assumption that the transformed 
error term is not serially correlated. This assumption is usually tested through the second-order 
autocorrelation, with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the second-order. In the 
examination of the nonlinear relationship between financial development and growth, this 
relationship is formally tested by conducting the U-test proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010). 
The standard approach for estimations to have a U-shape or an inverse U-shape is to include 
square terms. As a result, Equation (4.2) with the inclusion of a squared variable can be re-
written as Equation (4.9). 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜁𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡        (4.9) 
The function f produces a curvature in Equation (4.2), and depending on 𝛽 or 𝜁, it can be U-
shaped or not.  
𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛) < 0 <  𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥)               (4.10) 
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The implied conditions for a U-shape are presented in Equation (4.10) where the U-shape slope 
begins at either negative at the start and positive at the end or vice versa, which occurs at the 
extreme points of the slopes, 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥, in this case the minimum and maximum values 
of financial development. 
𝐻0: 𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛) ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑/𝑜𝑟 𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥) ≤  0      (4.11) 
𝐻1: 𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛) < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑/𝑜𝑟 𝛽 + 𝜁𝑓′(𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥) >  0      (4.12) 
To test that the sufficient conditions for a quadratic relationship are supported by the 
estimations, Lind and Mehlum (2010) suggest testing the following null hypothesis in Equation 
(4.11) or rejecting the combined alternative hypothesis of Equation (4.12) to confirm the 
existence of an inverse U-shape curve. This method allows for a formal procedure to test for 
the presence of the U-shape curve of financial development on economic growth. 
4.4.2 Data and Variables 
The data is compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China9. The National Bureau of 
Statistics of China provides issues of the China Statistical Yearbook, an official publication 
that includes aggregate, provincial and town-level data. Provincial data for 26 Chinese 
provinces from 1996 to 2015 is compiled for all variables used. Gansu, Guangxi, Hebei, Inner 
Mongolia and Tibet are dropped from the sample study due to the unavailability of data. The 
selection of the sample time-period was determined in part by missing data prior to 1995 and 
was not motivated by any other explicit reason.  
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Per capita growth rate (y) 520 0.120 0.052 −0.043 0.265 
Deposits to GDP (dy) 520 1.447 0.625 0.621 5.313 
Loans to GDP (ly) 520 1.087 0.319 0.545 2.265 
Private Investment (pri) 520 0.159 0.090 0.017 0.458 
Innovation (inno) 520 2.423 3.902 0.047 44.056 
Rule of law (law) 520 1.405 1.672 0.151 11.691 
Secondary education (edu) 520 0.373 0.056 0.227 0.494 
Openness to trade (opn) 520 0.609 1.591 0.032 12.561 
Initial per capita GDP (iypc) 520 19459.120 18151.120 1698.605 94974.140 
N refers to the number of observations from 26 provinces during the sample time-period 1995–2015. 
                                                          
9 Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn 
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The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 4.1, prior to the justification of 
the variables employed. The variables presented in Table 4.1. are in levels and are log-
transform for the consequent regressions. Further details of the variables employed can be 
found in the Data Appendix in Table A1.2 in Appendix A1.5. As mentioned in Section 4.4.1., 
previous empirical researches are based on a Barro (1991) styled regression augmented with 
financial development indicators. Thus, building on Equation (4.2), the real per capita GDP 
growth rate is used as the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 to proxy for economic growth. Real per capita 
GDP growth rate is a traditional proxy for economic growth in many empirical studies 
examining the relationship between financial development and growth (King and Levine, 
1993), including province-level investigations in China (Hao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012). In 
addition, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of independent variables, which includes financial development, 
institutional development and control variables. 
Financial development variables are used based on previous province-level examinations of 
China. Traditional variables of financial development used in previous research could not be 
employed at the province level, as the traditional financial development indicators are 
measured at the national level. The Chinese Statistical Yearbook does not provide statistics that 
could provide similar variables at the province level, such as M2 (King and Levine, 1993), nor 
bank credit provided by institutions to the private sector (Levine, 1997). Thus, considering data 
constraints, alternative variables are used to represent China’s financial development based on 
previous provincial research on China. The first variable is the ratio of deposits to GDP, 
denoted by dy, which is the total deposits in banks and financial institutions (Zhang et al., 
2012). Deposits of financial institutions were suggested to be a channel through which financial 
development promotes economic growth, as it overcomes transaction costs of collecting 
savings from individuals and firms, along with information asymmetry (Levine, 1997). 
Furthermore, the deposits benefit from the mobilisation of savings from financial institutions 
that can reallocate resources for most effective use. Annual provincial data is collected for 
deposits, and the ratio is calculated by dividing deposits by annual provincial GDP.  
The second financial development variable is the ratio of loans from banks and financial 
institutions to GDP, denoted by ly, which proxies for the depth of China’s financial sector 
(Hasan et al., 2009). Similarly, loans promote growth by mobilising savings and reallocating 
it in the form of loans that may be more effective in generating returns. Banks and financial 
institutions also benefit from information asymmetry, thus reducing transaction costs. In the 
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case of China, loans are considered more efficient than state budget appropriation regarding 
capital allocation (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008), as it promotes allocation of resources while 
facilitating risk management (Levine, 1997). Annual provincial data for loans is used, and the 
ratio is calculated dividing by annual provincial GDP.  
Furthermore, two additional financial development variables are included that aim to capture 
the nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth. First, dy2 is the squared 
term of dy and ly2, which is the squared term of ly. The squared terms capture possible nonlinear 
effects of financial development on economic activity (Breitenlechner et al., 2015). Research 
suggests that an inverse U-shape relationship between finance and growth may exist and that 
the effects financial development exerts can have an adverse effect on growth during crises, 
reducing its effectiveness in promoting growth (Breitenlechner et al., 2015). As the sample 
time-period covers the Asian financial crisis, the recent global financial crisis and the eurozone 
debt crisis, it may be interesting to observe whether financial development may be effective in 
promoting growth in China. Furthermore, it is well established that China’s financial sector is 
relatively underdeveloped, dominated by a large banking system with the direct influence of 
government ownership (Allen et al., 2005). In theory, this connection may suggest that the 
financial system may not efficiently allocate resources, as it has been well established that these 
state-owned banks generally provide loans to state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the 
ownership structure of these banks helped China through the recent global financial crisis, 
avoiding problems encountered by many major financial institutions in developed countries 
(Allen et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, some research suggests that government ownership of banks can promote long-
term growth especially in the absence of strong regulation (Andrianova et al., 2012). As 
financial reforms lagged behind other economic reforms in China, the strong influence of 
government ownership in banks can potentially promote growth through financing economic 
activity. In addition, the inclusion of squared terms may provide interesting results in relation 
to the effects of financial development in China. It is also important to highlight that although 
the financial development variables are measured at the province-level, banks can technically 
finance across provincial lines. However, in the case of China, the majority of bank activities 
take place within provinces, as cross-provincial bank lending seldom happens due to 
restrictions imposed by the People’s Bank of China. Furthermore, most nonbank financial 
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institutions operate only within a province, so the variables are suitable for this examination 
(Cheng and Degryse, 2010; Hasan et al., 2009).  
In addition to financial development, three institutional development variables are included 
that capture the influence of institutions other than the financial system. The first institutional 
development variable is the total amount of private investment, denoted by pri, which is the 
ratio of private-sector fixed investment to overall fixed investment (Hasan et al., 2009). State 
budget appropriation for fixed asset investment has been suggested to be less efficient 
compared to private funds, as private investments have budget constraints (Guariglia and 
Poncet, 2008). An increase in private investment suggests a more efficient source of funds for 
fixed investment and the overall institutional quality of the province. The second institutional 
development variable measures the level of innovation in China’s provinces, denoted by inno, 
which is the ratio of patents granted to patents accepted. Hasan et al. (2009) employed a similar 
proxy to capture the awareness and respect of intellectual property rights, as an increase in the 
ratio of patents granted reflects the innovative capabilities of the provinces. Furthermore, the 
ratio indirectly captures the awareness of property rights, which can promote economic growth 
(Park and Ginarte, 1997).  
Finally, the rule of law is included, denoted by law, as the third institutional development 
variable, measured by the number of lawyers per 10,000 persons. The rule of law is a difficult 
variable to capture, and the ratio of lawyers to persons is based on previous province-level 
growth examinations on China (Hasan et al., 2009). The increasing presence of lawyers may 
suggest the development of the legal system and promote the quality of the enforcement system 
in China. It is well established that countries with poor legal protection achieve less economic 
growth and financial development (La Porta et al., 1998). As a result, the increase in the 
presence of legal professionals may promote legal protection and lead to further economic 
growth. Also included are traditional control variables used in growth regressions. These 
include the percentage of the population with secondary education attainment, denoted by edu, 
openness to trade which measures the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, denoted by opn, 
and the log of initial or lag real GDP per capita to capture convergence effects, denoted by iypc.  
In addition, prior to model estimation, all considered variables were averaged over three-year 
periods in order to focus on long-term relationships (Hao, 2006). The effects of financial 
development may be immediate, through capital gain, or may take time to realize, through 
investments generating returns over time. Thus, the use of averages diminishes the effect of 
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short-term shocks and business cycles. This approach differs from studies that average only the 
dependent variable and use the initial values for all other independent variables (Hasan et al., 
2009). Averaged data was used for both dependent and independent variables to allow for 
consistency, as using an averaged dependent variable with initial values of independent 
variables may lead to loss of information through inefficiency (Levine et al., 2000).  
Four sets of regressions are computed for the respective first-difference and GMM model in 
order to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimations, which should be broadly similar across all 
findings. Set (1) contains only dy as the financial development variable, represented by 
Equation (4.13). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    (4.13) 
Set (2) contains only ly as the financial development variable, represented by Equation (4.14).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    (4.14) 
Set (3) contains dy and dy2 to capture the nonlinear effects of deposits to GDP on economic 
growth, represented by Equation (4.15). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽7𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    (4.15) 
Finally, Set (4) contains ly and ly2, represented by Equation (4.16), captures the nonlinear 
effects of loans to GDP on economic growth. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽7𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    (4.16) 
We hypothesise that financial development is positive and significant to economic growth, 
however in Sets (3) and (4), financial development should exert a nonlinear effect on economic 
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growth based on the recent weight of evidence that suggests finance to be weakening on 
economic growth. In this case, we expect the squared terms to be either negative or insignificant 
to economic growth. We expect the institutional development variables to be positive and 
significant to economic growth particularly on the level of innovation and the rule of law. The 
level of private investment is more difficult to hypothesise in the case of China, as government 
investment is suggested to be inefficient, however, might be more significant and can dampen 
the effects of private investment. We expect the control variables education and openness to be 
positive and significant to economic growth, based on the endogenous growth theory and the 
literature on the positive effects of trade on economic growth. Additionally, we expect the 
initial per capita GDP (iypc) to be negative and significant to economic growth to demonstrate 
convergence especially since regional disparity is observed. Finally, we expect the U-test to be 
significant for one of the financial development variables to confirm the presence of a U-shaped 
curve. In the case that the U-test is insignificant, we still expect finance to be nonlinear as we 
expect the squared terms to be significant. 
4.5 Estimated Results and Discussion 
Section 4.5. presents this study’s empirical results. The section begins with a brief discussion 
of the summary statistics and correlation matrix. The estimated regressions are then presented, 
and the results and policy implications are considered.  
The summary statistics of the level variables are presented in Table 4.1 in the previous section. 
The variables presented are measured annually and not in three-year averages. Considerable 
variation occurs across provinces and time, suggesting significant heterogeneity in the sample 
size. The sample consists of 26 provinces covering the time period from 1996 to 2015, a period 
when China experienced the Asian financial crisis, the recent global financial crisis, and 
subsequent Eurozone debt crisis. China’s provinces, however, maintained a high growth rate 
at a provincial average of 12% growth annually. In addition, the mean value of dy and ly is 
1.447 and 1.087, respectively, suggesting that the majority of provinces in China experience 
financial deepening, since the financial development variables are as large as their production 
output. The institutional variables exhibit a higher level of variation across time and provinces, 
in particular, inno and law, suggesting that some reforms may have been implemented more 
effectively in some provinces. The control variables also exhibit acceptable display of 
variation. Openness to trade shows strong variation, as it is well established that China 
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implemented its Open Door preferential policies in coastal provinces before extending the 
policies to the interior provinces (Bao et al., 2002).  
The estimated sample correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.2. The correlation matrix 
measures the linear relationship between two variables, where +1 represents perfect positive 
correlation while −1 represents perfect negative correlation. Most of the independent variables 
have a weak and negative relationship to economic growth y. This weakness suggests that the 
relationship between the variables may be nonlinear. Both financial development variables, 
deposits to GDP and loans to GDP presents a negative correlation to economic growth. 
However, correlation coefficients are affected by outliers, and both these variables have high 
levels of variation, as observed in Table 4.1. Although it suggests that finance is negative 
towards economic growth the correlation matrix does not take into account heterogeneity 
across provinces. In addition, the institutional variables, inno and law, and openness to trade, 
opn, have a very weak and negative relationship to economic growth. Meanwhile, private 
investment, pri, and secondary education attainment, edu, is positive to economic growth 
which is expected while initial per capita GDP, iypc, is negative to economic growth which 
implies that convergence is observed.  
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix 
Variable y dy dy2 ly ly2 pri inno law edu opn iy 
y 1.000           
dy −0.105 1.000          
dy2 −0.143 0.837 1.000         
ly −0.268 0.779 0.654 1.000        
ly2 −0.120 0.498 0.747 0.430 1.000       
pri 0.068 −0.175 −0.285 −0.280 −0.138 1.000      
inno −0.062 0.617 0.449 0.328 0.274 0.335 1.000     
law −0.099 0.742 0.728 0.531 0.558 0.115 0.670 1.000    
edu 0.129 −0.142 −0.197 −0.375 −0.167 0.402 0.189 0.035 1.000   
opn −0.045 0.437 0.387 0.259 0.263 −0.106 0.284 0.517 0.054 1.000  
iypc −0.020 0.584 0.450 0.300 0.331 0.431 0.827 0.814 0.261 0.462 1.000 
Definition of variables are in Table 4.1. iypc is log-transformed 
Table 4.3 reports the two-step first-difference GMM estimations. All four estimated sets are 
robust, as they satisfy the conditions of the Arellano-Bond test of no autocorrelation at the 
second order, as the p-value at the second order is larger than 0.05. Furthermore, all estimated 
sets satisfy the Sargan test of overidentification of instruments and thus have valid instruments. 
Moreover, the estimated coefficients provide expected signs and significance for most 
variables. In Set (1) and (2), both financial development indicators are significant and positive 
to economic growth. Furthermore, the institutional and control variables also provide the 
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expected signs and significance. The initial or lagged per capita GDP iypc is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that convergence is observed. Sets (3) and (4) provide 
interesting results. Most of the coefficients exhibit expected signs and significance, except for 
private investment pri.  
Table 4.3: Two-Step First-Difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
1.035*** 1.035*** 1.023*** 1.025*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.037) 
dy 
0.085***  0.105***  
(0.004)  (0.007)  
dy2 
  −0.037***  
  (0.005)  
ly 
 0.005*  0.007* 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
ly2 
   −0.030** 
   (0.010) 
pri 
0.006** 0.004* 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
inno 
0.005** 0.007** 0.006* 0.007** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
law 
0.036*** 0.054*** 0.032*** 0.051*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
edu 
0.078*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.082*** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
opn 
0.012* 0.015* 0.013* 0.016* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
iypc 
−0.056** −0.050** −0.052** −0.050** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
constant 
0.609*** 0.560*** 0.550*** 0.567*** 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.042) (0.031) 
     
N 416 416 416 416 
No. of instruments 144 144 145 145 
Wald Chi2 22143.392 4980.374 6909.254 30636.031 
p-value of Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p-value of AR (1) test 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008 
p-value of AR (2) test 0.320 0.882 0.331 0.849 
Slope of 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛   0.140*** 0.043*** 
Slope of 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥    −0.015* −0.047*** 
Lind-Mehlum U-test   0.439* 0.114*** 
Definition of variables is in Table 4.1. N refers to the number of observations included in the sample. N is lower here than in Table 4.1, as the 
dynamic panel estimations use three-year averages. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Set (1) contains deposits to GDP as the financial development indicator, while Set (2) contains loans to 
GDP instead of deposits. Set (3) and Set (4) include their respective squared terms to account for nonlinearity. 
These estimations also aim to capture the nonlinear effects of financial development. In Set 
(3), deposits to GDP dy is significant at the 1% level and positive towards economic growth. 
However, dy2 is negative and significant at the 1% level. The Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests 
confirm that an inverse U-shape exists, as the null hypothesis is rejected because the U-test’s 
upper and lower bounds are statistically significant. In addition, the lower bound slope of the 
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financial development in 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛 is positive at 0.140, while the upper bound slope 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥, is 
negative at −0.015. Similarly, Set (4) also show that loans to GDP ly is positive and significant 
at the 10% level, along with a negative and significant ly2. The squared variable ly2 passes the 
conditions of the Lind and Mehlum (2010) test, as 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛 is positive and significant at 0.043 and 
while upper bound slope 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 is negative and significant at −0.015., Thus the null hypothesis 
is rejected, and the existence of an inverse U-shape slope is confirmed. 
Table 4.4: Two-Step System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
1.053*** 1.114*** 1.049*** 1.118*** 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) 
dy 
0.086***  0.110***  
(0.006)  (0.012)  
dy2 
  −0.039***  
  (0.008)  
ly 
 0.011**  0.014** 
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
ly2 
   −0.036*** 
   (0.010) 
pri 
0.024*** 0.008** 0.017*** 0.007* 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
inno 
0.008** 0.010** 0.007* 0.010* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
law 
0.031*** 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.058*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
edu 
0.099** 0.095** 0.079*** 0.098*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) 
opn 
0.009* 0.010* 0.009** 0.011* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
iypc 
−0.069** −0.065** −0.064** −0.064** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
constant 
0.778*** 0.723*** 0.698*** 0.718*** 
(0.056) (0.034) (0.055) (0.032) 
     
N 442 442 442 442 
No. of instruments 160 160 161 161 
Wald-Chi2 13346.240 6873.689 5357.854 13478.781 
p-value of Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p-value of AR (1) test 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.004 
p-value of AR (2) test 0.461 0.828 0.404 0.725 
Slope of 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛   0.148*** 0.058*** 
Slope of 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥    −0.097* −0.045*** 
Lind-Mehlum U-test   0.399* 0.188*** 
Definition of variables is in Table 4.1. N refers to the number of observations included in the sample. N is lower than Table 4.1 as the dynamic 
panel estimations use three-year averages. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Set (1) contains deposits to GDP as the financial development indicator, while Set (2) contains loans to GDP instead 
of deposits. Set (3) and Set (4) include their respective squared terms to account for nonlinearity 
Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients and parameters of system GMM. All estimations 
in Table 4.4 are robust, as they satisfy the conditions of the Arellano-Bond test of no 
autocorrelation at the second order, as well as passing the Sargan test for the validity of 
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instruments. The estimated coefficients provide results similar to those of Table 4.3, suggesting 
that the model specification is not sensitive and is consistent throughout its estimations. The 
financial development variables are positive and significant in all sets of estimations, and the 
institutions and control variables also provide expected signs and significance. Furthermore, 
the squared financial development variable in Set (3) and Set (4) satisfies the Lind and Mehlum 
(2010) test, since the lower bound of its estimations are positive and significant and since the 
upper bound is negative and significant. Both reject the null hypothesis and confirm the 
existence of an inverse U-shape. 
The estimated results present an interesting picture for China’s finance–growth nexus. 
Financial development is significant and positive to economic growth in post-reform China. 
The estimations support the finance–growth nexus theory and the supply-leading hypothesis, 
which suggests that financial development promotes channels to growth through the various 
functions it provides. The results also support empirical work indicating that financial 
development is positive to growth in China (Hao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012). Despite the 
evidence suggesting that China has a relatively weak financial system (Allen et al., 2005), loans 
provided by the formal financial system proved to be more effective at promoting capital 
formation and mobilising savings compared to the state budget appropriation in China (Hao, 
2006). Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2012) attribute the positive effects of financial development 
to the financial reforms implemented prior to China’s entry into the WTO, which included 
interest rate liberalisation and an increase in the presence of foreign banks. These foreign banks 
were more efficient than the state-owned banks in China (Berger et al., 2009) and may have 
had a positive spillover effect on the financial system, producing positive effects of finance. In 
addition, although Guarliglia and Poncet (2008) find that financial development and specific 
indicators are negative, they find that the effects are gradually declining over time due to the 
progressive restructuring of the banking sector.  
There are concerns, however, about the increasing numbers of non-performing loans that 
contribute financial repression, as the financial system continues to be affected by bad debt 
(Bonin and Huang, 2001). Furthermore, the dominance of the four state-owned banks has 
created a leakage effect, where credit is controlled and channelled to the inefficient state-owned 
enterprises as opposed to the efficient private enterprises (Yao and Yueh, 2009). On the other 
hand, this effect is nullified, as China benefits from large amounts of foreign capital, allowing 
the government to allocate resources (Berger et al., 2009). As such, efficient allocation of 
84 
 
funding through the financial system within China may not have been as necessary, as they 
have excess funds. The formal financial system therefore still plays an important role in 
Chinese economic growth, as financial repression may have imparted financial stability (Cheng 
and Degryse, 2010; Yao and Yueh, 2009), despite claims that China’s formal financial sector 
is too weak to enforce sound governance (Allen et al., 2005). Furthermore, the significant and 
positive effect of financial development may indicate the effectiveness of financial reforms. In 
a recent study, Allen et al. (2015), however, claim that the large banking sector has been 
instrumental in financing the growth of various firms over the past decade. Yet, these 
imbalances are unsustainable for long-term growth, as the efficient allocation of resources must 
be improved. 
Furthermore, the results find that the effect of financial development is nonlinear, thus 
contributing to the literature that postulates the weakening effects of finance on growth. The 
weakening effect of finance may be attributed to the inefficiency of the state-owned banks that 
have dominated the sector (Hasan et al., 2009) alongside weak legal framework that may have 
limited growth (Cull and Xu, 2003). The nonlinear effect of financial development is observed 
in a number of recent empirical studies, where finance is either negative or insignificant to 
economic growth (Breitenlechner et al., 2015; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2013; Law and Singh, 
2013; Samargandi et al., 2015). In the case of China, the nonlinear effect of financial 
development may have resulted from changes in investment composition. Although China’s 
domestic stock exchanges and real estate market have grown rapidly since the 1990s, it suffers 
from high volatility and speculative short-term behaviour (Allen et al., 2015). Moreover, while 
financing capital assets and real estate may increase capital gain, it does not directly improve 
productivity or technological progress (Zhang and Bezemer, 2016). Thus, policymakers should 
be concerned that China’s financial system has focused on financing the housing market, as 
the housing market has been found to affect credit levels (Shen et al., 2016).  
As a result, the growth of the real estate sector reflects a suboptimal allocation of resources, as 
China may be overly dependent on net export and domestic investment (Zhang and Bezemer, 
2016). As China’s productivity slows, the importance of further reforms becomes important, 
as the stability of China’s economy can affect other economies. Additionally, China needs to 
find other sources of productivity growth, either through increased efficiency or through 
technological progress. In short, financial development may have been significant in China’s 
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provincial growth; however recent, excessive financial deepening may have reallocated 
resources to unproductive uses, thus producing a nonlinear effect on growth.  
Most of the institutional development variables are significant and positive towards economic 
growth. Private investment is positive and significant to economic growth, which is 
unsurprising in post-reform China, as private enterprises are more productive and efficient than 
state-owned enterprises (Chen and Feng, 2000). Although government spending is an essential 
component of output and growth, it is suggested that government spending may be effective 
only up to a certain threshold (Barro, 1989). Furthermore, Shahbaz et al. (2018) suggest that 
government size and influence can cause a decline in financial development, and as a result, 
can affect growth. China should continue further reforms on privatisation and encourage the 
private sector to develop through increasing private investment. The estimated results also 
provide support for the positive effects of innovation. It is suggested that awareness of property 
rights is associated with stronger growth, as innovation can contribute to growth and provide 
spillover effects through technological progress (Wennerkers, 1999). However, there are 
concerns about capturing the full effects of innovation through the use of patents, as used in 
this study. It was suggested that although the level of patenting can contribute to growth, the 
quality of patents is equally important (Hasan and Tucci, 2010). This may be of concern when 
examining patents from China, which has been claimed to have a weak legal infrastructure.  
However, Fisch et al. (2017) find empirical support that the quality of patents in China is 
increasing, especially in recent patents. The estimated results support the view that innovation 
through patenting may contribute to economic growth. As a result, governments should 
encourage further research and development through subsidisation of patent fees and research 
grants that can encourage further innovation and promote technological progress. Finally, the 
rule of law has a positive effect on economic growth, suggesting that the presence of legal 
institutions matters for growth. This finding affirms many previous works supporting the merits 
of legal institutions and growth theory (Beck et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998). China adopted 
various laws to protect foreign patents in 1984, and later with the Company Law in 1994, which 
may have positive effects on growth through innovation and growth in the private sector (Yao 
and Yueh, 2009). Furthermore, China’s financial system has established the China Banking 
Regulation Committee to oversee the banking industry and further develop the rule of law and 
institutions in the economy (Allen et al., 2015). Since the results indicate that institutional 
development has encouraged growth, China should continue to progress and focus on building 
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a sound financial system through prudent financial laws and regulations to encourage the 
efficient allocation of resources. 
Lastly, the control variables have provided expected signs and results, as the educational level 
is positive and significant to growth, which is expected (Barro, 1991). Human capital 
accumulation is consistent with the Solow model, suggesting that education is productivity 
enhancing and promotes technological progress (Mankiw et al., 1992). Moreover, openness to 
trade is positive and significant to growth. Economic openness is well established to be positive 
to growth in many past and recent empirical works (Barro, 1991; Darku and Yeboah, 2018). 
Outward-oriented policies can encourage capital inflow, as seen by China’s Open Door Policy, 
which was instrumental in encouraging foreign direct investment in the economy. Finally, the 
estimated results provide some evidence of a convergence effect. This evidence suggests that 
China’s poorer provinces are catching up to its wealthier counterparts. Neoclassical growth 
theory assumes diminishing returns, however, thus leading to the convergence implication in 
terms of per capita income (Solow, 1957). The observations support the findings of many 
empirical studies that have remained relatively robust, as the convergence effect is present for 
both developed and developing countries (Islam, 2003). The results, however, highlight the 
fact that a slowdown in future growth can be expected, unless technological progress is 
increased (Lee, 2017) through traditional policy prescriptions of improvements in human 
capital formation. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
There is vast empirical evidence suggesting that financial development and economic growth 
are inherently linked. However, there is a body of literature suggesting that the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth is weakening. Various academics have 
shown that financial crises and excessive financial liberalisation have resulted in financial 
development being insignificant and, in some cases, even harmful to growth. China has had a 
unique growth path since its reforms in 1978, as it experienced high growth despite having an 
underdeveloped financial and legal system. Previous empirical results concerning the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in China present a mixed 
picture: On the one hand, academics suggest that financial development impedes economic 
growth in China, but on the other, some academics posit that financial development 
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significantly affects economic growth in China, particularly since the progressive financial 
reforms.  
This study examines the role of financial development on economic growth in China’s 
provinces from 1996 to 2015, using dynamic panel regressions. In addition, this study formally 
identifies and confirms whether the relationship is nonlinear. Although previous empirical 
research in China has found evidence for both sides of the argument, no studies have formally 
accounted for the nonlinear effects of financial development on growth in China. In addition, 
the effects of institutional development on growth in China are examined, mainly private 
investment, the role of innovation, and the rule of law. Financial development is found to be 
positive and significant towards economic growth in line with the supply-leading hypothesis. 
The Lind and Mehlum (2010) test, however, confirms the existence of an inverse U-shape 
curve between financial development and economic growth, supporting the body of literature 
that postulates the weakening effects of financial development on growth.  
Policy implications can be derived from the findings, as they suggest that financial 
development still provides a positive effect on economic growth; however, excess 
financialisation may not be effective in stimulating growth, as nonlinear effects are observed. 
This finding supports those of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), who report the quality of lending 
will be more sustainable for growth than rapid financial development. On the other hand, 
China’s gradual financial and legal reforms may have been effective, as the estimations suggest 
that financial development is positive towards economic growth. The results also echo the 
findings from Andrianova et al. (2012) where government ownership of banks promote long-
term growth. As financial reforms lagged behind relative to other economic reforms in China, 
the influence of government ownership can potentially be solution to the lack of regulation. 
However, China maintains strict controls over its capital account (Schipke, 2016). China may 
be able to benefit from further deregulation on its capital account and gain from further 
investment, as some studies have found that capital flows can benefit countries that have the 
capacity to absorb these flows (Trabelsi and Cherif, 2017). Capital account liberalisation, 
however, should be implemented alongside further financial sector and legal reforms in order 
for China to fully benefit from the capital flows that can provide and contribute to growth.  
Furthermore, there are some limitations from this study that can be addressed for future work. 
Firstly, as the results statistically suggests that nonlinearity is observed for the effects of 
financial development on economic growth, it might be useful to identify the threshold levels 
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of the nonlinear effects on the individual provinces. As we understand that regional disparity 
is an issue in provinces across China, the threshold levels of financial development may differ 
from a financial developed province such as Guangdong or Shanghai, compared to the 
landlocked regions in Inner Mongolia or Tibet. Understanding this can further provide 
important policy implications on addressing regional disparity and extend the literature on 
finance-growth with regards to the weakening effects of finance. In addition, the second 
limitation that can be addressed for future work is to examine the effects of financial 
development on economic growth in provincial-level China from the perspective of the 
demand-side. As we employ a Barro (1991) styled regression augmented with financial 
development variables, we naturally focus on the supply-side aspect of the issue. 
Understanding how individual provinces react to the monetary policy set by the People’s Bank 
of China will provide policymakers with further evidence on the demand-side aspect of the 
finance-growth literature. Addressing these limitations can provide policy implications to 
address issues on regional disparity in China. 
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Chapter 5: Examining Spatial Spillover Effects of Public Health and 
Education Expenditure on Economic Growth in China’s Provinces 
5.1 Introduction 
Understanding the growth of an economy has always been an important research agenda in 
economics. Solow (1956) attested that technology is the driving force of economic growth, but 
various economists have criticized the fact that technology was exogenously given. As a result, 
endogenous growth theories introduce human capital into technological progress along with 
physical labour, emphasising the importance of human capital accumulation in encouraging 
economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991). Health and education are 
essential aspects of human capital that can promote growth, particularly for emerging countries 
as they experience various structural changes through reforms. Human capital is suggested to 
affect growth directly through the facilitation of foreign technology and encourages domestic 
technological progress through innovation (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). China is an 
interesting case study to examine the effects of human capital formation on economic growth, 
as its economy has benefited from large flows of foreign capital input and technology (Berger 
et al., 2009) alongside gradual reforms that allowed China to transition smoothly from a 
planned economy to a market economy (Arayama and Miyoshi, 2004). The increase in capital 
has indirectly benefited China’s human capital development through stimulating larger 
investments in public services and leading to increased productivity growth.  
However, the relationship between human capital formation and economic growth in China is 
complex, as the government plays an important role in influencing investment in health and 
education. China has progressively implemented reforms to decentralise its health care (Pan et 
al., 2015) and education systems (Jiang, 2013) in provincial-governments and counties, 
delegating them decision-making power and responsibility (Huang et al., 2017). In theory, 
decentralisation can encourage competition among local governments, which may have 
positive effects on welfare and promote positive spillover effects for economic growth (Oates, 
1972; Shleifer, 1985). Local governments have been suggested to benefit from information 
asymmetry, having access to local information as oppose to the Central government, therefore 
aligning the interests of both the public and government (Hayek, 1945). On the other hand, 
many developing and emerging economies are susceptible to corrupt local governments and 
elitism that can distort the positive effects (Weingast, 2009). As a result, delegating decision-
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making power and responsibility to local governments can positively impact economic growth, 
or impede it. As discussed in the previous chapter, gradual reforms have been instrumental in 
China’s transition and economic growth. A number of studies have claimed that 
decentralisation reforms in China, in particular the introduction of province-managing-county 
reforms, stimulate economic growth because they increase responsibility to provincial-
governments in China (Ma and Mao, 2018; Shah and Shen, 2008; Yu et al., 2016). These 
studies focus, however, on the effects of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth. As a 
result, it is interesting to examine the interaction of China’s provinces with a focus on health 
and education investment, as human capital investments can affect economic growth through 
human capital formation. 
This chapter examines the effect of health and education investment on economic growth in 
China’s provinces from 1996 to 2015 using a spatial autoregressive model. We employ the 
spatial autoregressive model, as it allows for the decomposition of partitions to identify whether 
local or global spillover effects are present. Incorporating spatial dependency is important in 
deepening our understanding of the behaviour of provincial-governments in health and 
education investment. The essence of spatial analysis lies in the fact that closer observations 
tend to be more similar than further ones (Tobler, 1970). This implies that the decisions of 
regional governments concerning the provision of services is affected by neighbouring 
governments (Tiebout, 1956). At the same time, it has been empirically established that health 
and education investments can stimulate economic growth, developing human capital 
formation and productivity growth (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Sianesi and Reenen, 2003). As 
health and education expenditure are decentralised to provincial-governments, it is interesting 
to examine the effects of health and education on economic growth as well as accounting for 
neighbouring provinces’ behaviour where increased decentralisation and responsibility can 
affect the allocation of public expenditure. Furthermore, the spatial autoregressive model also 
allows for the decomposition of direct, indirect and total effects, where direct effect estimates 
the impact of a given province and indirect and total effect reflect the magnitude of spillovers 
on a given province and neighbouring provinces (LeSage and Pace, 2009). This method allows 
for the identification and magnitude of spillover effects from human capital investments to 
economic growth.  
The study contributes to the literature as few studies have examined China’s inter-provincial 
interactions while accounting for health and education investment and economic growth. To 
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the best of our knowledge, the two closest studies are an examination of fiscal decentralisation 
in China’s provinces using a spatial error corrected model (Brehm, 2013) and an examination 
of the strategic interaction of China’s provincial education expenditure using a spatially lagged 
model (Jiang, 2015). In this chapter, we employ a static spatial autoregressive model to 
examine the effects of decentralisation of health and education investment on economic 
growth, with an emphasis on the economic impact of human capital development, as opposed 
to a focus on only decentralisation reforms or education expenditure. This provides provide 
new empirical evidence examining the effects of decentralisation of health and education 
expenditure in provincial-level China and provide new empirical evidence on the extent of 
spillover effects of health and education on economic growth.  
In addition, we employ a static model which provides more reliable inferences than does a 
dynamic lagged model, as sample time-period and data availability on China’s provinces are 
short. Furthermore, this study focuses on human capital development, as recent research has 
shown decentralisation in China’s provinces to promote inter-provincial competition and to be 
beneficial to its economy (Ma and Mao, 2018; Yu et al., 2016). On the other hand, the effects 
of health and education on economic growth in China have met with mixed findings (Chen et 
al., 2014; Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Zhang and Zhuang, 2011). Examining the effects of health 
and education investment and its impact on economic growth in China while considering 
strategic interaction between provinces can provide policy implications for the Central 
government with regards to fiscal decentralisation and policy implications for provincial and 
local governments. 
In general, the estimated results show that health and education investment have a positive and 
significant effect on economic growth. The findings support previous examinations in China 
that find human capital investment to be positive and significant to economic growth (Chen et., 
2014; Chi, 2008; Li and Huang, 2009; Song et al., 2000; Yao and Zhang, 2001). Furthermore, 
this research contributes new evidence of spillover effects from health and education 
investment, as the estimated results identify that both indirect and total effects are positive and 
significant to economic growth. Furthermore, the findings provide evidence that the spillover 
effects of health and education investment produce a global effect, where health and education 
spillover effects affect higher-order neighbouring provinces, as reported in the partitioned 
estimates.  
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The results empirically support the positive effect of human capital investment on growth. 
Additionally, the effects of inter-provincial interaction are positive, as spatial dependency is 
found to be significant and positive towards economic growth, supporting previous 
examinations that find decentralisation and strategic interaction in China’s provinces to be 
beneficial (Jiang, 2015; Ma and Mao, 2018; Yu et al., 2016). This research contributes further 
empirical evidence to the positive effects of decentralisation with focus on health and education 
investment. The estimated results, however, find that spillover effects from education 
investment are stronger than those of investments in health. This difference may reflect 
underlying issues regarding health investment in China, where a number of studies have 
highlighted that decentralisation does have its benefits, but the efficiency of its health care 
system is declining over time (Audibert et al., 2013). The policy implications from the findings 
are discussed. 
Section 5.2 provides a brief literature review on economic growth and the role of health and 
education. Section 5.3 reviews the health and education reforms that China underwent. The 
measurement, data sources and methodology are discussed in Section 5.4. The results and 
discussion are presented in Section 5.5, and the conclusions are presented Section 5.6. 
5.2 Human Capital and Economic Growth 
The Solow model is one of the most influential models for interpreting economic growth, which 
presents a production function with labour and capital as inputs moving towards a steady-state 
(Solow, 1956). The Solow model was developed with the view that higher rates of savings and 
investment allow for capital accumulation and therefore economic growth. However, the 
assumption of steady-state growth and diminishing returns meant that any further 
improvements in long-term growth and productivity are possible only with technological 
progress (Solow, 1957). In addition, it is criticised that technological progress was exogenously 
given, so if the growth of the input factors cannot fully explain output, there must be other 
factors (Nordhaus, 1969). As a result, many endogenous growth theories took into account that 
growth itself is endogenous and cumulative.  
Early endogenous growth models relax the assumption of the Solow model, where the addition 
of human capital in the production function allows technological progress to be endogenous 
(Lucas, 1988; and Romer, 1994). Human capital refers to the knowledge and skills that 
individuals or groups acquire to produce goods and services. Furthermore, human capital 
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allows technological progress to be endogenous, as it accounts for individuals. Lucas (1988) 
criticised that previous economic models were too narrow, and consequently he included the 
stock of human capital in his growth model, distinguishing between physical capital and human 
capital. Human capital can be accumulated through learning and acquiring skills (Lucas, 1988). 
Similarly, Romer (1994) modelled technological progress as dependent on the stock of 
knowledge and individual investments in knowledge. Individuals with more schooling and 
experience are found to be more productive and thus contribute more to growth. As growth 
models move towards endogenous growth models, the importance of human capital is obvious 
for economic growth. Therefore, the policy implications of human capital investment are of 
concern to governments and academics, as public expenditure on health and education can 
promote economic growth. 
Health is a component of human capital that must be considered and incorporated when 
formulating endogenous growth models (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). It is suggested 
that a healthier population can work longer and be more productive, as well as improving their 
cognitive abilities to enhance the efficiency of the economy (Schultz, 1999). Similarly, Barro 
(1997) also finds that health and education may be complementary, as he finds education to be 
positively associated with higher life expectancy, thus providing an incentive to further 
accumulate human capital. This view implies that health is complementary to education, as it 
provides an incentive to obtain knowledge and skills that can be amortised over a longer 
working period. Furthermore, a positive feedback effect can be observed, as an increase in 
growth and per capita income allows higher consumption of food and nutrition. However, the 
positive feedback effect may also suggest that there are causality issues between health and 
economic growth. Logically, investments in health can increase with rising incomes. As a 
country grows wealthier, it may be rational for individuals to increase health care expenditure, 
so economic growth may influence health care expenditures (Hall and Jones, 2007).  
On the other hand, various academics have provided theoretical and empirical evidence 
supporting the positive effects of health on economic growth, as a healthier population can 
increase growth through various channels of improved education and productivity. Knowles 
and Owen (1997) established a significant relationship between health and growth with 
education playing a modest role. They suggest that poor health adversely affects cognitive 
abilities and leads to poor education. Similarly, Mayer et al. (2001) support the view that health 
is important to growth, as health contributes more to economic growth than does education, at 
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least in Latin American countries. Some studies have also provided evidence of a two-way 
causality, by which health expenditure exerts a significant positive effect on economic growth, 
in turn stimulating higher health investment (Bloom et al., 2004). Health investment can 
provide long-term benefits to economic growth, as it is suggested that poor health leads to 
lower productivity, a critical factor that has led certain regions to be underdeveloped (Cole and 
Neumayer, 2006). This suggest that the effect of health expenditure on growth may differ 
between advanced and developing economies and that a threshold effect may be present. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of health investment may differ across economies, as it can affect 
economic growth indirectly, by raising the incentive for schooling investment, and directly, by 
increasing output as it promotes a healthier population of workers (Weil, 2007).  
Some academics advocate policies favouring education expenditure over health. Webber 
(2002) has stated that reducing undernutrition would make only a modest contribution to 
growth and that schooling and education may prove to be more significant. Economists have 
long argued that the benefits of human capital accumulation through education may not be 
restricted to the direct recipient but might spillover to other individuals in the same firm, 
industry, region or economy (Sianesi and Reenen, 2003). It must be considered, however, that 
differences in human capital variables can affect estimation results, especially since different 
stages of education will have varying returns to educations (ibid.). As a result, the allocation 
of investment to different stages of education can have varying effects on economic growth 
(Judson, 1998). Previous empirical findings highlight the importance of secondary-level 
education, whose enrolment rate can affect economic and productivity growth positively 
(Englander and Gurney, 1994; Levine and Renelt, 1992). Both health and education are 
important components of human capital, thus, investing in human capital formation can allow 
an economy to benefit, as it can substitute for capital and increase technological progress 
(Krueger and Lindahl, 2001).  
5.3 Health and Education Reforms in China 
The health care system in China has experienced dramatic changes since the government 
introduced the co-payment system in the 1980s, allowing hospitals to be more independent, but 
at the cost of the public health care system, due to a change in incentives for hospitals (Ho, 
1995; Hsiao, 1995). Prior to the start of the reforms, the First National Health Conference took 
place in 1952, unveiling four guiding principles of health development: giving equal 
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importance to traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine; serving workers, peasants 
and soldiers; putting disease prevention foremost; and mobilising all population sectors for 
health work (Zhao and Feng, 2010). The four guiding principles of health development imply 
a reliance on government to provide universal health care, a hallmark of Communist China. As 
the first round of reforms took place in the early 1980s, the policies that were put into place 
aimed to provide incentives for hospitals to become fiscally accountable and health providers 
to provide more services that allowed them to earn more (ibid.). The second round of health 
reforms, in 1996, however, was criticised by the public, as the government drastically reduced 
health expenditure, promoting the viability of institutions by reforming the health 
administration system and the service system (ibid.).  
Recent health reforms re-focused on developing the public hospital system, as health care is 
important to public welfare (OECD, 2012). The reversal of reforms implies a predominant 
reliance on public financing for health care in China, as the New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
was re-introduced to support public financing of health spending and as the Central government 
has pledged to ensure universal access to health by reducing fragmented health insurance 
schemes (Cheung and Padieu, 2015). Hsiao (1995) suggested that early reforms caused unequal 
access to health care between the rich and poor, reducing the standard of living. Despite the 
various changes in the health care system, the government has pledged to maintain all public 
spending on health institutions, thus indicating the importance of health care by committing to 
policies that favour public health care. 
The education system has also experienced various systemic reforms in recent decades. The 
direction of the education system is centrally governed by the Ministry of Education in Beijing, 
alongside provincial education departments and local education authorities (Zhao and Qiu, 
2012). In the past few years, however, the government has gradually eased direct control of the 
education system, managing the system indirectly through legislation, funding and large-scale 
funding while providing local governments with more decision-making power (OECD, 2016). 
Currently, compulsory education in urban areas, which includes elementary and junior 
secondary school, is subsidized by the provincial and city governments, whilst compulsory 
education in rural areas is sponsored by the county and township governments (Zhao, 2007). 
Although the number of private schools has increased in recent years, the public education 
system remains the core of the China’s education system (Xu, 2002).  
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The strategy of decentralising education is a vital part of China’s educational reforms, as it 
encouraged fiscal and administrative responsibility from local and provincial governments. As 
a developing country, the educational reforms in China were driven by the need to be 
financially sustainable while achieving societal goals in human capital development (Bray and 
Borevskaya, 2001). Educational reforms through decentralisation were also driven by the 
concerns over education quality, so delegating responsibility to local authorities would 
encourage more innovative ideas and strategies despite financial constraints (Farrell and Grant, 
2005). Over the past 30 years, China’s education reforms have made significant progress, as 
over 95% have realized their nine-year compulsory education, alongside the development of 
various vocational and technical colleges and higher education institutions (Sun, 2010).  
Empirical research on health and education reforms in China has produced mixed results. Early 
empirical work that examined the effects of human capital on economic growth in China found 
human capital to be insignificant (Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Wei et al., 2001). By contrast, 
some have found more positive results, for instance Arayama and Miyoshi (2004), who find 
that human capital contributes about 15% to China’s growth. This finding supports the 
endogenous growth theory, offering evidence of the effects of human capital on productivity 
growth. Similarly, Li and Huang (2009) show that both health and education have positive and 
significant effects on economic growth and that education and health investments are 
complementary. Recent studies have also consistently found that human capital contributes 
through economic and productivity growth (Li et al.,2017; Li and Wang, 2018). Thus, it is 
interesting to observe whether provinces are spatially dependent when allocating investment in 
health and education, encouraging a positive feedback cycle. 
5.4 Econometric Methodology 
This section discusses the econometric model that will be employed and justifies the variables 
and spatial weight matrix used.  
5.4.1 Spatial Autoregression Model 
Following Li and Huang (2009), this chapter augments the initial model proposed by Knowles 
and Owen (1995) to account for spatial dependency. Li and Huang (2009) extend the Mankiw–
Romer–Weil (1992) model to include health and education stock in a panel case study, as 
presented in Equation (5.1). However, the dependency between observations and locations are 
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seldom captured in conventional statistical models. Spatial regression models account for 
dependence between observations that are located in space, as observations around an area 
usually exhibit similar patterns and values (LeSage, 2008).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜐𝑖𝑡 
𝜐𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐
2)            (5.1) 
Consider the following panel-regression, as presented in Equation (5.1). In each cross-section 
are i provinces that operate over t sample time-period. Variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 
and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of independent variables, in this case health and education. The vector of 
parameters is 𝛽, and the error term 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is composed of 𝜇𝑖—the province-specific, time-invariant 
effect errors that are fixed over time—and the time-varying random error 𝜐𝑖𝑡, which is 
independent and identically distributed. Specifying Equation (5.1) with a fixed-effects 
estimator can remove effects that may result from within the province or time-invariant effects; 
however, this method assumes that observations and provinces are independent. Although this 
may be true when comparing for observations across countries, when examining differences 
within a single country, with regards to the policies implemented, this tendency may be harder 
to capture without sample data, leading to estimates that are biased and inconsistent because 
spatial dependency should be accounted for (Anselin and Griffith, 1998). As a result, spatial 
econometrics models are considered to capture the interdependence between observations that 
have proximity with each other. The spatial autoregressive model is employed, considering 
interdependence between the dependent variables of observations, as presented in Equation 
(5.2). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5.2) 
Variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of independent variables and 𝛽, 𝜌, and 𝛼 
are vectors of parameters. Equation (5.2) introduces the spatial weight matrix 𝑊𝑖𝑗, where 
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the averaged dependent variable of neighbouring provinces. The construction of 𝑊𝑖𝑗 
is discussed in the next section. The interdependence of 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡 is captured by the spatial rho 𝜌, 
where if 𝜌 = 0, then Equation (5.2) will be identical to Equation (5.1). It is important to note 
that 𝜌 is bounded, to indicate positive or negative spatial dependence, from −1 to +1, due to 
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the row-normalised restriction imposed on 𝑊𝑖𝑗. Hence, the addition of 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡, captures the 
spillover effect from changes that a province can exert on other provinces. In addition, the 
spatial autoregressive model is used with fixed effects instead of random effects, based on the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (Akaike, 1974). Generally speaking, a model should be 
chosen that resembles the true data-generating process, and there are few investigations in the 
spatial context. It is suggested that the AIC outperforms the Bayesian Information Criterion 
with larger observations and that the AIC often picks the true model (Burnham, 2004). The 
AIC of both spatial autoregressive fixed- and random-effects is reported. The random-effects 
is presented in Table A2.1 the Appendix section. The AIC suggests that the fixed-effects model 
is the preferred model.  
In addition to fixed- and random-effects specification, the spatial autoregressive model allows 
for a static or dynamic specification. The dynamic specification includes a spatial lag denoted 
by 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, instead of the 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡. The static specification, presented in Equation (5.2), is 
employed rather than the dynamic specification, due to the limited sample time-period chosen. 
The dynamic specification calculates short-run and long-term marginal effects, which may not 
be reliable if there are shorter time-periods. On the other hand, the static model involves 
contemporaneous values of the dependent and independent variables with averaged marginal 
effects (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Additionally, the analysis employs the spatial autoregressive 
model via maximum likelihood, as it produces more consistent results for spatial models (Lee, 
2004). The estimation of spatial models with least squares can lead to inconsistent estimates, 
especially with spatially lagged variables (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Thus, this study employs 
the spatial autoregressive model using maximum likelihood. 
Furthermore, the spatial autoregressive model allows spillovers to be calculated by expanding 
the information set from 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡 to include information from neighbouring provinces, in the 
form of average direct, average indirect and average total effects (Anselin, 1988). The direct 
effect estimates the impact of the expected value of province i due to changes in its independent 
variables, while indirect effects measure the impact of expected valued of province i due to 
changes in the independent variables in provinces j. Equation (5.3) presents the spatial 
autoregressive model with the data generating process shown in Equation (5.4), were 𝑊 
represents the spatial weights matrix, 𝜌 is a parameter measuring spatial dependency, and 𝜄𝑛 
represents an 𝑛 × 1 vector of ones associated with the constant term 𝛼. 
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𝑦 =  𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝜄𝑛𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜀        (5.3) 
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑛 −  𝜌𝑊)
−1(𝜄𝑛𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 +  𝜀) 
𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝐼𝑛)            (5.4) 
Equation (5.3) allows us to express the simultaneous nature of the spatial autoregressive 
process through its data generating process in Equation (5.4), as spatial autoregressive models 
can be expanded to include information from neighbouring provinces. Equation (5.5) presents 
the expansion of the data generating process in Equation (5.4) (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Kim 
et al., 2003). 
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑛 −  𝜌𝑊)
−1 (𝜄𝑛𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋 +  𝜀) 
𝑦 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑟(𝑊)𝑥𝑟  +  𝜄𝑛𝛼 + 𝑉(𝑊)𝜀
𝑘
𝑟=1
 
𝑆𝑟(𝑊) = 𝑉(𝑊)𝐼𝑛𝛽𝑟 
𝑉(𝑊) = (𝐼𝑛 −  𝜌𝑊)
−1 = 𝐼𝑛 +  𝜌𝑊 +  𝜌
2𝑊2 +  𝜌3𝑊3 + ⋯           (5.5) 
Equation (5.5) show that simultaneous feedback occurs, as spatial dependency provides 
feedback effects where 𝑦 converges on the data generating process. 
Furthermore, the measure of total effect, 𝑛−1𝜄𝑛
′ 𝑆𝑟(𝑊)𝜄𝑛 , can take the simple form of Equation 
(5.6). 
𝑛−1𝜄𝑛
′ 𝑆𝑟(𝑊)𝜄𝑛 = 𝑛
−1𝜄𝑛
′ (𝐼𝑛 −  𝜌𝑊)
−1𝛽𝑟𝜄𝑛 
= (1 −  𝜌)−1𝛽𝑟             (5.6) 
Following LeSage and Pace (2009), the formal definition of the average total effect, average 
direct impact and average indirect impact from changes in the model from the vector 𝑋 can be 
offered, as shown in Equation (5.7). 
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?̅?(𝑟)𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑛
−1𝑡𝑟(𝑆𝑟(𝑊)) 
?̅?(𝑟)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑛
−1𝜄𝑛
′ 𝑆𝑟(𝑊)𝜄𝑛 
?̅?(𝑟)𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 = ?̅?(𝑟)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 −  ?̅?(𝑟)𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡                         (5.7) 
Moreover, since impacts are a function of 𝑆𝑟(𝑊), this model can be expanded and applied to 
Equation (5.7) to observe the impact associated with each power of 𝑊, producing Equation 
(5.8). In this case, 𝑊0 refers to the province itself; 𝑊1 is the immediate first-order province, 
while 𝑊2 is a second order provincial neighbour, and so on.  
𝑆𝑟(𝑊) ≈ (𝐼𝑛 +  𝜌𝑊 +  𝜌
2𝑊2 +  𝜌3𝑊3+, … , +𝜌𝑞𝑊𝑞)𝛽𝑟     (5.8) 
These partitions allow for the identification of local and global spillovers, where the former 
would arise in a scenario in which the impact of 𝑦 from a province would only affect its 
immediate neighbours, while the latter suggests that the impact of 𝑦 affects neighbours beyond 
the immediate ones (LeSage and Pace, 2009).  
5.4.2 Data, Variables and the Spatial Weight Matrix 
The data is compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China10. The National Bureau 
of Statistics of China provides issues of the China Statistical Yearbook, an official publication 
that includes aggregate, provincial and town-level data. Province-level data are compiled for 
30 Chinese provinces from 1996 to 2015 for all the variables, and Hainan is dropped from the 
sample as it is not contiguous with mainland China. The sample time-period is chosen based 
on data availability, as there are missing data prior to 1996. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max 
Real GDP per capita (y) 600 21177.890 19563.640 1906.890 101275.900 
No. of health institutions (hi) 600 17364.860 17124.210 476.000 81403.000 
Medical personnel per 10k (mp) 600 22.617 14.844 1.010 85.570 
Real educational funds (mil ¥) (ef) 600 40977.730 43708.760 447.940 304749.100 
Secondary education attainment (edu) 600 0.367 0.073 0.085 0.507 
Workforce growth (wg) 600 0.110 0.034 0.031 0.212 
Fixed investment rate (ir) 600 0.533 0.226 0.233 1.328 
N is the number of observations from 30 provinces during the period 1996–2015. 
                                                          
10 Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn 
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Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics and are in level terms. These are log-transform for 
the consequent regressions. Further details of the variables employed can be found in the Data 
Appendix in Table A1.3 in Appendix A1.6. There is considerable variance in most of the 
variables employed, suggesting heterogeneity across provinces and time. The Real GDP per 
capita is expected to be highly varied across provinces and time as China in aggregate has 
developed rapidly during 1996–2015, as the Open Door Policy was implemented across the 
nation and the Central government began to reform various sectors of the economy prior to its 
entry into the WTO. Furthermore, regional disparity between the provinces became more 
pronounced as the foreign investment began to flow into the coastal provinces and benefited 
the neighbouring provinces more. Thus, differences in the growth of the economy can also help 
to explain the large variance observed across the health and education expenditure variables 
namely the number of health institutions, medical personnel per 10,000 persons and real 
educational funds. On the other hand, secondary education attainment show less variation 
across time and provinces, reflecting the compulsory nine-year education system that China 
enforces. Thus, this is expected to be similar across the provinces. Similarly, there should be 
some variance in terms of the workforce growth rate and fixed investment rate across the 
provinces as the wealthier coastal provinces will have more capital investment compared to 
inland provinces. 
Building on Equation (5.2) is an examination of the effects of health and education investment 
on economic growth. Real GDP per capita (y) is used for the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡, which is 
used in many empirical examinations as a standard proxy for economic growth (Barro, 1991). 
In addition, province-level real GDP per capita is also a standard growth proxy for provincial 
examinations in China (Li and Wang, 2018). Real GDP per capita measures total output of a 
country while accounting for population and inflation. In addition, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
independent variables that includes both health and education investment and control variables. 
Human capital can be approximated in many ways; for example, Barro (1991) used school 
enrolment, life expectancy at birth, and fertility rate as proxies for human capital. However, 
the examination of health and education on economic growth in China is complex due to the 
unavailability of traditional health and education variables at the province level. As a result, 
previous studies suggested using China-specific variables that can act as a good proxy for 
health and education stock and is comparable across provinces. Li and Huang (2009) suggested 
using medical beds per 10,000 persons and medical doctors per 10,000 persons as a proxy for 
China’s human capital development. To some extent, these variables capture health investment 
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and knowledge accumulation, but two similar although different variables are used, as this 
study focuses on health and education investment. The first variable that captures health 
investment is the total number of health institutions in the province, denoted by hi, which 
reflects investment in physical capital and health stock. The number of health institutions is 
more accurate in this study, as it examines the level of investment of provincial-governments. 
In addition, instead of medical doctors, medical personnel per 10,000 persons, denoted by mp, 
are used, similarly to Li and Huang’s (2009) use of them, as it still captures investment in health 
stock.  
I also employ two education variables that are China-specific and are comparable across 
provinces. The first variable that captures education investment is the total amount of real 
educational funds invested, denoted by ef, which aims to capture the level of educational 
investment of a province. This variable differs from previous studies suggesting China-specific 
education variables determining that the ratio of students to teachers at the primary level 
captures educational investment (Chen et al., 2014; Li and Huang, 2009). This interpretation 
may be suitable for the previous study’s examination of China from 1978, where there is lack 
of data on educational funds and because primary level schooling is important for China (Li 
and Huang, 2009). As this sample time-period encompasses China only from 1996 onwards, 
educational funds still capture the level of education investment in China by provincial 
governments while also conveying information from the fiscal perspective. The second 
education investment variable used is the percentage of population with secondary education 
attainment, denoted by edu. This variable is traditionally used to reflect the quality and 
investment of education (Knowles and Owen, 1995) and is China-specific, as it signals 
completion of the nine-year compulsory education in China (Chen et al., 2014). In addition, a 
set of control variables are included: workforce growth rate, denoted by wg, is the summary of 
population growth, depreciation rate and technological progress, and fixed investment rate, 
denoted by isr, is the share of fixed investment spending in GDP. The sum of depreciation rate 
and technological progress is assumed to be 5% and is consistent for all provinces and years 
(Mankiw et al., 1992). 
Finally, prior to estimating the spatial autoregression, a row-normalised spatial weight matrix 
is constructed based on contiguity between the 30 provinces. There are various methodologies 
to calculate spatial weights, for example using centroid distances, and in this chapter, weights 
based on boundaries are used. There are several advantages of using boundaries, as they are 
103 
 
easily computed, and the boundaries shared between provinces play in important role in 
determining the degree of spatial influence. Spatial contiguity weight is employed, which 
simply indicates whether provinces share a boundary or not. If the province shares boundaries, 
it is given a value of 1, with 0 otherwise, and the diagonals are set to 0 to prevent observations 
being defined as a neighbour to itself (Anselin and Bera, 1998). The set of boundary points of 
unit i is denoted by boundary(i), and the contiguity weights are defined as follows: 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 =  {
1 , 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦(𝑖) ∩ 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦(𝑗) ≠ ∅ 
0 , 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦(𝑖) ∩ 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦(𝑗) = ∅ 
.          (5.9) 
After assigning the spatial weights, the matrix is row-normalised so that the summation of 
elements in each row is a unity. It is convenient to row-normalise the matrix to remove 
dependence on extraneous scale factors while preserving the spatial features. The standard 
approach is employed below: 
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1 .      (5.10) 
The ith row of 𝑊𝑖𝑗 contains all spatial weights influencing spatial unit i, namely (𝑊𝑖𝑗 : 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
as 𝑊𝑖𝑖  = 0. So, if the weights in each row are normalised to have the unit sum of equation 
(5.10), this normalisation produces the row normalisation of 𝑊𝑖𝑗, which now can be interpreted 
as the fraction of all spatial influence on unit i attributable to unit j (Cliff and Ord, 1973). In 
this chapter, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is the row-normalised spatial contiguity weight matrix, based on 30 Chinese 
provinces. Subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑗 refer to respective province 𝑖 and 𝑗. The contiguous spatial weights 
matrix and row-normalised spatial weights matrix is presented in the Data Appendix A1.7 in 
Tables A1.4 and A1.5. 
The full specification model is presented in Equation (5.11) below: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑤𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         (5.11). 
Our hypothesis for the following model is as follows. We hypothesise that spatial dependency 
between provinces (𝜌𝑊) will be positive and significant towards economic growth. Since the 
Central government has delegated increasing responsibility towards provincial governments in 
health and education expenditure, referring to the theory of yardstick competition (Shleifer, 
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1985), we believe the provincial governments will interact strategically and spatially with 
regards to neighbouring provincial governments. In terms of the health expenditure variables 
(hi and mp), we expect both of these to have positive and significant direct, indirect and total 
impact on economic growth, benefiting directly from an increase in health expenditure and 
indirectly from spatial spillover effects from neighbouring provinces. Additionally, we expect 
both education expenditure variables (ef and edu) to be positive and significant in their direct, 
indirect and total impact on economic growth, benefiting from increases in productivity 
through increases in education levels and spillover effects from neighbouring provinces 
through labour mobility between provinces. Finally, with regards to the two control variables, 
workforce growth rate and fixed investment rate (wg and ir), we expect these to be positive and 
significant to economic growth, however, as these are not traditional production function 
variables, since this is an augmented Barro (1991) regression, this might not be the case. 
5.5 Results and Discussion 
Section 5.5 presents and discusses the empirical results. The section begins with a brief 
discussion of the correlation matrix, followed by a discussion on the results of the spatial 
autoregression model. The decomposed partitioned effects of the spatial autoregression model 
are then presented and discussed alongside their policy implications. 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 5.2. The correlation matrix measures the linear 
relationship between two variables, where +1 is perfectly positively correlated and −1 is 
perfectly negatively correlated. The independent variables show moderate positive correlation 
to the dependent variable, suggesting that a linear relationship exists between the regressor and 
dependent variable. This is expected for both health and education variables. An increase in 
the number of health institutions (hi) and medical personnel (mp) suggests provincial 
governments are increasing its investment in health expenditure, which can directly and 
indirectly increase economic growth while an increase in the educational funds (ef) suggests 
an increase in education expenditure by provincial governments. Furthermore, an increase in 
the proportion of population with secondary education attainment (edu) suggests a higher level 
of education within the province which can lead to an increase in productivity (Sianesi and 
Reenan, 2003). On the other hand, workforce is moderately negatively correlated to growth 
which is not expected and may suggest differences in workforce labour across provinces. 
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However, fixed investment rate is positively correlated to growth which is consistent with 
economic growth theories (1956). 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix 
Variable y hi mp ef edu wg ir 
y 1.000       
hi 0.374 1.000      
mp 0.432 0.374 1.000     
ef 0.324 0.398 0.350 1.000    
edu 0.285 0.309 0.371 0.328 1.000   
wg −0.514 −0.290 −0.478 −0.240 −0.153 1.000  
ir 0.515 0.304 −0.079 0.358 −0.028 0.002 1.000 
Definition of variables are in Table 5.1. 
Prior to discussing the results presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, we provide a brief 
explanation on the interpretation of direct, indirect and total parameters of the spatial 
autoregression model using Figure 5.1 as an example. In Figure 5.1, we present a hypothetical 
model with two provinces 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 with a single independent variable 𝑥 and the error term 𝑒. 
Figure 5.1: Spatial Autoregression Model with Two Provinces 
 
The model coefficient considers the spatial impact between the provinces 𝑦1 and 𝑦2. The direct 
parameters take into account the single province itself without considering the impact of 
neighbouring provinces, for example 𝑦1 =  𝑥1 + 𝑒1. The indirect parameters only examine the 
spatial spillover impact of neighbouring provinces, for example 𝑦1 = 𝑦2 + 𝑥2 + 𝑒1. Finally, 
the total parameter examines the impact of the own province and the spatial spillover impact 
arising from neighbouring provinces, for example 𝑦1 = 𝑥1 + 𝑦2 + 𝑥2 + 𝑒2. Refer back to 
Equation (5.3) for the spatial autoregression model. 
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Figure 5.2: Spatial Autoregression Partitioning with Eight Provinces 
 
In Table 5.4, we partition the effects of hi, mp, ef, and edu refers to Equation (5.8). The 
partitioning effects measure the extent of impacts once all the provinces reach their equilibrium 
(i.e. total parameter). For example, zero-order provinces (𝑾𝟎) provides the estimates of the 
impact associated with the respective province itself, while immediate neighbouring provinces 
or first-order provinces (𝑾𝟏) provides the estimate of the impact of spillovers from 
neighbouring provinces. The next estimate would be the impact of neighbours of the 
neighbouring province, for example second-order province (𝑾𝟐) and so on until 𝑾𝒏 which 
represents the total parameters of the cumulative effects from the spillovers. Figure 5.2 
provides a visual representation of the partitioning spillover effects of an economy with eight 
provinces. 
Table 5.3: Fixed-Effects Spatial Autoregression Coefficients and Associated Parameters 
Variable 
Model  
Coeff. 
Direct  
Parameter 
Indirect  
Parameter 
Total  
Parameter 
hi 
0.016* 0.018* 0.015* 0.033* 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) 
mp 
0.013 0.012 0.010 0.022 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.031) (0.068) 
ef 
0.388*** 0.419*** 0.348*** 0.767*** 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) 
edu 
0.076* 0.084* 0.072* 0.156* 
(0.165) (0.174) (0.145) (0.318) 
wg 
1.408*** 1.534*** 1.270*** 2.803*** 
(0.327) (0.340) (0.269) (0.598) 
ir 
0.188*** 0.203*** 0.169*** 0.372*** 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.033) (0.070) 
     
𝑾𝜌 0.493***    
LL 594.986 R2-within 0.983  
AIC −1173.970 R2-between 0.158  
FE Mean 0.556 R2-overall 0.713  
Definition of variables are in Table 5.1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis 
The estimated coefficients and associate parameters of the spatial autoregression model are 
reported in Table 5.3. We begin our discussion by providing a brief discussion on the control 
variables, workforce growth rate and fixed investment rate, followed by a discussion on the 
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spatial dependency coefficient or the spatial rho (𝑾𝜌). We then discuss the coefficients of the 
health (hi and mp) and education (ef and edu) expenditure variables and provide some 
interpretation on the results. The control variables show expected results, as wg and ir are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for the estimated coefficient, direct, indirect and total 
effects. China has experienced substantive changes in its demographics, largely as a result of 
high birth and mortality rates in the 1950s, which led to the implementation of the controversial 
‘one-child’ policy in 1979 (Yao et al., 2013). China’s vast population, however, became the 
foundation for its economic growth, as it provided an abundant supply of labour that affected 
capital stock through domestic savings and increased the workforce population (Bloom and 
Williamson, 1998; Hasan, 2010; Higgins and Williamson, 1997).  
Although the role of China’s workforce population in the economy has been debated (Yao et 
al., 2013), this study’s results support the view that workforce population growth is positive to 
GDP per capita growth. Additionally, investment-driven growth is a crucial strategy of 
economic growth for both the Central and provincial-governments in China, partly driven by 
the large flow of foreign direct investment and high levels of domestic savings in China’s 
financial system (Chen et al., 1995). Furthermore, the positive and significant indirect and total 
effects of fixed investment may result from the fact that China’s investment demand is depends 
heavily on inter-provincial networks (Qin and Song, 2009), thus resulting in positive spillover 
effects. 
The spatial dependency coefficient or 𝑾𝜌 reflects spatial dependence, measuring average 
influence on a province’s own dependent variable by their neighbouring province’s dependent 
variable (LeSage and Pace, 2009). The coefficient of 𝑾𝜌 is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that spatial dependencies between provinces are significant and beneficial to 
growth. This finding implies that the level of output of a province depends on neighbouring 
provinces’ level of output. The spatial dependency observed can be explained through the 
gradual decentralisation reforms that China’s Central government has implemented, such as 
the province-managing-county reforms. The aim of province-managing-county reforms was to 
improve local economic outlooks, increasing financial development while improving the 
supply of public services (Huang et al., 2017). In theory, the decentralisation reforms 
implemented in China’s provinces works in the same concept of the yardstick competition 
theory, where incentives are provided to local governments that perform well (Shleifer, 1985).  
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Additionally, the welfare competition model may apply to Chinese provinces, as the theory 
suggests that the decision-making of local governments are affected spatially (Brueckner, 
2013). There are a number of concerns with decentralisation, however, in particular for 
transitioning countries that are prone to corruption and elite influence. However, dependency 
between China’s provinces is positive and significant, supporting other studies that find 
competition between provinces to be positive (Yu et al., 2016). Furthermore, the positive and 
significant spatial dependency may provide indirect benefits towards growth, as some studies 
find that decentralisation reforms increase allocative efficiency, since they align the interests 
of government spending and the public (Ma and Mao, 2018). Hence, the empirical findings 
support the theory of decentralisation because increased responsibility for provinces can 
encourage growth.  
The study’s findings on health investment present a mixed picture. The coefficient, direct, 
indirect and total parameters for number of health institutions hi are positive and significant at 
the 10% level to economic growth; however, the number of medical personnel mp is positive 
but insignificant. The coefficient and direct parameter of health institutions is positive and 
significant to growth, supporting the findings of previous studies that have examined the effect 
of health investment and growth (Bloom et al., 2004; Weil, 2007). This study’s findings also 
support the examination of health investment and growth in China, implying that health 
investment can promote growth (Li and Huang, 2009). Interestingly, the marginal indirect and 
total effects of health institutions are also significant at the 10% level and positive to economic 
growth. This result implies that an increase in the number of health institutions in neighbouring 
provinces can stimulate growth in a given province. The estimated marginal effects emphasise 
the importance of health investments in encouraging growth, as it provides spillover effects for 
the economy. Such effects may arise through the welfare competition between provinces that 
can benefit the economy positively (Brueckner, 2013). As such, the health of the Chinese 
people is important for the economy, and as a result, the Central government has committed to 
further reforms allowing for universal access (OECD, 2012), thus increasing the expectations 
of the public and producing welfare competition.  
On the other hand, the estimations for the number of medical personnel on economic growth 
is found to be positive but insignificant. There may be a number of underlying reasons for these 
findings. A number of studies have claimed that the Chinese hospital system is relatively 
inefficient, as the health care system is publicly managed and owned by the Central government 
109 
 
(Pan et al., 2015). In addition, rising incomes and increased demand for health care (OECD, 
2012) have strained the performance of Chinese health care sector, which is found to be 
declining (Audibert et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the development of private health care has been 
restricted, further straining the public health system (Pan et al., 2015). It may be unsurprising 
to find that the estimated coefficients for medical personnel are insignificant. Similarly, 
Facchini and Seghezza (2018) find health expenditure contributes to economic growth, but they 
highlight the importance of productive and unproductive spending, as some types of capital 
expenditure may have ambiguous effects on growth.  
The point here is not to discourage investments in health care, but the increases in medical 
personnel may be unproductive, as the inefficiency of the health care system signals other 
underlying issues. The number of health institutions may have captured the effects of 
investments into the construction of institutions rather than the quality of the health care 
delivery. Other studies have found that health resource allocations are usually large, which can 
impede economic growth (Miller and Russek, 1997) and increase the cost of the service (Kelly, 
1997), making health care systems inefficient. Thus, hospital performance must be improved 
through decentralisation and through encouraging welfare competition11 reforms (Pan et al., 
2015).  
The estimated results for the effect of education investment on growth are more favourable. 
Both educational funds ef and secondary education attainment edu are positive and significant 
at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. Furthermore, the coefficient and direct parameters of 
both education estimations have significant and positive effects on economic growth. The 
estimations support previous findings that show secondary education attainment to be 
impactful for economic growth (Englander and Gurnery, 1994; Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
Educational funds are positively and significantly correlated with economic growth, reflecting 
the commitment of China’s Central government to increase the level of education in China. It 
has been suggested that debt finance in education promotes economic growth (Miller and 
Russek, 1997), and various studies have provided evidence that the returns to education are 
large (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001).  
As the source of funds that support the education system are provided by state budgetary 
allocation, China’s Central government should continue to delegate and decentralise the 
                                                          
11 Competition policies that focuses on the defence of market competition in order to increase welfare. 
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education system to provincial authorities (OECD, 2016), as these reforms have significant 
effect on education investment (Huang et al., 2017). Furthermore, the coefficient and direct 
parameter, which estimates the effect of an individual province, may reflect the ability of 
human capital to absorb foreign technologies (Barro, 2001), as China has benefited from large 
inflows of foreign capital (Berger et al., 2009). In addition, the estimated results also show that 
education investment has positive and significant indirect and total effects, which may reflect 
the role of knowledge in positive spillover effects.  
The extent of spillover effects for education is reported in Table 5.4, where both education 
funds and secondary education attainment have global spillover effects that gradually diminish 
following higher-order neighbours. Table 5.4 presents the spatially partitioned direct, indirect 
and total impacts associated with orders 𝑾𝟎 to 𝑾𝟒, based on the averaged estimated 
coefficients in Table 5.3. The partitioned estimations sum up to 𝑾𝒊𝒋, which is the average 
direct, indirect and total effects of the estimated model. Several studies emphasise the 
importance of TFP growth in China through developing highly skilled workers (Li and Wang, 
2018). The development of skilled workers or the development of advanced human capital can 
promote long-term growth, as it can encourage innovation, leading to technological progress 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992). This may shed some light on the positive and significant spillover 
effects reported by educational funds and secondary education attainment in Table 5.4, as many 
studies find that knowledge accumulation and innovative activities may lead to productivity 
spillover effects (Scherngell et al., 2014).  
Table 5.4: Spatially Partitioned Direct, Indirect and Total Impacts 
Variable Order Direct Indirect Total Variable Order Direct Indirect Total 
hi 𝑾𝟎 0.016 0.000 0.016 mp 𝑾𝟎 0.013 0.000 0.013 
 𝑾𝟏 0.000 0.008 0.008  𝑾𝟏 0.000 0.006 0.006 
 𝑾𝟐 0.001 0.003 0.004  𝑾𝟐 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 𝑾𝟑 0.000 0.002 0.002  𝑾𝟑 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 𝑾𝟒 0.000 0.001 0.001  𝑾𝟒 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 𝑾𝒊𝒋 0.018 0.015 0.032  𝑾𝒊𝒋 0.014 0.011 0.025 
          
ef 𝑾𝟎 0.388 0.000 0.388 edu 𝑾𝟎 0.076 0.000 0.076 
𝑾𝟏 0.000 0.191 0.191  𝑾𝟏 0.000 0.037 0.037 
𝑾𝟐 0.021 0.073 0.094  𝑾𝟐 0.004 0.014 0.018 
𝑾𝟑 0.003 0.044 0.047  𝑾𝟑 0.001 0.009 0.009 
𝑾𝟒 0.003 0.020 0.023  𝑾𝟒 0.001 0.004 0.004 
𝑾𝒊𝒋 0.416 0.349 0.765  𝑾𝒊𝒋 0.081 0.068 0.150 
Order refers to the neighbouring province, where 0 refers to own province and 4 refers to 4th order province 
In other words, the estimated coefficient and direct effects of education may reflect the ability 
of the economy to absorb and utilise foreign technology, while the indirect and total effects 
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imply that spillovers effects through knowledge accumulation and education investment can 
further increase growth. The literature on the role of government spending in encouraging 
growth is divergent; however, the effects of government spending on education are robust and 
have long-lasting effects on economic growth (Bose et al., 2007). This insight may provide 
some explanation as  to why educational investment spillovers are global in nature, affecting 
provinces beyond immediate neighbours. The spillover effect has been suggested to be a 
mechanism of the absorptive quality of education, as provinces react positively to neighbouring 
provinces’ education expenditures (Jiang, 2015). In consequence, China should continue to 
invest in education by increasing state budgetary allocation and by delegating more 
responsibility to provincial-governments to improve the quality of its public education system. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
China’s reforms and transition from a planned economy to a market economy are remarkable, 
as it has experienced strong economic growth. An important factor in China’s reforms was the 
decentralisation of fiscal policy that allowed provincial governments to have more 
responsibility and authority over investment and expenditure. As a result, provincial 
governments play an important role in allocating resources for the development of human 
capital formation through health and education expenditure. Meanwhile, in theory, 
decentralisation may encourage local governments to improve the efficient allocation of public 
resources and spur economic development through welfare competition among local 
governments (Brehm, 2013). This study examines the effect of health and education investment 
on economic growth in Chinese provinces from 1996 to 2015 using a spatial autoregressive 
model. Previous research in China has focused on either examining the effects of human capital 
on growth or the effects of fiscal decentralisation on the economy. In general, human capital 
formation in China plays an important role in developing the economy’s ability to absorb 
foreign technology and encouraging innovative activities that lead to technological progress. 
In addition, many studies have found that fiscal decentralisation benefits growth through 
positive strategic inter-provincial behaviour and spatial dependency. The use of spatial 
autoregression allows for the observation of spatial dependency while examining the effects of 
human capital investment in China’s provinces. 
Policy implications can be derived from the following results. The estimated results show that 
spatial dependency is significant and positive among China’s provinces, suggesting that 
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decentralisation is beneficial for economic growth. China’s Central government is committed 
to further reforms and decentralisation from direct control to macro-level monitoring of its 
fiscal revenue and expenditure, which may further benefit the economy. This policy is found 
to be effective, as it stimulates provincial economic growth by aligning the interests of the local 
province’s needs to the government, supporting many previous studies’ similar results (Ma and 
Mao, 2018). Furthermore, both health and education investments are positive and significant 
to economic growth, in line with various studies on the positive effects of human capital 
formation. However, estimations show education investment to be stronger than health 
investment in spurring economic growth. The weaker effects of health investment on economic 
growth are a reflection of China’s health care system, where there are a number of underlying 
issues. Rising incomes and public expectations have seen a rapid expansion of the hospital 
sector, which is mostly publicly owned and highly regulated (OECD, 2012). The rapid 
expansion has come at a cost, as it has been well-established that the health care system is 
relatively inefficient (Audibert et al., 2013). Thus, in terms of policy implications, China needs 
to re-assess the role of the health sector and emphasise the quality of health care delivery.  
On the other hand, education investment is positive and significant towards growth. In fact, the 
decomposition of the spatial autoregressive model shows that education investment exerts 
positive global spillover effects on neighbouring provinces. Many previous studies have 
affirmed the role of education in developing knowledge capacity to absorb foreign technology 
in capital inputs and to encourage technological progress through innovation. This may shed 
some light on the differences in health and education investment. Although China’s education 
system is dominantly state-run, the decentralisation policies implemented by the Central 
government have proven effective in developing human capital formation (OECD, 2016). In 
addition, the economy benefited from a rapid rise in schooling through demand from local 
people, as rates of people returning to education were rising (Li et al., 2017). With regards to 
policy implications, the Central government should continue to invest and appropriate funds to 
further increase the quality of the labour force in order to develop advance human capital, as 
China transitions towards a knowledge-based economy (Scherngell et al., 2014). 
The study affirms the role of human capital formation in spurring economic growth, but this 
point of emphasis may raise some issues in the context of China’s growth. It is well-
documented that China benefited from large flows of foreign capital (Berger et al., 2009; Chen 
et al., 1995), which significantly impacted productivity growth. On the one hand, a capable 
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workforce that is healthy and highly skilled can absorbed and utilise foreign capital to its 
advantage. On the other hand, the estimated results may not reflect underlying issues that the 
labour market experiences. During the period of 1998 through 2008, it was documented that 
China’s higher education enrolment rate expanded almost six-fold, resulting in a labour supply 
shock that reduced relative wages and increasing unemployment rates (Knight et al., 2017). 
The relationships between these events may provide an avenue for future research, since 
examining the effects of technological progress and productivity using a production frontier 
may provide stronger inferences through which to understand the role of labour and its 
interaction with capital.  
Finally, there are some limitations in this study that can be address for further work. First, the 
study employs a contiguous spatial weights matrix since the study focuses on the spatial 
strategic interaction between provinces. However, it might be useful to also examine the spatial 
effects of health and education using a distance-based spatial weights matrix, which does not 
focus on the spatial strategic interaction, however, provides a deeper understanding on the 
effects of geographical distance on health and education variables on economic growth. This 
is highly relevant in the case of provinces across China as increases in educational level and an 
overall increase in the quality of labour might results in increases in labour mobility that can 
affect growth in the wealthier provinces. This provides important policy implications regarding 
China’s policy on labour mobility. Secondly, this study employs health and education 
expenditure variables that are comparable across Chinese provinces. It might be useful to 
examine the effects of health and education within the Chinese provinces to provide a deeper 
understanding of how public health and education is organised. This can overcome some of the 
assumptions made by the variables in this study. For example, educational funds within a 
specific province may be spent in infrastructure capital or on the labour force in terms of 
increasing the quality of staff within the education sector. This might provide further 
understanding on the mechanism of public expenditure within the province and provide policy 
implications for varying provinces as wealthier provinces with a larger population may increase 
its expenditure in both infrastructure and staff while poorer provinces are faced with a trade-
off. 
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Chapter 6: Examining the Efficiency of China’s Provinces Through the 
Decomposition of the Spatial Durbin Production Frontier 
6.1 Introduction 
China has experienced strong economic growth over the past 40 years, starting as one of the 
weakest economies in the world to becoming the second-largest economy, after the United 
States. After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, China began its reforms and opened its 
economy for trade and foreign investment; it gradually liberalised prices, diversified ownership 
of state-owned firms and enterprises, strengthened property rights and kept inflation under 
control (Hofman and Wu, 2009). China’s reforms are of interest to many policy-makers and 
researchers, as the country has undergone a more gradual and experimental reform path than 
did other transitioning countries in East Europe. According to Hofman and Wu (2009), China 
has had three phases of reforms: market-seeking reforms, market building-reforms and market-
enhancing reforms; allowing China to gradually identify and build the right economic 
institutions to promote a market-driven economy (Naughton, 2006).  
The long-term prospects, however, of maintaining its rapid growth are of concern, as economic 
growth has been slowing since the turn of the century. Thus, understanding the sources of 
China’s growth and how reforms promoted this growth is essential to inform policymakers in 
developing future reforms. Some empirical studies have claimed that the rapid growth in China, 
particularly in the early stages of reforms, was due to a high and stable level of capital input 
(Ezaki and Sun, 1999). This source of growth has parallels with the case of Asia’s newly 
industrialised economies, such as South Korea, which grew through large flows of capital 
input. There are concerns on sustaining China’s growth, as being dependent on large inputs of 
capital may lead to smaller improvements in productivity over time (Krugman, 1994). As 
China’s growth slows and plateaus, productivity-driven growth through technological progress 
or improving the country’s technical efficiency becomes increasingly important for sustaining 
long-term growth, as maintaining a high level of investment and savings is unsustainable.  
This study examines the productivity and efficiency of China’s provinces from 1985 to 2013, 
employing a spatial Durbin production frontier model that allows for the decomposition of 
transient and persistent efficiency as well as spatial efficiency spillovers. Identifying transient 
and persistent efficiency is essential for long-term growth, as it separates short-term (transient) 
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and long-term (persistent) efficiency, which allows policymakers to identify whether China 
can grow further by improving its allocation of resources through short-term solutions or long-
term structural policy changes. The inefficient allocation of resources has always been an issue 
for reforming countries, thus identifying short- and long-term efficiency may provide avenues 
for further growth. Productivity studies examining China have suggested that China has grown 
both through an influx of capital inputs (Ezaki and Sun, 1999; Krugman, 1994) and through 
consistent TFP growth over time, attributed to catch-up or convergence with other countries, 
also known as disembodied technological progress (Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014). Total 
factor productivity growth in China, however, may be a result of one-off events such as its 
entry into the WTO, which introduced it to superior foreign technology (Wu, 2000), or the 
preferential policies that allowed foreign firms to invest in China (Bao et al., 2002).  
There seems to be a lack of studies focusing on the efficiency of resources in post-reform 
China. In fact, some have claimed that efficiency gains in China have levelled off and further 
improvements have been exhausted (Wu, 2000). While this may be true, more recent research 
seems to suggest that efficiency levels in China have increased over time, implying a 
convergence in productivity performance (Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014). This study, to 
the best of our knowledge, is the first to examine the efficiency of Chinese provinces that 
focuses on the short- and long-term efficiency of China’s provinces, using a spatial Durbin 
production frontier, thus contributing to the literature.  
Previous productivity studies examining China have been carried out using different 
methodologies, aimed to determine productivity and efficiency. This approach differs from a 
growth-accounting methodology. The frontier methods, such as the non-parametric data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) are 
predominantly used. The chapter contributes to the new estimation strategy evolving in the 
literature that typifies Glass and Kenjegalieva’s (2018) work. The chapter uses the technique 
to examine China’s efficiency and productivity by applying Glass and Kenjegalieva’s (2018) 
novel spatial Durbin stochastic frontier, which allows for the decomposition of the four-
component error using province-level data. This point of emphasis is important, as few studies 
have accounted for spatial effects on China’s TFP growth; Zhu et al. (2008) have examined 
spatial TFP convergence, while Scherngell et al. (2014) have focused on knowledge capital 
and its effect on TFP spillovers.  
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Furthermore, it is essential to consider spatial elements in TFP studies, especially for 
economies like China. Some studies have highlighted the regional disparity of growth in China 
(Démurger et al., 2002), which may have resulted from regional preferential policies that 
favour certain provinces in China. These preferential policies, however, were extended to all 
provinces in China, and there may be other factors in play. For example, geography has played 
an important role for regional development in China, both economically and historically (Bao 
et al., 2002), where its Eastern provinces have more naturally favourable conditions, in contrast 
to the mountainous and hilly interior provinces. As a result, building transportation and 
infrastructure network links between provinces incurs higher costs for China’s interior regions. 
Consequently, it is crucial to consider spatial elements when examining a vast country like 
China. The methodology employed accounts for distances between provinces, using a distance 
weighted matrix measured by great-circle distance12, providing evidence new to the literature. 
The estimated results suggest that there still exist areas for continued development in China, as 
the average gross efficiency is at 81.60%, suggesting that GDP can be increased by another 
19.40% if these structural issues are addressed. This result contrasts previous claims that the 
potential for efficiency improvement was nearly exhausted in the 1990s and that the Chinese 
economy needs to promote technological progress (Wu, 2002). However, it must be considered 
that differences in methodological approaches have resulted in different estimations. In fact, 
the estimated average transient efficiency is nearly 100%, thus supporting the argument that 
efficiency improvements have been exhausted. There is, however, room for further growth 
through improvements in persistent efficiency. In addition, the estimated results of spatial 
efficiency spillovers are positive, as most provinces have obtained scores above 100%, 
suggesting that the efficiency and multiplier spillover is sufficiently large and has pushed the 
province beyond the best-practice frontier. The estimated findings of spatial spillovers may 
support previous empirical research suggesting that China’s growth may be due to convergence 
with massive increases in capital and disembodied technological progress. Furthermore, the 
frontier results also suggest that the effects of real capital stock on GDP over time exert an 
inverse U-shape curve, causing growth to slow, a result that affirms previous findings that 
capital may be converging to its steady state. Policy implications are discussed in the Section 
6.5. 
                                                          
12 The great-circle distance or orthodromic distance is the shortest distance between two points on a surface of a 
sphere. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief literature review 
concerning productivity and growth in China. Section 6.3 provides a background on the 
physical and topographical conditions of China. Explanation of data sources and methodology 
are discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 6.6 
concludes. 
6.2 Productivity and Economic Growth in China 
Productivity is a concept that measures the ratio of outputs to inputs at a very basic level. If 
output increases with the same quantity of inputs, then productivity increases. This 
corresponding change can occur when firms increase their efficiency or technological progress, 
allowing productivity growth to converge or shift. Economists have researched productivity 
and efficiency extensively ever since the productivity slow-down of Japan and the US, which 
sees the economies experiencing lower productivity despite improvements in the workplace. 
Productivity growth is important, as it is a major determinant of future standard of living, and 
a permanent decline would be a source of serious concern (Munnell, 1990). The measurement 
of productivity, however, can be misleading at times, as labour productivity can be increased 
by employing more capital. For this reason, an influx of capital into an economy can increase 
productivity growth. However, productivity growth through an increase in capital flows is 
unsustainable, as economies will converge to their steady states (Holtz-Eakin, 1992). It is 
suggested that an increase in physical capital and human capital formation can improve 
productivity growth; however, increasing investment rates will only temporarily increase 
growth. Therefore, identifying the sources of productivity growth is essential, providing 
valuable information to policymakers to promote sustainable long-term economic growth.  
Efficiency can be attributable to long-term structural changes (persistent efficiency), through 
reforms and policy changes, or non-systematic developments that can be solved in the short-
term, such as addressing business cycles (transient efficiency) (Badunenko and Kumbhakar, 
2016; Colombi et al., 2014; Filippini and Greene, 2016). The distinction between short- and 
long-term efficiency provides policymakers with more information to make informed 
decisions. Long-term planning matters because policies designed with short-term consequence 
in mind are likely to backfire once the immediate crisis has passed (Baumol, 1986). Baumol 
(1986) has stressed the importance of economic history and the long-term perspective, as a 
thorough examination of economies cannot be conducted without investigating past events that 
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have shaped the current economy today. Therefore, examining China’s productivity is 
interesting due to the structural changes it underwent, from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy. During pre-reform China, Mao Zedong forced various industries to move 
their operations to under-developed interior provinces, and this re-allocation of resources has 
shaped China’s modern development. In addition, certain labour policies have affected the 
market, including the hukou policy that restricted the movement of labour between rural and 
urban areas. It is well-established that centrally planned economies produce well below their 
best practice output, for systemic reasons, and have low levels of technological progress when 
compared to other economies (Wu, 2000). As a result, many researchers have examined the 
role of efficiency and productivity in economic growth in post-reform China. 
The source of productivity growth in China has been debated. Differences in results usually 
depend on the methods of calculating productivity growth. Ezaki and Sun (1999), using a 
growth-accounting methodology, find that productivity growth in China was mainly due to the 
high and stable level of capital input alongside TFP growth or technological progress of around 
4%. Similarly, Wu (2000) concludes that technological progress should be encouraged if China 
wants to sustain its growth, as the potential for efficiency improvement has almost been 
exhausted. Furthermore, it was criticised that technological progress was slow in cities with 
dominant state sectors, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, when compared to other 
provinces (ibid.). In addition, reforms in the agricultural industry played an important role in 
productivity growth. Agricultural productivity was high in the early 1970s and 80s due to the 
introduction of the Household Responsibility System and the dual-track price system for 
agricultural goods (Zheng and Hu, 2006). However, they also find that TFP growth slowed 
during the late 1990s and claim that the technological progress that China’s has experienced is 
mainly a product of the transfer of foreign technology.  
On the contrary, Wu (2009) has re-examined China’s productivity, finding that one-third of its 
growth is attributable to TFP growth, which is sustainable, yet not as high as other advanced 
economies. Similarly, Chen et al., (2009) find that growth in China has been propelled by 
technical progress, while efficiency change and adjustment in production scale may have an 
adverse effect on growth. They also find that growth is stronger in coastal regions that non-
coastal regions, suggesting that production units face different production opportunities. 
Likewise, Tian and Yu (2012) find similar results, where TFP growth in Eastern China is 
significantly higher than the other regions. These differences in regional growth can be 
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attributed to the capital stock, human capital, and economic infrastructure, as well as the 
geographical conditions discussed further in Section 6.3. Therefore, examining China using 
province-level data also avoids the assumption that all provinces have access to similar 
production technologies.  
In addition to efficiency improvements and technological progress, other factors may affect 
productivity and efficiency. Trade liberalisation may affect productivity growth, for example. 
However, there are arguments for both sides. On the one hand, there are critics who argue that 
the effect of openness on growth is overstated and may be doubtful, as there may be 
endogeneity and measurement problems (Krugman, 1994; Rodrik, 1995). Other theories of 
growth, however, have provided support for the positive effects of growth (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1986). Since its reforms, China has gradually liberalised its economy with continuous 
commitment, as it entered the WTO in 2001. It is well established that China has benefited 
from disembodied technological progress from foreign investment (Wu, 2000), which supports 
the theory that open countries have a greater ability to absorb technological advances generated 
in leading nations (Edwards, 1988). Furthermore, it is suggested that foreign direct investment 
can provide positive productivity spillover effects through direct knowledge transfer, capital, 
and new skills into the economy (Javorcik, 2004). Furthermore, several empirical studies have 
been conducted on the positive effects of openness on China’s regional productivity growth, 
suggesting that openness can promote economic development (Jiang, 2011). Consequently, it 
may be interesting to examine the effects of openness in Chinese provinces using spatial 
productivity model and assessing whether spillover effects are present.  
6.3 China’s Regional Economic Structures 
The role of geography in economic growth has always been overlooked, as many economic 
models are dimensionless in space. On the other hand, observations have shown that 
productivity growth in many tropical countries is lagging, while temperate-zone countries 
continue to lead growth and technological progress (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). In addition, 
many tropical countries have disadvantageous geography; in particular, landlocked countries 
lack access to the coast. Furthermore, agricultural productivity is very low in many tropical 
countries where yields are low and where health issues with regards to disease burdens are 
common. China is a vast country, covering over 9 million km2, and its provinces vary in 
climate. Most provinces are subtropical, alongside the more temperate northern provinces. 
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China’s eastern provinces have excellent access to coastal seaports and flat land, in contrast to 
its landlocked regions, which are mountainous and poor; hence, the economy has naturally 
focused on its eastern provinces for development (Bao et al., 2002). Historically, the southeast 
coastal region was sparsely populated and uncultivated; however, after the outbreak of the 
Opium War in 1840, Western powers forced China to open coastal ports (ibid.). 
Although economic policy is a dominant factor in directing growth, understanding the 
topographical conditions between regions is important, as it can have significant effects on 
income levels and growth through its impact on network links (Gallup et al., 1999). It is well 
established that coastal countries generally have higher incomes compared to landlocked 
countries, which are disadvantaged by their lack of access to the sea, increasing the costs of 
international trade (ibid.). This makes investments in landlocked areas unfavourable. 
Furthermore, when China began reforming and opening up, the government implemented the 
Open Door Policy, creating Special Economic Zones, preferential policies for foreign firms in 
specific provinces. These preferential policies are mainly deregulation policies, as prior to the 
reforms, many provinces were over-regulated as a result of China’s centrally planned economy 
(Démurger et al., 2002).  
Opening up to the world market is important for China’s development, since deregulation is a 
source of productivity growth and since firms in the Special Economic Zones can import inputs 
duty-free, collaborate with foreign companies in investment and manufacturing and provide 
productivity spillovers through knowledge transfer and capital inflows (Ortega-Argilés, 2012). 
Guangdong and Fujian were the first Special Economic Zones established in the early 1980s, 
two coastal provinces that blossomed into important export platforms. Soon after, many 
deregulation policies were extended to other coastal provinces. After Deng’s Southern tour of 
China in 1992, the government extended this preferential policy to all interior and inland 
provinces, yet foreign investment continued to flow into the coastal regions, implying the 
increased costs of interior provinces may carry. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2012) find evidence 
suggesting that transportation networks have a moderate and positive causal effect on per capita 
GDP in China, and the country’s infrastructure is a key to promoting growth and development, 
as it allows access to the markets.  
Accordingly, if distances between provinces can affect growth or productivity through 
transport costs, spatially closer provinces may benefit from having lower transportation costs 
and provide spillover effects through agglomeration effects, factor mobility and technological 
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diffusion. Chinese provinces provide an excellent case study to investigate the effects of 
economic and political institutions while considering the effects of geography on economic 
development, due to their topographical conditions and having undergone structural changes 
in the country’s economy.  
6.4 Empirical Methodology 
This section discusses the econometric model employed in this study, its data and the variables 
employed in the analysis. 
6.4.1 Spatial Durbin Production Frontier Model 
Aigner et al. (1977) developed the stochastic frontier model, building upon the pioneering work 
from Farrell (1957), by introducing an error specification that is composed of two components. 
The model described can be written as Equation (6.1), where the production frontier consists 
of the outcome variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 row vector of constant, input variables and other control or 
environmental variables that may be included. The idiosyncratic error 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and the time-varying 
technical efficiency 𝜇𝑖𝑡 are included as well.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
=  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                              (6.1) 
The next development was the addition of an extra component of a persistent efficiency, in 
addition to the time-varying technical efficiency 𝜇𝑖𝑡, and idiosyncratic error 𝑣𝑖𝑡. This addition 
was first developed by Pitt and Lee (1981), who introduced persistent efficiency 𝜇0𝑖, which is 
assumed to be constant through time. Several models were developed, and the most recent 
development of the persistent efficiency in stochastic frontier modelling was proposed and 
simulated by Colombi et al. (2014), Kumbhakar et al. (2014), and Tsionas and Kumbhakar 
(2014). The model is written as Equation (6.2), which presents the separation of the error term 
into four components. The first component, 𝑣0𝑖, captures random noise and was originally 
introduced by Greene (2005), as firms’ latent heterogeneity. In this analysis of the productivity 
of Chinese provinces, 𝑣0𝑖 can be interpreted as province-specific effects. The second 
component, 𝜇0𝑖, captures long-term (persistent) efficiency (Kumbhakar and Hesmati, 1995). 
Both 𝑣0𝑖 and 𝜇0𝑖 are time-invariant. The third component, 𝜇𝑖𝑡, captures short-run time-varying 
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(transient) efficiency, while 𝑣𝑖𝑡 captures random noise or idiosyncratic error (Badunenko and 
Kumbhakar, 2016).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣0𝑖 − 𝜇0𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
=  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀0𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (6.2) 
These four-component error structures can be defined as two composed-error terms, as shown 
in Equation (6.5); 𝜀0𝑖 =  𝑣0𝑖 − 𝜇0𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝜇𝑖𝑡, which has an efficiency term and a 
noise term and is of use for the estimation of the model. Identifying persistent efficiency is 
important, especially in the case of China, where the reforms have allowed provinces to operate 
with more autonomy and incentives. Theoretically, reforms would lead to structural changes 
in the economy that can affect persistent efficiency positively, since reforms allow for the 
efficient re-allocation of inputs to capital and labour within the firms (Mundlak, 1961). In 
addition, transient efficiency is crucial to identify non-systemic problems that can be solved in 
the short term (Filippini and Greene, 2016). As China underwent reforms, prices were 
liberalised, and production restrictions were lifted, alongside the introduction of the dual-track 
price policies impacting the economy in the short-run. Identifying the sources of efficiency is 
important in estimating China’s provincial productivity, as the decomposition can provide 
policy implications. Badunenko and Kumbhakar (2016) have suggested that a high value of 
persistent inefficiency may be an indicator of non-competitive market conditions while 
theoretically, in a perfectly competitive market, persistent inefficiency is zero. China’s reforms 
were implemented gradually, and there may be interesting findings and policy implications to 
correct these conditions 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, spatial econometrics has been a focal point in regional and urban 
economics, as popularised by Anselin (1988). Spatial econometric relationships consider 
spatial dependence, which refers to the location of samples in space, and spatial heterogeneity, 
which refers to the fact that spatial econometric relationships may vary systematically over 
space (Lesage and Pace, 2009). Spatial econometric regression requires a spatial weights 
matrix (𝑊𝑁) within an estimation, where a basic regression Equation (6.3) can be augmented 
with a spatial weights’ matrix, such as Equation (6.4). Equation (6.4) is also known as the 
Spatial Durbin Model, in its simplest form, and it assumes dependence between outcome 𝑦𝑖 
and the spatial lags of both the outcome (𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑦) and explanatory variables (𝑊𝑖𝑥𝛾). 
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𝑦𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖          (6.3) 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑦 +  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖𝑥𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖       (6.4) 
Traditionally, the issue of spatial dependence is seldom discussed in stochastic frontier 
modelling (Aigner et al., 1977; Farrell, 1957; Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). Fortunately, the 
literature on spatial stochastic frontier modelling has been developed recently (Adetutu et al., 
2015; Glass et al., 2013; Glass et al., 2016). An essential feature of spatial stochastic frontier 
modelling is the estimation of efficiency spillovers, which complements the literature on 
estimating productivity spillovers. 
Estimating spatial a Durbin stochastic frontier with a four-component error structure is a 
method first introduced by Glass and Kenjegalieva (2018) using a cost frontier. This chapter 
employs a spatial Durbin production frontier with a four-component error structure and random 
effects as shown by Equation (6.5), where variables are in log form and mean-differenced. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜂1𝑡 + 𝜂2𝑡
2 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡𝜛 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜓 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑔𝑗𝑡𝜁       
+ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑧𝑗𝑡𝜃 + 𝛿 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣0𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢0𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                      
   𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, . . . 𝑇     (6.5) 
In each cross-section, there are 𝑁 provinces indexed 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 that operates over 𝑇 indexed 
𝑡 = 1, . . . 𝑇. The observation for the output variable is 𝑦𝑖𝑡, real GDP, for the ith province at time 
t. The vector of exogenous independent input variables, real capital stock and labour employed 
is 𝑔𝑖𝑡.  The time trend is t, where both t and t
2 are included to account for Hick-neutral 
technological change. ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑔𝑗𝑡 is a vector of spatial lags of the inputs, real capital stock 
and labour employed. The vector of control variables is 𝑧𝑖𝑡, and ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑧𝑗𝑡 is a vector of 
spatial lags of the control variables. Moreover, ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑦𝑗𝑡 is a vector of spatial lags of the 
outcome, as spatial Durbin specification requires spatial lags of both dependent and 
independent variables. However, 𝑊𝑁𝑡 and 𝑊𝑁𝑡
2 are dropped when estimating for the local 
spatial parameters, as 𝑡 and 𝑡2 are perfectly collinear with 𝑊𝑁, when 𝑊𝑁 is row-normalised 
(Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018). The intercept is 𝛼, and 𝜂1, 𝜂2, 𝜛, 𝜓, 𝜁, 𝜃, and 𝛿 are vectors of 
parameters. These variables shift the frontier leading to technological advancement. In 
addition, the four-component error structure is as follows: 𝑣0𝑖 captures random province-
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specific effects, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random noise or idiosyncratic error, 𝑢0𝑖 captures persistent 
inefficiency while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 captures transient inefficiency. The justification and details of variables 
chosen and spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑁 are covered in Section 6.4.2. 
𝑣0𝑖  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣0
2 ), 𝑢0𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢0
2 ), 𝑣𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), 𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)            (6.6) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝜀0𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 =   𝑣0𝑖 − 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡             (6.7) 
The model specification includes a four-component error structure: 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝜀0𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣0𝑖 −
𝑢0𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where 𝑣0𝑖 − 𝑢0𝑖 is the time-invariant component and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time-
varying component. The specification accounts for unobserved heterogeneity using random 
effects, as it is assumed that the errors are independently distributed. Employing fixed effects 
may not be suitable, as the time-varying idiosyncratic error will not be independently 
distributed because they are correlated with the fixed effects (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018). 
Variables 𝑢0𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are assumed to have half-normal distributions (Greene, 2004). 
Badunenko and Kumbhakar (2016) and Filippini and Greene (2016) estimate the non-spatial 
part using a one-step simulated maximum likelihood method, since employing a Bayesian 
approach may involve loss of information. Equation (6.5) is more complex than its non-spatial 
counterpart, since it includes a spatial term and is employed using a pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018), where the first step transforms 
Equation (6.5) into a non-frontier model, step two splits the time-varying error components 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and step three splits the time-invariant errors 𝑣0𝑖 and 𝑢0𝑖. 
Once the parameters of the spatial Durbin frontier have been established, the second part of the 
estimation is to calculate the direct, indirect and total marginal effects to account for 
productivity spillovers (Glass et al., 2016). To complete this calculation, Equation (6.5) is 
transformed to a reduced form, shown as Equation (6.8), where the i subscripts are dropped to 
denote successive stacking of cross sections and where ι denotes the (N x 1) vector of ones. 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼ι + 𝜂1𝑡 + 𝜂1𝑡
2 + 𝑔𝑡𝜛 + 𝑧𝑡𝜓 + 𝑊𝑁𝑔𝑡 + 𝑊𝑁𝑧𝑡 
+ 𝛿𝑊𝑁𝑦𝑡 + 𝑣0 + 𝑣𝑡 − 𝑢0 − 𝑢𝑡                        (6.8) 
In Equation (6.8), 𝛿𝑊𝑁𝑦𝑡 is taken to the left-hand side, which gives (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)𝑦𝑡, as seen in 
Equation (6.9), where 𝐼𝑁 denotes the identity matrix. 
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(𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼ι + 𝜂1𝑡 + 𝜂1𝑡
2 + 𝑔𝑡𝜛 + 𝑧𝑡𝜓 + 𝑊𝑁𝑔𝑡 
+ 𝑊𝑁𝑧𝑡 + 𝑣0 +  𝑣𝑡 − 𝑢0 − 𝑢𝑡     (6.9) 
The reduced form is obtained in Equation (6.10) by taking (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁) in Equation (6.9) to the 
right-hand side, and (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1 is the spatial multiplier matrix which accounts for feedback 
effects. 
𝑦𝑡 = (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1 × (𝛼ι + 𝜂1𝑡 + 𝜂1𝑡
2 + 𝑔𝑡𝜛 + 𝑧𝑡𝜓 + 𝑊𝑁𝑔𝑡 +  𝑊𝑁𝑧𝑡 + 𝑣0 +  𝑣𝑡 − 𝑢0 − 𝑢𝑡) (6.10) 
Once the reduced-form is established, it is possible to calculate the absolute direct, indirect and 
total time-invariant and time-varying costs efficiencies. Glass and Kenjegalieva (2018) 
approach this by transforming the estimates to identify an individual net time-invariant, as well 
as net time-varying and gross time-varying efficiency (GVE). These estimates do not include 
efficiency spillovers, however. On the other hand, these net and gross efficiency measures are 
decomposed to absorb direct, indirect and total net and gross efficiency from Equation (6.10), 
where (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1𝑢0 =  𝑢0.𝑇𝑜
𝑇𝑜𝑡  and (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1𝑢𝑡 =  𝑢𝑡.𝑇𝑜
𝑇𝑜𝑡  are (N x 1) vectors of the 
absolute total (Tot) time-invariant and time-varying efficiencies, respectively.  
(𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1 (
𝐺𝑉𝐸1
⋮
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑁
)
𝑡
=  (
𝐺𝑉𝐸11
𝐷𝑖𝑟
⋮
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑁1
𝐼𝑛𝑑
+
+
+
⋯
⋱
⋯
+
+
+
𝐺𝑉𝐸1𝑁
𝐼𝑛𝑑
⋮
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑁
𝐷𝑖𝑟
)
𝑡
=  (
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑇𝑜.1
𝑇𝑜𝑡
⋮
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑇𝑜.𝑁
𝑇𝑜𝑡
)
𝑡
    (6.11) 
The function 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑡.𝑇𝑜
𝑇𝑜𝑡  can be written in the form of Equation (6.11) and can be interpreted as a 
collective measure of a province’s internal and external efficiency (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 
2018). On the main diagonal, 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷𝑖𝑟 denotes absolute direct GVE for the ith province during 
time t, 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑 is the absolute indirect GVE spillover to the ith province from the jth provinces 
for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑡.𝑇𝑜
𝐼𝑛𝑑 =  ∑ 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑁
𝑗=1  is the sum of the absolute indirect GVE spillovers for 
the ith province from the jth provinces for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The (N x 1) vector of 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑇𝑜.𝑁
𝑇𝑜𝑡  can be 
decomposed to provide estimates of 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷𝑖𝑟 and 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑.  
The efficiency scores estimated are bounded within the interval [0, 1], as standard efficiencies 
in the literature of stochastic frontier modelling, with 0 being the lower bound.  
The upper-bound efficiency estimates, however, differ from the efficiency estimates of GVE 
scores, (1 - ( 𝜇0𝑖)) scores and (1 - exp ( 𝜇𝑖𝑡)) scores, as 𝐺𝑉𝐸
𝐷𝐼𝑟, 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑑scores 
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are unbounded. This difference allows for the simple interpretation of where scores greater 
than 1 suggest that efficiency spillover is sufficiently large and has pushed the province beyond 
the best practice frontier. It is suggested that the spillover acts as an efficiency performance 
multiplier and that the network’s collective performance is relatively better than its own 
efficiency (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018). Section 6.4.2 provides a more detailed discussion 
of the variables. 
6.4.2 Data, Variables and the Spatial Weights Matrix 
The data is compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China13. The National Bureau 
of Statistics of China provides issues of the China Statistical Yearbook, an official publication 
that includes aggregate, provincial and town-level data. Province-level data are compiled for 
30 Chinese provinces from 1985 to 2013 for all the variables apart from capital stock. Hainan 
from is dropped from the sample, as it is not contiguous or landlocked with the other provinces. 
Furthermore, the sample time-period is chosen as there are missing data before 1985 and after 
2013. To run, the spatial Durbin simulation requires no missing data, and thus the sample time-
period is not motivated by reasons other than missing data. All variables are logged-
transformed and mean-differenced which can be easily interpreted as elasticities.  
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Real GDP (y) (100 mil. ¥) 870 4915.82 7740.66 15.39 57580.45 
Real capital stock (k) (100 mil. ¥) 870 199.87 249.86 1.16 1842.30 
Labour employed (l) (per 10,000 people) 870 2138.04 1442.86 105.72 6580.40 
Govt. spending to GDP (gov) 870 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.50 
Openness to trade (opn) 870 0.25 0.36 0.02 3.69 
N is the number of observations from 30 provinces during the period 1985–2013. Real GDP, real capital stock and labour employed are 
reported in levels. The dummy variable Coast includes Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Zhejiang. 
Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics of the level variables. There is considerable variation 
across provinces and time, suggesting significant heterogeneity from the sample size. The 
sample covers the years 1985 through 2013, when China underwent many structural changes 
throughout its reforms, and the statistics are expected to vary—in particular, output GDP and 
the inputs, capital stock and labour employed. Similar to Chapters 4 and 5, output GDP is 
expected to have high variation across time and provinces. Since capital stock and labour are 
functions of output GDP, both of these variables are expected to have high variance across time 
                                                          
13 Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn 
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and provinces. Finally, the share of government spending to GDP seems to have less variation 
as provincial governments played an important role in promoting economic growth in China, 
where they have more responsibility, especially since the Central government decentralised 
fiscal responsibility to provincial governments. Openness to trade have higher variation across 
time and provinces and this is expected as the Open Door Policy was initially implemented in 
coastal provinces, which already benefited from excellent links to international markets. 
Meanwhile, landlocked interior provinces lagged behind in the implementation of the Open 
Door Policy and suffered from higher costs of transportation due to its unfavourable 
geographical conditions. 
The construction of the spatial Durbin frontier uses the traditional variables of frontier 
modelling (Aigner et al., 1977). The output 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is real GDP and is standard for analysing 
productivity. This is measured annually and at the provincial-level. The inputs 𝑔𝑖𝑡 is a (1 x 2) 
vector, where the first vector is real capital stock, denoted by k, and the second input is the 
labour employed per 10,000 persons, denoted by l. Data for real capital stock is obtained from 
Wu (2015), who provides an alternative approach to estimating China’s regional capital stock 
series. The Chinese Statistical Yearbook does not provide capital stock data, and the lack of 
data has been a major problem as researchers attempt to calculate their own capital stock, with 
Chow (1993) leading the way in his seminal paper, in the construction of provincial-level 
capital stock measurements. There are problems of double-accounting in previous methods of 
calculating capital stock in China, and the lack of focus on calculating regional and sectoral 
capital stock. The capital stock calculated follows the conventional perpetual inventory method 
but overcomes the problems of assuming ad hoc rates of depreciation for sectors and regions; 
and is available online (Wu, 2015). The control inputs 𝑧𝑖𝑡 are a (1 x 3) vector of variables, 
where gov measures government spending as a share of GDP, opn is traditional measure of 
openness to trade and is measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, and coast is a 
dummy variable for provinces that are coastal and are not landlocked. The coastal provinces 
are Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Zhejiang. 
In addition, a spatial weight matrix (𝑊𝑁) is constructed to account for spatial lags. There are 
various methods of constructing a spatial weight matrix. In Chapter 5, a contiguity spatial 
weights matrix is constructed to examine the spatial relationship between health and education 
expenditure across Chinese provinces. In this chapter, however, the specification of 𝑊𝑁 that 
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reflects the geographical nature of China is more suitable, as it considers the reallocation of 
resources, such as transportation links between provinces. Thus, the spatial weight matrix 
employed for this model is based on great circle distance, which is the shortest distance, 
between provinces. The assumption here is that the shorter the distance between provinces, the 
greater the degree of spatial interaction between the provinces, which lowers transportation 
costs due to closer network links. Furthermore, geographical distance is appropriate for this 
case, as the transportation links between provinces ensure provinces are not isolated from each 
other. The matrix is also row-normalised so that the weights in each row are have the unit sum 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 ,
𝑛
𝑗=1  𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑛. The row normalisation of 𝑊𝑁 allows straightforward interpretation 
as the fraction of all spatial influence on province i attributable to province j and preserves the 
spatial scaling of the data (Cliff and Ord, 1969). 
The full model specification for the study is presented in Equation (6.12) as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽8𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽10𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽𝑗 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣0𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢0𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
   𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, . . . 𝑇     (6.12) 
where 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is the vector of independent variables. The four error terms are interpreted as follows: 
𝑣0𝑖 is the province-specific effects, 𝑢0𝑖 captures long-term efficiency, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 captures random-
noise or idiosyncratic error and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 captures short-term time-varying efficiency. 
Our hypothesis for the following model is as follows. Firstly, with regards to the spatial 
dependency between provinces, we expect the spatial rho 𝑾𝜌 to be positive and significant 
towards economic growth. In similar vein to Chapter 5, we expect provincial governments will 
engage in competitive spatial strategic interactions and in this case, improvements in 
transportation costs can have positive spillover effects between provinces. Consistent with the 
production function theory, we expect capital k and labour l to be positive and significant to 
economic growth. However, since the spatial models are not commonly used in the productivity 
literature until recently, there is no strong consensus on the direction of the indirect effects of 
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k and l. As improvements in capital can potentially spillover onto other regions through 
disembodied technological progress (Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014; Wu, 2000), we expect 
the indirect effects of k to be positive and significant to output growth. On the other hand, we 
expect the indirect effects l to be insignificant as movements in labour between provinces 
means that there will be a trade-off between the provinces. We expect both the squared terms 
of k and l to be either negative or insignificant over time, as consistent with the Solow (1956) 
growth model, that the positive effects of capital will diminish over time and that the 
composition of labour will change over time as provinces experience structural change. We 
expect the time-trend to have a positive and significant impact on output growth as China has 
experienced strong economic growth during the period. Finally, for the three control variables, 
we expect government spending, openness to trade and coastal dummy to be positive and 
significant to economic growth and should have a positive and significant spillover effect on 
neighbouring provinces. 
In terms of the decomposition of the model for the consequent efficiency estimations, we 
expect both persistent and transient efficiency to be higher in the coastal provinces. We believe 
that the gradual and experiment approach in the implementation of policies across provinces in 
China will mean that coastal provinces will be benefit earlier from such structural changes. 
However, we expect all the provinces to provide spatial efficiency spillover effects that can 
promote overall economic growth. 
6.5 Estimated Results and Discussion 
The section begins with a discussion of the production frontier coefficients and parameters. 
The persistent, transient efficiency scores and marginal efficiency scores are then presented, 
followed by a discussion on policy implications. 
Similar to Chapter 5, prior to discussing the results presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.4, we provide 
a brief explanation on the interpretation of the direct, indirect and total parameters of the spatial 
Durbin model as well as the localised spillover parameter W that the model reports using Figure 
6.1 as an example. In Figure 6.1, we present a hypothetical model with three provinces 𝑦1, 𝑦2 
and 𝑦3 with a single independent variable 𝑥 and the error term 𝑒. 
Like the spatial autoregressive model introduced in Chapter 5, the model coefficient considers 
the spatial impact between 𝑦1, 𝑦2 and 𝑦3 in the provinces 𝑤1, 𝑤2 and 𝑤3. The direct parameters 
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take into account the individual provinces itself without considering the impact of neighbouring 
provinces. The indirect parameters consider the spatial spillover impact of neighbouring 
provinces 𝑤2 and 𝑤3 while the total parameter examines the impact of own province and the 
spatial spillover impact arising from neighbouring provinces. The difference between the 
spatial autoregressive model employed in Chapter 5 and the spatial Durbin model in this 
Chapter is the inclusion of local spatial spillovers, which is the 𝛽𝑗 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗𝑡 in Equation 
(6.12). This examines the effects of first-order neighbours and is known as a local spillover 
effect. 
Figure 6.1: Spatial Durbin Model with Three Provinces 
 
Table 6.2 reports the coefficients and parameters elasticities (log-transformed and mean-
differenced) of the spatial Durbin production frontier. Spatial lag coefficient or 𝑾𝜌 reflects the 
spatial dependence, measuring average influence on observations by their neighbouring 
observations (LeSage and Pace, 2009). 𝑾𝜌 is positive, at 0.587 and significant at the 1% level, 
which is a good indicator of fit for spatial econometric models. In addition, a higher and 
positively significant value of 𝑾𝜌 improves the fit of the model and loglikelihood (LL). 
Furthermore, 𝑾𝜌, captures the global spillover effects of dependent variable y, which 
incorporates the feedback effects that arises because of impacts passing through neighbouring 
provinces and back to the original province (LeSage and Pace, 2011). The positive and 
significant 𝑾𝜌 suggests that growth in some provinces promotes growth in other provinces 
through feedback effects.  
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Table 6.2: Spatial Durbin production frontier coefficients and associated parameters 
Variable 
Model 
Coeff. 
Direct  
Parameter 
Indirect  
Parameter 
Total 
Parameter 
k 
0.422*** 0.433*** 0.422* 0.855* 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.267) (0.281) 
l 
0.393*** 0.385*** -0.271 0.113* 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.351) (0.361) 
k2 
-0.133*** -0.149*** -0.700** -0.849* 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.358) (0.376) 
l2 
0.020 0.013 -0.272 -0.259 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.368) (0.386) 
kl 
0.039 0.063* 1.055* 1.118* 
(0.034) (0.042) (0.561) (0.591) 
t 
0.026* 0.028** 0.037* 0.064* 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.033) 
t2 
-0.004** -0.004** -0.006** -0.010** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
kt 
0.042*** 0.045*** 0.119* 0.163** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.076) (0.080) 
lt 
-0.016*** -0.018*** -0.116** -0.134** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.057) (0.060) 
gov 
-0.031*** -0.054*** -0.971*** -1.025*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.174) (0.180) 
opn 
0.026*** -0.024** 0.087* 0.063* 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.059) (0.060) 
coast 
0.396*** 0.477*** 3.018** 3.495*** 
(0.097) (0.105) (1.353) (1.378) 
Wk 
-0.063 
(0.116) 
Wl 
-0.343** 
(0.148) 
Wk2 
-0.224* 
(0.135) 
Wl2 
-0.139 
(0.148) 
Wkl 
0.440** 
(0.218) 
Wkt 
0.027 
(0.029) 
Wlt 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
Wgov 
-0.387*** 
(0.090) 
Wopn 
0.052** 
(0.027) 
constant 
-1.175*** LL 789.18 
(0.291) 𝑾𝜌 0.587*** 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 
0.092  
(0.002) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 
0.002  
(0.062) 
 
𝑣0𝑖 
0.166  
(0.016) 
𝑢0𝑖 
0.267  
(0.030) 
 
Definition of variables are in Table 6.1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The dummy variable Coast includes Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. 
The geographic advantages are that the coastal provinces may benefit and spillover to 
neighbouring provinces. An increase in income for a province may result in an increase in 
expenditure, such as infrastructure investment that can provide network links between 
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provinces, thus benefiting a neighbouring province by providing access to the coastal 
provinces, and thus to the global economy. The positive and significant 𝑾𝜌, is explained based 
on the argument that factor mobility plays an important role in determining the economic 
benefits of infrastructure development (Banerjee et al., 2012). 
The estimated results also capture the spillover effects of the independent variables through the 
direct, indirect and total parameters, which are presented in Table 6.2. The direct impact is the 
change of observation of a province’s own independent variable for its own GDP, while the 
indirect effect is the change of a province’s own independent variable for all neighbouring 
provinces’ GDPs. An important characteristic here, the spillovers specified by the spatial 
Durbin model are global in nature, transmitting to all provinces in the spatial weight matrix 
(Anselin, 2003). On the other hand, local spatial spillovers, captured by WN variables, are those 
that interact only with their neighbours with a common border; thus, they do not consider the 
full spatial weight matrix.  
The model coefficient and direct elasticities of k are positive and significant at the 1% level, in 
line with the production theory. The theory on spatial production frontier, however, does not 
specify whether the indirect and total elasticity should be positive or negative. Table 6.2 shows 
that the indirect and total elasticity of k is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
that an increase in capital inputs across provinces benefits a given province’s own y. On the 
other hand, the local spatial elasticity of capital, Wk, is negative but insignificant and will not 
be discussed. The estimated results of k support the convergence theory, where capital flows 
to areas with relatively high marginal products and those with relatively lower capital per 
worker (Holtz-Eakin, 1992). Furthermore, the flow of capital in China may result from foreign 
direct investment with foreign technologies (Javorcik, 2004), where lagging provinces may 
benefit from the possibility of rapid growth through technological diffusion (Gallup et al., 
1992).  
Again, this may have arisen due to the advantages of coastal provinces. When interior 
provinces of China implemented the preferential policies, the inflow of foreign capital into 
these provinces is limited compared to coastal provinces (Démurger et al., 2002). The interior 
provinces may have benefited from the indirect effects of capital through diffusion from more 
advanced provinces. These estimated results resemble the findings of Scherngell et al., (2014), 
who report that knowledge capital can provide inter-regional spillover in China. However, the 
effects of capital deepening may be slowing down, as k2 is negative and significant at the 1% 
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level, exerting an inverse U-shaped curve. The estimation supports much empirical research 
that has suggested the impact of capital on growth may be declining and that China must 
promote sustainable ways to maintain its high level of growth through technological progress 
or human capital formation (Zheng and Hu, 2006; Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014; 
Scherngell et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the model coefficient and direct elasticities of l are also positive and significant at 
the 1% level, supporting production theory. However, the indirect elasticity is insignificant, 
and the local spatial effect Wl is negative and significant at the 5% level, which does not fit 
expectations. There may be reasons indirect elasticity is insignificant and local spillover is 
negative and significant. Theory suggests that labour generally flows from low-productivity to 
high-productivity regions. However, in the case of China, this may not happen for two reasons: 
geography and China’s policy on labour. Firstly, the landlocked interior regions of China are 
mountainous and isolated from the advance coastal provinces. The distance and the poor 
infrastructure links make cross-border migration more difficult than internal migration 
(Démurger et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, internal migration is itself restricted in China, due to the policy of the household 
registration system or hukou. The hukou system identifies a person as urban or rural, thus 
limiting labour to either agricultural or non-agricultural. This restriction of labour movement 
constrains factor mobility and may have resulted in the negative local spillover, as there may 
be less labour force to slow the process of capital deepening. Similar results were found by 
Ezaki and Sun (1999), who found that the contribution of labour is small and has been steadily 
declining. Furthermore, previous empirical research on China’s productivity has indicated that 
the economy needs to take full advantage of the underutilised demographic dividend (Yao et 
al., 2013). China has slowly taken steps to address this problem, as they have recently relaxed 
the controversial one-child policy, implemented in 1979. Thus, China must actively increase 
the participation in and quality of labour to benefit from the country’s varying demographics. 
The estimated direct first-order time parameter is positive and significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that China’s provinces have benefited from technological progress. The estimated 
results are in line with production theory, where positive technological progress promotes 
growth by shifting the frontier. This growth may have resulted in the policies that China has 
gradually implemented to reform and open up its economy to the world, where its provinces’ 
may have absorbed the technological advances that are generated in other advance economies 
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through foreign direct investment (Edwards, 1998; Javorcik, 2004). Growth through 
technological progress is important, as it is the major driving force of structural change 
(Kruger, 2008). Furthermore, structural changes are long-term changes that promote 
sustainable long-term growth (Baumol, 1986).  
The estimated findings in Table 6.2 support the view that China has grown through both 
increases in input and technological progress (Chen et al., 2009; Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 
2014). The findings also support the argument put forth by Zhu et al. (2008) where they find 
spatial dependence in province-level total factor productivity across regions, as the indirect 
elasticities of t is positive and significant at the 10% level. Although it is also important to 
acknowledge that China’s technological progress may result from the flow of foreign 
technologies, which may not be a sustainable way to maintain technological progress. 
Similarly, Zheng and Hu (2006) highlight the need for China to promote its own technological 
progress rather than relying on Western or foreign technologies to lift its productivity levels, 
prompting in disembodied technological progress (Wu, 2000). China must identify policies 
that can encourage further innovation and promote human capital formation through 
investments in education and health in order to sustain growth through technological progress. 
The elasticities of the control variables also present an interesting picture. The model 
coefficient, the direct, indirect and total elasticity of gov, which is the share of government 
spending over GDP, are all negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with some studies that observe the significant negative relationship between government size 
and economic growth (Főlster and Henrekson, 2001). In theory, larger government sectors may 
have negative spillover effects on the economy, as larger governments may be formed through 
increases in taxes and borrowing money. On the other hand, if governments do not spend any 
money, there will be limited growth. Although the literature on government size and growth is 
inconclusive, a number of studies support the inverted U-shape curve relationship, where 
government spending is only beneficial up to a certain point (Barro, 1989; Scully, 1995). Prior 
to reforms, a large part of China’s planned economy was supported through state-owned 
enterprises that exist to support the economy, but these firms may not be efficient and 
productive.  
As China began its reforms, local and provincial governments were given increased 
responsibility due to decentralisation; many local and provincial governments were given a 
strong local incentive to promote a lean and clean mode of operation by reducing government 
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size and attracting foreign investors (Wu and Lin, 2012). Some studies have found that 
openness to trade may reduce government size (Ferris et al., 2008). This finding is interesting, 
as Table 6.2 reports the total elasticity of opn to be positive and significant at the 10% level, as 
expected. Wu and Lin (2012) suggest that openness to trade may enhance the learning 
capacities of local governments and increase allocative efficiency in China through 
strengthening its governance. This strengthening may shed some light on why the estimates of 
gov affect growth negatively, while opn is positive, as openness to trade may promote leaner 
government.  
Finally, the control variable coast reports expected results, as the coefficient, direct, indirect 
and total elasticity are positive and significant at the 1% level, supporting the view that coastal 
provinces may have advantages over their interior provinces. This is unsurprising, as 
historically the Open Door Policy began with the establishment of Special Economic Zones in 
Guangdong and Fujian, followed by the Coastal Open Cities policy in the 1980s, the Coastal 
Open Economic Zone in 1985 and finally the Coastal Open Belt in 1988 before extending the 
Open Door Policy to the interior provinces (Démurger et al., 2002). This may provide reasons 
for why China’s coastal provinces grew rapidly only in the post-reform era, as pre-reform 
China saw Mao restricting investment in the coastal provinces. More interestingly, the local 
spatial spillover of coast is positive and significant at the at the 1% level. The interpretation 
suggests that being neighbouring province to a coastal province can increase GDP, affirming 
the view that coastal regions have spatial and topographical advantages from which 
neighbouring provinces can benefit (Bao et al., 2002). Consequently, geographic factors here 
play an important role, as the coastal provinces have access to the international markets and 
lower costs of transportation that encourage rapid economic growth.  
In addition, Glass and Kenjegalieva (2018) specify that the direct parameters of the spatial 
production frontier can be interpreted in the same way as the parameters from a non-spatial 
frontier. Thus, the monotonicity properties apply to the direct parameters. Monotonicity is a 
condition by which any additional units of an input can never decrease beyond the level of 
output, and it is important in the theoretical consistency of frontier analysis (Sauer et al., 2006). 
Frontier modelling theory states that production functions should monotonically increase all 
outputs. If a production frontier is not monotonically increasing, the efficiency of estimates 
cannot be reasonably interpreted (Henningsen and Henning, 2009). The first-order direct output 
and inputs parameters, k and l, are both positive, which satisfies the monotonicity property of 
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the production function at the sample mean. In addition, the specification of a spatial Durbin 
model is supported through the significant coefficient of the local spatial variables of WN 
except for Wk, Wl2 and Wkl. As the specified model is supported and satisfied through the 
monotonicity conditions and positive parameters, the four error terms are modelled to estimate 
a frontier and identify efficiency scores. 
Table 6.3: Average Efficiencies of Provinces 
 
Gross 
Efficiency  
Persistent  
Efficiency  
Transient 
Efficiency  
Total average 81.60% 81.73% 99.84% 
Persistent efficiency scores are derived from (1 - exp ( 𝜇0𝑖)) and transient efficiency scores are derived from (1 - exp ( 𝜇𝑖𝑡)). Gross efficiency 
is the interaction between persistent and transient efficiency. * denotes coastal provinces 
Table 6.3 presents the average efficiency scores of provinces from the fitted structural form of 
the spatial Durbin frontier model. Gross efficiency is the interaction between persistent 
efficiency (1 - exp ( 𝜇0𝑖)) and transient efficiency (1 - exp ( 𝜇𝑖𝑡)), and these efficiency scores 
are bounded between 0 and 1. On the other hand, Table 6.4 presents the 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑟, 𝐺𝑉𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 
𝐺𝑉𝐸𝑇𝑜𝑡efficiency scores, which are unbounded, where scores above 1 suggests that provinces 
perform beyond the best practice frontier, thus providing a more complete picture of economic 
performance (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018). As this is the first application, to the best of this 
our knowledge, of spatial Durbin production frontier model to China’ provinces, some caution 
must be made when comparing efficiency estimations to previous productivity and efficiency 
studies on China. In addition, with regards to the persistent and transient efficiency scores, 
Badunenko and Kumbhakar (2016) highlight that as the simulation of persistent and transient 
efficiency is new, it may estimate only one type technical efficiency reliably, while the other 
may be inaccurate. The transient efficiency scores reported in Table 6.3 have an average of 
99.84% across provinces. This finding may support the claims of Wu (2000), who suggested 
that efficiency gains in China has been exhausted. However, as the transient efficiency scores 
do not vary across provinces, it may also suggest that the smallest and largest technical 
efficiency at either end of the distribution has not been estimated precisely. Thus, the transient 
efficiency scores cannot be discussed.  
The reported average persistent efficiency scores are 81.73% and gross efficiency scores are 
81.60%, implying that if China improves its provincial efficiency, it can increase GDP by 
19.40%. However, the 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕 of coastal provinces are distributed throughout the sample, as 
Guangdong is the most efficient province, with Guangxi performing less efficiently than its 
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peers. This distribution suggests that coastal provinces benefiting from the deregulation of 
preferential policies and transportation links may be in the form of increased capital and 
investment rather than efficiency gains. In fact, the 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕 scores vary considerably, as even 
landlocked provinces like Xinjiang and Tibet are as efficient as some of their coastal 
counterparts. Bin et al. (2018) arrived at similar results, concluding that allocative efficiency 
varies considerably across areas that can influence the distribution of resources. The important 
outcome here is that the majority of the provinces remain inefficient at employing their 
resources. The low persistent efficiencies scores may be the result of various systematic 
problems from local and provincial governments and since the sample time-period, 1985 to 
2013, examines post-reform China. As discussed earlier, many decentralisation policies 
increased the responsibilities of provincial and local governments to achieve growth through 
the contraction of state-owned enterprises.  
Table 6.4: Average Efficiencies of Provinces 
Province 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑫𝒊𝒓 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑰𝒏𝒅 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕 
Guangdong* 93.98% 26.74% 120.73% 
Heilongjiang 91.81% 27.52% 119.33% 
Tibet 91.51% 27.08% 118.58% 
Hubei 90.52% 27.03% 117.55% 
Sichuan 90.48% 26.98% 117.46% 
Chongqing 90.07% 26.92% 116.98% 
Beijing 89.82% 26.88% 116.70% 
Liaoning* 87.97% 27.47% 115.44% 
Inner Mongolia 87.86% 27.12% 114.98% 
Shanghai* 87.92% 26.63% 114.55% 
Hunan 87.08% 27.00% 114.08% 
Jilin 86.70% 27.66% 114.36% 
Xinjiang 86.02% 27.26% 113.27% 
Shandong* 84.95% 27.22% 112.17% 
Henan 84.81% 27.17% 111.98% 
Jiangsu* 85.01% 26.56% 111.57% 
Shanxi 81.88% 27.12% 109.01% 
Shaanxi 81.25% 27.06% 108.31% 
Yunnan 80.31% 27.16% 107.47% 
Tianjin* 79.58% 27.46% 107.05% 
Gansu 79.22% 26.84% 106.05% 
Zhejiang* 79.31% 26.88% 106.19% 
Hebei* 77.45% 27.37% 104.82% 
Fujian* 76.78% 27.09% 103.87% 
Jiangxi 74.89% 27.15% 102.04% 
Guangxi* 67.06% 27.37% 94.43% 
Guizhou 66.25% 27.46% 93.71% 
Anhui 65.58% 27.39% 92.97% 
Ningxia 65.39% 27.37% 92.76% 
Qinghai 64.60% 27.42% 92.02% 
Total average 81.87% 27.15% 109.01% 
𝑮𝑽𝑬𝐷𝑖𝑟, 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝑮𝑽𝑬𝑇𝑜𝑡efficiency scores are unbounded as it takes into account spatial efficiency spillovers. The spatial efficiency 
spillovers is calculated by the spatial multiplier matrix (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1 
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In addition, the direct, indirect and total gross time-varying efficiencies reported in Table 6.4 
provide interesting results. The average direct gross time-varying efficiency is 81.87%, which 
is the sample mean of a province’s gross efficiency plus the efficiency feedback. The efficiency 
feedback is a component of a province’s direct efficiency, which via the spatial multiplier 
matrix, (𝐼𝑁 − 𝛿𝑊𝑁)
−1, passes through a province’s first-order and higher-order neighbouring 
province and rebounds back to the unit (Glass and Kenjegalieva, 2018). As a result, the direct 
gross time-varying and gross efficiency scores are nearly the same, since technically there are 
no feedback effects. It is also observed that the average indirect gross time-varying efficiency 
is 27.15%, indicating that the spillovers are relatively large and push the average total gross 
time-varying efficiency to 109.01%, performing beyond the frontier. These estimations suggest 
that the productivity growth in China may arise from technological progress, a suggestion in 
line with a number of empirical studies on China (Laurenceson and O’Donnell, 2014; 
Luckstead et al., 2014; Scherngell et al., 2014; Tian and Yu, 2012; Wu, 2011; Yao, 2013). 
Figure 6.2: Kernel Density of Gross Efficiency Scores 
 
When examining the gross efficiency scores Figure 6.2 shows that the distribution of gross 
efficiency scores is not smooth and is negatively skewed. The kernel density distribution shows 
that the efficiency scores can be split into two distinct groups of provinces, where the first 
group converges towards the higher end of the efficiency scores while the lower end of the 
group converges at around an efficiency score of below 70%. There are five provinces that 
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obtained these low scores: Qinghai (64.49%), Ningxia (65.20%), Anhui (65.24%), Guizhou 
(66.02%) and Guangxi (66.88%). Meanwhile, there are five provinces that obtained efficiency 
scores above 90% and these five provinces are: Sichuan (90.07%), Hubei (90.24%), Tibet 
(91.41%), Heilongjiang (91.66%) and Guangdong (96.77%). However, at closer examination 
of these provinces in order to understand the efficiency scores, we find no obvious solution or 
case to be. Both higher and lower tier efficiency groups have autonomous provinces14 while 
the coastal provinces do not display any obvious advantages when compared to the interior 
landlocked provinces.  
Figure 6.3: Spatial Distribution of Gross Efficiency Scores 
  
This is apparent when examining Figure 6.3, which presents the spatial distribution of the gross 
efficiency scores of the provinces. Unlike the spatial distribution maps presented in Chapter 1, 
Figure 6.3 do not show any obvious pattern or explanation on the random distribution of the 
efficiency scores. The lack of explanation for the efficiency scores highlights the need to 
examine spatial productivity growth in provincial-level China as efficiency of resources only 
partially explains productivity growth. 
                                                          
14 There are five autonomous provinces in China: Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet 
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Although, there are empirical studies that raise concerns over regional disparity between the 
coastal and non-coastal provinces. However, since the total gross time-varying efficiencies 
vary considerably across provinces, and many provinces have benefited overall when 
examining the efficiencies of provinces. In aggregate, the findings suggest that China has 
improved its position and has benefited when compared to international standards as 
productivity growth increases; however, worries arise about increasing wage inequality, which 
may have resulted from rapid technological change (Xu and Ouyang, 2015). As China benefits 
from foreign technology and transitions from an agrarian industry to a manufacturing and 
service-intensive one, wage inequality may persist due to the hukou system that restricts 
movement of labour. Thus, as China continues to grow, it must have policies in place to reduce 
inequality through improving the skills of its labour force and through education that can result 
in human capital formation.  
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
China’s economy has experienced remarkable economic growth since its reforms in 1978, 
continually achieving growth year after year. The gradual policies implemented by the 
government to transition from a planned economy to a market economy were successful 
compared to the shock-therapy policies that many Eastern European countries implemented. 
This study examines the productivity and efficiency of China’s provinces from 1985 to 2013, 
using a spatial Durbin production frontier. Previous empirical studies have not reached a 
consensus on the source of China’s productivity growth. On the one hand, some researchers 
have suggested China has grown by benefiting from large inflows of capital stock and can tap 
into its vast demographic of labour supply. On the other hand, others have reported that China 
has grown through total factor productivity or technological progress, and efficiency gains have 
been exhausted. There is a middle ground, however, as many academics agree that China has 
benefited from convergence and is catching up to the frontier through disembodied 
technological progress and increased efficiency from foreign technology, savings and 
investment. China, however, is a large country, and its provinces vary considerably. One strand 
of the literature highlights the uneven growth path that its provinces experience, as its coastal 
provinces grew faster than its interior provinces. Taking regional disparity into account, 
China’s productivity is examined on a provincial level, as each province will have access to 
different production technologies and inputs.  
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Furthermore, China’s regional disparity may be a result of its geographic and topographic 
conditions, in addition to its history. The western provinces are mountainous and hilly with 
poor infrastructure links, while the eastern coastal provinces have flatlands and excellent access 
to coastal waters and the international market. Although coastal provinces were subjected to 
preferential (deregulation) policies, these policies were extended to all provinces, yet many 
foreign investments still flowed into the coastal provinces. As a result, the importance of 
geographic significance cannot be overlooked. This analysis uses a row-normalised spatial 
weight matrix constructed based on great circle distance between the provinces that preserves 
scaling. In addition to traditional production frontier variables, such as capital stock and labour, 
three additional variables were also employed: government spending on GDP, openness to 
trade, and a coastal dummy. The spatial Durbin production frontier using random effects is 
employed to control for endogeneity; the model satisfies the monotonicity properties, as the 
model coefficient and first-order direct parameters are positive and significant. The global 
spillover variable of the model and first-order local spatial spillover is positive and significant, 
which supports the spatial Durbin specification of the model. 
The results for the effects of capital stock and labour are as expected. Interestingly, capital 
stock and labour estimates have positive and significant spillovers through indirect effects, 
affirming previous findings that technological progress may have diffusion effects and that 
transportation links between provinces may promote factor mobility. In addition, government 
size has a negative and significant effect on growth, as may be expected for post-reform China, 
and that openness to trade has a positive and significant effect on growth, which is expected as 
foreign direct investment flowed into the country. The coastal dummy is significant and 
positive, in line with views that coastal provinces may have benefited more from the country’s 
interior provinces. Provincial and local governments should develop further infrastructure links 
between provinces, particularly developing direct access to the influential coastal provinces.  
Furthermore, the spatial Durbin production frontier is decomposed to calculate efficiency 
scores for China’s performance. Efficiency scores must be interpreted with caution, as 
differences between results may be due to methodological differences. Average gross 
efficiency in China is 81.60%, suggesting that GDP can increase by another 19.40%. The main 
point is that China has grown rapidly through large capital inflows that allowed them to 
converge to the frontier and benefit from disembodied technological progress. However, as 
foreign investment into China has continued to flow into the country, economic growth has 
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slowed down, and there are doubts as to whether China’s traditionally high savings rate can be 
maintained. This concern draws a parallel to the Japanese economy prior to the oil crisis, where 
the country grew rapidly due to unsustainable increases in capital formation. Growth in 
investment must emphasise productivity and the efficient use of resources. The obvious 
solution here is to promote further technological progress through deregulation, research and 
development and education, which affects human capital formation.  
The estimated results, however, show that China may have been using its resources 
inefficiently, a product of systematic problems with long-term implications. If China can 
identify these sources of structural problems, then it can provide further increases in growth 
through efficiency. These solutions or policies may appear in the form of further 
decentralisation and increased responsibility to provincial and local governments or through 
the contraction of state-owned enterprises. On a more positive note, the average gross time-
varying efficiency score is 109.01%, indicating that most provinces benefited from 
technological progress. Gross time-varying efficiency considers spatial spillovers, which 
incorporates feedback effects from neighbouring provinces. This result provides support for 
further infrastructure development across China’s provinces as efficiency spillovers are 
present. Finally, China should develop health and education policies that lead to human capital 
formation, as China must sustain its growth through future technological progress, innovation, 
and research and development.  
There are several limitations to the study and directions for future research. The study focuses 
on the efficiency of Chinese provinces. However, efficiency levels only partially explain 
productivity levels across China. Examining the spatial productivity growth via total factor 
productivity can provide policymakers with a deeper understanding of regional disparity and 
prescribe policies that are suitable for provinces at different stages of development. 
Furthermore, although the methodology employed is novel, it may be possible to examine the 
productivity and efficiency of China’s provinces on a provincial sector-level nested within the 
province-level data. Employing a spatial multi-level production model may enhance the 
findings above, particularly with regards to the economic sectors. Such an analysis may provide 
further insight into agricultural productivity and China’s transition towards a modern economy. 
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks 
7.1 Summary of Main Conclusions 
Within the last 40 years, China has achieved strong economic growth and is the second-largest 
economy in the world. China’s successful economic reforms has allowed its economy to grow 
rapidly and avoid the problems that many transitioning countries have experienced. 
Meanwhile, the literature on economic growth theories focuses on traditional determinants of 
growth such as physical capital, labour and human capital. In many transitioning economies, 
policy prescriptions can have profound effects on traditional determinants through other 
fundamental factors. Fundamental determinants such as financial development, institutional 
frameworks, government intervention and other factors, play an essential role in fostering these 
traditional determinants of growth. Thus, the study of economic growth is a complex 
phenomenon and continues to become an important research agenda for academics and 
policymakers alike. As a result, this thesis examines the determinants of economic growth in 
provincial-level China using a newly updated dataset. 
More importantly, China’s strong economic growth resulted in regional disparity in terms of 
economic growth across its provinces. In order to understand this phenomenon further, we 
explore the development of China’s modern economy in Chapter 2. China’s economic reforms 
was unique compared to other transitioning countries, as the Central government began its 
reforms in the rural economy. Agricultural reforms were undertaken as the Central government 
deemed it necessary for China’s economy to be self-sufficient prior to industrialisation reforms. 
The Household Responsibility System was successful as it provided incentives for the 
agricultural sector and reinvigorated the rural economy. The introduction of the Household 
Responsibility System was followed by the successful implementation of the Budgetary 
Responsibility System and the establishment of the Township and Village enterprises, which 
provided increasing fiscal responsibility for provincial and local governments. This was an 
important turning point in China’s economic reforms, as the success of the initial reforms was 
at the cost of the state-owned sector. As a result, the Central government began to focus on the 
state-owned sector and thus, began a series of unproductive reforms aimed at promoting the 
inefficient state-owned sector. The Central government then focused its efforts at promoting 
foreign direct investment within the coastal provinces while continuing its efforts on the 
struggling state-owned sector. This resulted in a widening income gap between the provinces 
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as industries began to agglomerate in coastal provinces with more developed industrialised 
centres. Consequently, China’s coastal provinces benefited from these reforms and are 
relatively richer compared to the underdeveloped landlocked interior provinces in China. 
Meanwhile in Chapter 3, we explore the determinants of economic growth. Despite being well 
researched, the study of economic growth continues to expand and provide many avenues for 
future work. In this chapter, we explore the role of financial development on economic growth. 
Traditionally, many previous researches find evidence that financial development exerts a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, recent empirical studies find evidence of a 
weakening finance-growth relationship as the world experiences more financial crises in recent 
decades. The financial sector in China is dominated by government-owned banks and reforms 
in its financial sectors lag behind its other reforms thus providing an interesting avenue for 
research. Furthermore, we review the role of governments in spurring economic growth which 
can be argued to be both positive and negative to economic growth. There is no strong 
consensus and the empirical evidence on the role of governments in economic growth is mixed. 
Throughout its economic reforms, China’s Central government has maintained its role in the 
development of the economy with various policy implementations and have provided 
increasing responsibility to provincial and local governments. Many of these policies promote 
the development of formal institutions in China’s modern economy, which we reviewed 
towards the end of Chapter 3. Lastly, we also review the importance of geographical factors in 
economic growth. Geographical factors are often overlooked in economic growth as many 
growth models are dimensionless in nature. Topographical conditions and urban industrial 
centres are a hallmark of economic geography and should always be considered in a 
topographically diverse country like China, where region vary from the mountainous provinces 
in the north to the more temperate and coastal provinces in the south east region.  
In summary, these determinants of economic growth are important to consider for a 
transitioning economy like China. Therefore, this thesis specifically examines the determinants 
of economic growth in provincial-level China focusing on the role of spatial spillovers. In order 
to examine these issues, this thesis investigates the role of financial development on economic 
growth in Chapter 4, the spatial spillover effects of health and education expenditure on 
economic growth in Chapter 5, and the spatial efficiency spillover effects and its implications 
on economic growth in Chapter 6. Holistically, this thesis contributes to the literature in 
understanding economic growth in China, as it focuses on examining economic growth at the 
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regional provincial-level to deepen our understanding of regional disparity in China. 
Additionally, this thesis uses an updated dataset covering the period from 1996 to 2015 
focusing on the period of drastic policy implementations and recent financial crises. More 
importantly, this thesis focuses on the role of spatial spillovers in economic growth for 
provincial-level China. This contributes new empirical literature, as the thesis examines the 
extent of spatial effects on provincial-level growth in China as geographical factors are often 
overlooked in previous studies of economic growth. The specific contributions of the individual 
empirical chapters are summarised below. 
In Chapter 4, we examine the nonlinear effects of financial development and economic growth 
in China’s provinces. The positive effects of financial development on economic growth has 
become a stylised fact as a result of the burgeoning empirical literature on the finance-growth 
nexus. However, recent research finds evidence of a weakening relationship between the two 
particularly at increase in occurrences of financial crises. Meanwhile, the financial reforms 
lagged behind other reforms as the Central government continues to have a strong presence in 
the large four state-owned. Previous studies examining financial development in provincial-
level China has found mixed evidence and thus, in this study, we formally test for the existence 
of nonlinearity in financial development on economic growth using dynamic panel models that 
control for endogeneity across provinces and employing the U-test proposed by Lind and 
Mehlum (2010).  
We show that financial development has a positive and significant impact on growth, however, 
a significant nonlinear U-shape relationship between financial development and economic 
growth also exists. On the one hand, the positive effects of finance on growth may stem from 
the fact that China’s growth has been attributed to capital accumulation through foreign 
investment. Despite having a repressed financial system that favoured lending to the inefficient 
state-owned enterprises, the inflow from foreign direct investment have benefitted the financial 
system. Furthermore, the repressed financial system has resulted in a high savings rate. 
However, the effects of capital accumulation will diminish and converge to a steady state, so 
further financialisation and investment may not be productive. State-owned commercial banks 
in China have dominated the financial system and continue to support the state-owned sector, 
creating a repressed financial system. Furthermore, some studies have shown that recent 
financial development in China has been fuelled by real estate markets, which do not provide 
benefits to firms despite providing capital gains. 
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In Chapter 5, we examine the health and education expenditure and its effect on economic 
growth in China’s provinces using a spatial autoregressive model. This study examines the role 
of spatial interactions between provincial governments in China, which to the best of our 
knowledge is the first to do so. Provincial governments in China have assumed increasing fiscal 
responsibility as the Central government implemented decentralisation of responsibility. As a 
consequence, the provincial governments can potentially engage in competitive behaviour that 
can result in positive welfare gains. The spatial autoregressive model captures the spatial 
dependency between governments and estimate the level of strategic spatial interaction for 
economic growth. Furthermore, this study focuses on the effects of health and education 
expenditure on economic growth. While, endogenous growth theory emphasises the role of 
health and education on economic growth, the spatial effects of health and education are less 
examined. In this study, we decompose the estimates from the spatial autoregressive model 
which allows us to observe the extent of spillover effects from health and education on 
economic growth. 
We find evidence to that suggest that increasing public expenditures on health and education 
investment has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. More interestingly, the 
findings suggest that health and education investment have spillover effects across 
neighbouring provinces as the estimated results identify a significant and positive effect of 
indirect and total effects. Moreover, the partitioning estimates suggests that human capital 
exerts a global spillover effect beyond immediate neighbouring provinces, affecting higher-
order provinces. The findings provide support for the importance of human capital formation 
in economic growth. Equally important, the estimated results suggest that decentralisation may 
promote strategic provincial interaction, as spatial dependency is positive and significant in the 
model. This finding supports China’s policies of fiscal decentralisation and the theory of 
yardstick competition, which postulates the beneficial effects of decentralisation. The findings, 
however, estimate that the effects of education investment are stronger than those of health 
investment.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, we examine the efficiency of China’s provinces using a spatial Durbin 
production frontier, which allows for the identification of short- and long-term efficiency and 
the estimates of spatial efficiency spillover effects. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that provide estimates for spatial efficiency spillover effects and persistent and 
transient efficiency at provincial-level China. Examining efficiency at the provincial-level in 
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China is practical as China’s geography is diverse across the country. The coastal provinces 
have excellent transport links while the interior landlocked provinces face higher costs due to 
poor transportation links and lack of development in infrastructure. This suggests that the 
provinces face varying production opportunities across the region. Furthermore, the spatial 
Durbin model considers the effect of geographical distance which is often overlooked in many 
economic models. 
The estimated results support the claims that there are still areas for further improvements. The 
average gross efficiency stands around 80%, which suggests that output can be potentially 
increased by another 20%. More importantly, much of the inefficiency is attributed to persistent 
long-term structural issues. Meanwhile, the transient efficiency of provinces is very high and 
close to 100%. This supports a number of empirical researches that suggests efficiency gains 
in China have been exhausted. Furthermore, we find evidence of spatial efficiency spillovers 
in provincial level China with an average of 27.15% efficiency spillover from neighbouring 
provinces. This results in an overall gross efficiency that is positive and beyond best practices, 
affirming the successes of previous economic reforms. However, at closer examination of these 
figures, the efficiency scores obtained by the provinces are not determined by the geographical 
position of the provinces or by its income groupings as the efficiency scores are dispersed 
across the region. 
7.2 Implications from Thesis 
Although this thesis focuses on economic growth in provincial-level China, there are important 
implications to consider for academics examining economic growth. Firstly, we show the 
important of considering the role of geographical and more specifically the role of spatial 
spillovers in economic growth. Many economic models are dimensionless and overlook spatial 
elements when examining economic growth. This is important to consider especially since 
topographical conditions can affect the production opportunities that an economy faces 
especially when examining differences in coastal and landlocked regions such as in Africa. 
Furthermore, understanding spatial interaction between governments is always overlooked and 
this should always be considered when examining the effects of fiscal expenditure on economic 
growth as governments interact and can potentially behave based on neighbouring 
governments. 
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Secondly, in Chapter 4, we find further evidence of a weakening finance and growth 
relationship. Academics examining the role of finance on growth should reassess the quantity 
and quality of financial development, as the findings in Chapter 4 find evidence on a weakening 
finance-growth nexus. With regards to China, policymakers should continue to assess and 
control for excessive financial development in China and implement further reforms in the 
financial sector to foster productive investments. Furthermore, policymakers should identify 
the specific thresholds on the nonlinear effects of finance on growth in the various provinces 
in China. This will provide policymakers with information to formulate varying policies for 
different provinces that are at different stages of development.  
Thirdly, the Central government should continue to decentralise fiscal responsibility towards 
provincial and local governments as spatial strategic interaction results in positive welfare 
gains as observed in Chapter 5. In addition, the results show that education expenditure is more 
effective than health expenditure. Although the obvious policy implication here is to focus on 
further education development in China. However, it reflects underlying issues in China’s 
health care system as the effects of decentralisation may have deteriorated the delivery of health 
care systems as provincial governments focused too much on the sustainability and profitability 
of healthcare providers. China needs to reform its ineffective health care insurance system and 
ensure that local and provincial governments are financially capable of delivering quality 
health care.  
Finally, the estimated results in Chapter 6 suggests that provincial governments and 
policymakers should identify the sources of inefficiency within the respective provinces. The 
results suggests that average output can potentially increase by 20% if the sources of 
inefficiency are investigated and addressed. China should continue to reform and restructure 
its economy as inefficiency is attributed to long-term persistent issues. Meanwhile, 
policymakers should identify the role of productivity growth in individual provinces. This can 
deepen our understanding of the determinants of productivity growth in provincial-level China 
and identify promote policies that are unique to provinces that can lead to future economic 
growth. 
Overall, the thesis shares similar concerns with policymakers and academics that highlight the 
sustainability of China’s long-term economic growth. The effects of capital accumulation will 
diminish over time and there needs to be other sources of economic growth. Chapters 4, 5 and 
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6 propose several practical advices in the form of further reforms to allow the Chinese economy 
to sustain long-term economic growth.  
7.3 Limitations and Extensions 
There are various avenues for future research based on the limitations of the empirical chapters 
and the study of economic growth in China. In Chapter 4, we statistically establish the nonlinear 
effects of finance on growth. Although this is important, policymakers will need to further 
investigate the threshold levels for the quantity of finance that can promote growth and 
consequently prescribe policies that are exclusive for individual provinces. This is important 
in order to address the issues of regional disparity across China. Secondly, in Chapter 4, we 
focus on the supply-side aspect of finance, as we measure financial development using the ratio 
of loans or deposit to GDP. This ignores the demand-side of finance and future work should 
investigate the role of the Central bank in promoting provincial-level growth in China. 
In Chapter 5, there are some methodology limitations that can provide directions for future 
research. The study employs a contiguous spatial weights matrix that focuses more on the 
behaviour of provincial governments, which places less emphasis on the spatial effects of 
health and education. Employing a distance-based spatial weights matrix will not permit for 
partitioning, however, provides a deeper understanding on the spatial effects of health and 
education expenditure with focus on geographical distance. This is important as the variables 
are employed at the provincial level and labour mobility is affected by the geography while the 
quality of labour is affected by health and education expenditure in China. Furthermore, the 
variables employed focus on general aggregate provincial-level variables on health and 
education expenditure in China’s provinces. Although this is acceptable, examining the 
productivity of health and education providers within provinces can provide policymakers with 
a deeper understanding on the mechanism of public expenditure and prescribe unique policies 
for different provinces in China. Finally, in Chapter 6, although the methodology employ is 
novel, examining efficiency levels partially explain productivity growth. Examining the 
productivity levels through total factor productivity growth using a spatial Durbin model in 
China’s provinces can further deepen our understanding in China’s provinces and allow 
policymakers to prescribe policies that are individual to provinces. 
In general, economic growth is a complex phenomenon. Modelling and estimating growth are 
complicated, and researchers are generally constrained by these limitations. Economic growth 
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is generally examined quantitatively using GDP or GDP per capita, which limits the extent of 
income distribution across an economy. Many transitioning countries suffer from growing 
income inequality, as certain policies do not promote inclusive growth patterns, diminishing 
this issue. China has suffered from regional disparity and inequality throughout its reforms, 
where it assumed the hukou household registration system that restricts urban and rural 
labourers to work in their respective sectors. Although in recent years, the government has 
relaxed the system, income inequality between China’s coastal and interior regions continues 
to divide the country. As a result, examining inclusive policies that can reduce inequality in 
disadvantaged regions in China may provide future avenues of research, as China needs to 
maintain social stability if it wants to continue to consolidate its position in the world economy.  
Furthermore, China’s share of the tertiary sector is as large as its secondary sector, suggesting 
that growth is driven by consumption and growth. This issue also coincides with the increasing 
costs of labour in China’s economy which can potentially lead to a middle income-trap. 
Understanding the constraints faced by provinces due to the changing composition of China’s 
GDP growth can further deepen our understanding on China and provide important information 
to policymakers for future reforms. 
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Appendix 
A1: Data Appendix 
A1.1 List of Provinces in China 
Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Yunnan, and Zhejiang. 
China’s Capital: Beijing 
Municipalities (Equal status as provinces): Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin 
Autonomous Provinces: Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet. 
Coastal Provinces: Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang 
Inland Provinces: Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Yunnan.
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A1.2 Map of China’s Provinces 
Figure A1.1 Map of China’s Provinces 
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A1.3 Demographics on China’s Provinces 
In terms of total population in 2018, Guangdong has the largest population with 113,460,000 
while Tibet is the smallest with a total population of 3,440,000. 
In terms of population density in 2018, Shanghai has the largest population density of 3,823/ 
km2 while Tibet has the least population density of 3/ km2. 
In terms of total area, Xinjiang has the largest with an area of 1,664,897 km2 while Shanghai 
is the smallest with an area of 6,341 km2. 
In terms of GDP, Guangdong has the largest total GDP with 97,277.77 (100 million ¥) and 
Tibet with the least with 1,477.63 (100 million ¥). In terms of GDP per capita, Beijing has the 
largest per capita GDP with ¥140,211.00 and Gansu has the smallest with ¥31,336.00. 
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Table A1.1: Demographics on China’s Provinces (2018) 
Province Capital 
Total 
Population 
Population Density 
per km2 
Area 
(km2) 
GDP (100 
million ¥) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP Primary 
Industry (100 
million ¥) 
GDP Secondary 
Industry (100 
million ¥) 
GDP Tertiary 
Industry (100 
million ¥) 
Anhui Hefei 63,240,000 451 140,200 30,006.82 47,712.00 2,638.01 13,842.09 13,526.72 
Beijing Beijing 21,540,000 1,313 16,410 30,319.98 140,211.00 118.69 5,647.65 24,553.64 
Chongqing Chongqing 31,020,000 376 82,403 20,363.19 65,933.00 1,378.27 8,328.79 10,656.13 
Fujian Fuzhou 39,410,000 325 121,400 35,804.04 91,197.00 2,379.82 17,232.36 16,191.86 
Gansu Lanzhou 26,370,000 58 453,700 8,246.07 31,336.00 921.30 2,794.67 4,530.10 
Guangdong Guangzhou 113,460,000 631 179,800 97,277.77 86,412.00 3,831.44 40,695.15 52,751.18 
Guangxi Nanning 49,260,000 208 236,700 20,352.51 41,489.00 3,019.37 8,072.94 9,260.20 
Guizhou Guiyang 36,000,000 204 176,167 14,806.45 41,244.00 2,159.54 5,755.54 6,891.37 
Hainan Haikou 9,340,000 264 35,354 4,832.05 51,955.00 1,000.11 1,095.79 2,736.15 
Hebei Shijiazhuang 75,560,000 400 188,800 36,010.27 47,772.00 3,338.00 16,040.06 16,632.21 
Heilongjiang Harbin 37,730,000 83 454,800 16,361.62 43,274.00 3,000.96 4,030.94 9,329.72 
Henan Zhengzhou 96,050,000 575 167,000 48,055.86 50,152.00 4,289.38 22,034.83 21,731.65 
Hubei Wuhan 59,170,000 318 185,900 39,366.55 66,616.00 3,547.51 17,088.95 18,730.09 
Hunan Changsha 68,990,000 329 210,000 36,425.78 52,949.00 3,083.59 14,453.54 18,888.65 
Inner 
Mongolia 
Hohhot 25,340,000 21 1,183,000 17,289.22 68,302.00 1,753.82 6,807.30 8,728.10 
Jiangsu Nanjing 80,510,000 785 102,600 92,595.40 115,168.00 4,141.72 41,248.52 47,205.16 
Jiangxi Nanchang 46,480,000 278 166,919 21,984.78 47,434.00 1,877.33 10,250.21 9,857.24 
Jilin Changchun 27,040,000 141 191,126 15,074.62 55,611.00 1,160.75 6,410.85 7,503.02 
Liaoning Shenyang 43,590,000 299 145,900 25,315.35 58,008.00 2,033.30 10,025.10 13,256.95 
Ningxia Yinchuan 6,880,000 104 66,400 3,705.18 54,094.00 279.85 1,650.26 1,775.07 
Qinghai Xining 6,030,000 8 720,000 2,865.23 47,689.00 268.10 1,247.06 1,350.07 
Shaanxi Xi'an 38,640,000 188 205,800 24,438.32 63,477.00 1,830.19 12,157.48 10,450.65 
Shandong Jinan 100,470,000 640 157,100 76,469.67 76,267.00 4,950.52 33,641.72 37,877.43 
Shanghai Shanghai 24,240,000 3,823 6,341 32,679.87 134,982.00 104.37 9,732.54 22,842.96 
Shanxi Taiyuan 37,180,000 238 156,000 16,818.11 45,328.00 740.64 7,089.19 8,988.28 
Sichuan Chengdu 83,410,000 172 485,000 40,678.13 48,883.00 4,426.66 15,322.72 20,928.70 
Tianjin Tianjin 15,600,000 1,306 11,946 18,809.64 120,711.00 172.71 7,609.81 11,027.12 
Tibet Lhasa 3,440,000 3 1,228,400 1,477.63 43,397.00 130.25 628.37 719.01 
Xinjiang Ürümqi 24,870,000 15 1,664,897 12,199.08 49,475.00 1,692.09 4,922.97 5,584.02 
Yunnan Kunming 48,300,000 123 394,000 17,881.12 37,136.00 2,498.86 6,957.44 8,424.82 
Zhejiang Hangzhou 57,370,000 564 101,800 56,197.15 98,643.00 1,967.01 23,505.88 30,724.26 
Data is compiled from the China Statistical Yearbooks available at http://www.stats.gov.cn.  The GDP figures are in nominal terms and the data compiled are from 2018.
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A1.4 GDP during Initial Reforms in 1978 and Current GDP 
Figure A1.2: Nominal GDP in China’s Provinces in 1978 
 
Figure A1.3: Nominal GDP in China’s Provinces in 2018 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (Various Years) 
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A1.5 Additional Details for Variables Employed in Chapter 4 
Table A1.2: Additional Details for Chapter 4 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Per capita GDP growth rate y 
Provinces included: 
Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Xinjiang, 
Yunnan, and Zhejiang. 
 
Dropped Provinces:  
Gansu, Guangxi, Hebei, Inner 
Mongolia and Tibet are dropped 
from the sample study due to the 
unavailability of data. 
 
Per capita GDP growth rate is a traditional proxy for economic growth used in many 
empirical researches based on a Barro (1991) styled regression. 
 
In Chapter 4, I calculate the per capita GDP growth rate by calculating the Real GDP per 
capita for the respective provinces, taking into account inflation rate using the indices 
provided by the China Statistical Yearbooks. I then calculate the growth rate by taking 
the differences of the present Real GDP per capita with the past Real GDP per capita and 
dividing it by the past Real GDP per capita. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Deposits to GDP dy 
Deposits to GDP is a proxy for financial development and is based on previous 
provincial-level examinations of finance-growth in China (Zhang et al., 2012). 
 
In Chapter 4, this is measured by obtaining the total amount of deposits in banks and 
financial institutions and dividing it by the total GDP of the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Loans to GDP ly 
Loans to GDP is a proxy for financial development and is a traditionally used proxy for 
financial development in previous studies (Hasan et al., 2009; King and Levine, 1993). 
 
In Chapter 4, I calculate this by obtaining the total amount of loans that banks and 
financial markets have provided and dividing this by the total GDP of the respective 
province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 520 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Table A1.2: Additional Details for Chapter 4 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Private Investment pri 
 Private investment is a measure of institutional development and is used in a number of 
studies that examine the effects of institutional development on economic growth in 
provincial-level China (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Hasan et al., 2009). In the case of 
China, private investment is suggested to be more efficient than government investments 
as they have government investment have fewer budget constraints. 
 
In Chapter 4, I measure this by taking the total amount of private-sector fixed investment 
and dividing it by the total amount of overall fixed investment in the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Innovation inno 
The innovation in Chapter 4 is a proxy that measures the level of innovation in China’s 
provinces and have been used in previous studies (Hasan et al., 2009; Park and Ginarte, 
1997). This variable indirectly captures the awareness of property rights and is a measure 
of institutional development. 
 
In Chapter 4, I measure this by taking the total number of patents granted and dividing 
this by the total number of patents accepted in the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Rule of law law 
The rule of law in Chapter 4 is measured based on previous provincial-level China studies 
as it is a difficult variable to proxy (Hasan et al., 2009). The presence of lawyers suggests 
an increasing development of the legal and enforcement system in China. 
 
In Chapter 4, I measure this by taking the total number of lawyers and dividing this by 
10,000 persons in the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 520 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Table A1.2: Additional Details for Chapter 4 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Secondary education edu 
 Secondary education is a traditional control variable that is used in many growth 
examinations (Barro, 1991). In the case of China, measuring education at secondary level 
is relevant as schools have a compulsory nine-year education programme. 
 
In Chapter 4, I measure this by using the sample provided in www.stats.gov.cn, which 
measures the percentage of population with secondary level education attainment of the 
respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Openness to trade opn 
Openness to trade is a traditional control variable that is used in previous examinations 
of economic growth (Barro, 1991). 
 
In Chapter 4, I measure this by obtaining figures for the total amount of exports and 
imports and divide this figure by the total amount of GDP of the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Initial per capita GDP iypc 
This variable is traditionally employed to capture convergence and is used in many 
studies that examine economic growth (Barro, 1991). 
 
Using the Real per capita GDP of the respective province and year, I take the lag of the 
variable and include this into the regression. 
 
 The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 520 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn.
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A1.6: Additional Details for Variables Employed in Chapter 5 
Table A1.3: Additional Details for Chapter 5 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Real GDP per capita y 
Provinces included: 
Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, 
Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. 
 
Dropped Provinces:  
Hainan dropped from the sample 
study as it is not contiguous to 
mainland China. 
Real GDP per capita is a traditional proxy for economic growth (Barro, 1991). In Chapter 
5, however, I employ real GDP per capita instead of the per capita GDP growth rate 
employed in Chapter 4. This was used in provincial-level studies examining the effects 
of human capital on economic growth in China (Li and Huang, 2009; Li and Wang, 2018). 
 
In Chapter 5, I measure this by obtaining the nominal GDP per capita values and then 
calculating the Real GDP per capita for the respective provinces, taking into account 
inflation rate using the indices provided by the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Number of health institutions hi 
The number of health institutions is a proxy for human capital development, in terms of 
health stock, that is comparable across Chinese provinces (Li and Huang, 2009). 
Traditional health variables, such as life expectancy, at the provincial-level are not 
available. 
 
In Chapter 5, I measure this by obtaining the total number of health institutions in the 
respective provinces annually, which reflects investment in physical capital and health 
stock made by provincial governments. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Medical personnel per 10,000 
persons 
mp 
Similar to the number of health institutions, medical personnel per 10,000 persons is 
another proxy for human capital development that is comparable across Chinese 
provinces, reflecting investment in human capital (Li and Huang, 2009).  
 
Although Li and Huang (2009) employs medical doctors, in Chapter 5, I collect data for 
the total number of medical personnel (across all health institutions within a province) 
and divide this by the number of population (per 10K). 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 600 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Table A1.3: Additional Details for Chapter 5 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Real educational funds ef 
 Real educational funds aim to capture the level of investment made by provincial-
governments in education stock (Chen et al., 2014; Li and Huang, 2009). This also 
reflects the level of public expenditure made by provincial-governments as they are 
responsible for public expenditure. 
 
In Chapter 5, I measure this by obtaining the nominal values for the total amount of 
educational funds for the respective provinces and calculate the real terms by taking into 
account inflation using the CPI indices provided by the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Secondary education attainment edu 
Secondary education is a traditional control variable that is used in many growth 
examinations (Barro, 1991). In the case of China, measuring education at secondary level 
is relevant as schools have a compulsory nine-year education programme. Furthermore, 
this variable is traditionally used to reflect the quality and investment in education 
(Knowles and Owen, 1995) and is comparable across China. 
 
Similar to Chapter 4, In Chapter 5, I measure this by using the sample provided in 
www.stats.gov.cn, which measures the percentage of population with secondary level 
education attainment of the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 600 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Table A1.3: Additional Details for Chapter 5 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Workforce growth wg 
 The workforce growth rate reflects the level of labour in the respective province and is 
employed in previous provincial-level studies examining health and education in China 
(Li and Huang, 2009; Li and Wang, 2018). More specifically the workforce growth rate 
is the sum of population growth, depreciation rate and technological progress. I employ 
this variable as a control variable in Chapter 5. 
 
Following previous studies, in Chapter 5, I measure the population growth by obtaining 
values for annual total population in the respective provinces and obtaining the 
differences annually. With regards to the depreciation rate and technological progress, 
following Mankiw et al. (1992), this is assumed to be at 0.05 (5%) and is consistent for 
all provinces and years. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Fixed investment rate ir 
The fixed investment rate reflects the level of capital in the respective province and is 
employed in provincial-level studies examining health and education in China (Li and 
Huang, 2009; Li and Wang, 2018). I employ this variable as a control variable in Chapter 
5. 
 
In Chapter 5, I measure this by obtaining the total amount of fixed investment in a 
respective province and dividing this by the total GDP of the respective province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 600 and is measured annually from 1996–2015. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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A1.7: Spatial Weights Matrix Employed in Chapter 5 (Contiguity Matrix) 
In Chapter 5, I employ a contiguous spatial weights matrix of 30 Chinese provinces, dropping 
Hainan as it is not contiguous to mainland China. 
This section presents the contiguous spatial weights matrix employed and the row-
normalisation transformation. The contiguous spatial weights and row-normalisation was 
carried out using the Stata command spmat. The following provinces are included and the letter 
in parenthesis refers to the labels within the matrix. 
Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), 
Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), Hubei (W12), 
Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia 
(W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), 
Shanxi (W24), Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), 
and Zhejiang (W30). 
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Table A1.4: Contiguous Spatial Weights Matrix in Chapter 5 
Provinces W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 W20 W21 W22 W23 W24 W25 W26 W27 W28 W29 W30 
W1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
W2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
W5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
W6 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
W8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
W9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
W10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W13 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
W15 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
W16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W18 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W19 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W20 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
W21 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
W24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W25 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
W26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W27 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
W28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
W29 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W30 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The labels refer to the following provinces: Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), 
Hubei (W12), Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia (W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), Shanxi (W24), 
Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), and Zhejiang (W30). 
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Table A1.5:  Row-Normalised Contiguous Spatial Weights Matrix in Chapter 5 
Provinces W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 W20 W21 W22 W23 W24 W25 W26 W27 W28 W29 W30 
W1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 0.20 0 0.20 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 
W2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 
W5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0 0 0 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 0 
W6 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W7 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 
W8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.25 0 
W9 0 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0 0 0 0.14 0 0.14 0 0.14 0 0 0 0 
W10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.50 0 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W11 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W12 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 
W13 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 
W14 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 
W15 0.17 0 0 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 
W16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W18 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 0.13 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.13 0 0.13 0 0.13 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W19 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W20 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 
W21 0 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 
W22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.33 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.50 
W24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W25 0 0 0.11 0 0.11 0 0 0.11 0 0 0 0.11 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.11 0 
W26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W27 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 
W28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.33 0 0 0 
W29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 
W30 0.20 0 0 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The labels refer to the following provinces: Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), 
Hubei (W12), Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia (W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), Shanxi (W24), 
Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), and Zhejiang (W30). 
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A1.8: Additional Details for Variables Employed in Chapter 6 
Table A1.6: Additional Details for Chapter 6 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Real GDP y 
Provinces included: 
Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, 
Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. 
 
Dropped Provinces:  
Hainan dropped from the sample 
study as it is not contiguous to 
mainland China and therefore does 
not face the same transportation 
costs when compared to the 
contiguous provinces, which only 
face land transportation costs 
between provinces. 
In this study, I employ as spatial Durbin production function model that employs the 
traditional variables in frontier modelling or in stochastic frontier analysis models 
(Aigner et al., 1977). Thus, this requires the traditional variables used in production 
function namely output, capital and labour measured at the provincial-level. 
 
In Chapter 6, I obtain the annual observations for provincial-level GDP and then calculate 
the real terms by taking into account the inflation rate reported by the indices in the China 
Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The real GDP figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures 
used in the subsequent regressions are log-transformed and mean-differenced, which can 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
Real Capital Stock k 
The China Statistical Yearbooks does not provide capital stock data at the provincial-
level and only provides aggregate capital stock data. Thus, in Chapter 6, I obtain values 
for capital stock using the values reported by Wu (2015).15  
 
Wu (2015) measures the capital stock using the conventional perpetual inventory method, 
where he justifies his choice of deflators, estimations of provincial-level rates of 
depreciation and estimations of the initial value of capital stock. These values are adjusted 
for real terms (constant 2010) and I input these values directly. 
 
The real capital stock figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and 
the figures used in the subsequent regressions are log-transformed and mean-differenced, 
which can be interpreted as elasticities. 
The total number of observations N is 870 and is measured annually from 1985–2013. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
                                                          
15 Wu, Y (2015). China’s capital stock series by region and sector. (Discussion paper 15.24). University of Western Australia Business School. [Online at: 
http://www.business.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2823907/DP-15.24_Yanrui1.pdf] 
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Table A1.6: Additional Details for Chapter 6 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Labour Employed per 10,000 l 
 In Chapter 6, I obtain the values for labour employed per 10,000 persons at the provincial-
level using annual data provided by the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The labour figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures 
used in the subsequent regressions are log-transformed and mean-differenced, which can 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
Government spending to GDP gov 
I employ three control variables, in addition to the traditional production function 
variables. These include government spending to GDP, openness to trade and a dummy 
variable that captures coastal provinces. 
 
Government spending to GDP examines the role of the government in output growth. In 
Chapter 3.3, I provide various arguments for and against the role of government spending 
in promoting output growth. In Chapter 6, I obtain the nominal values for the government 
spending in the China Statistical Yearbooks as the Government Consumption 
Expenditure and dividing this by the nominal values for GDP. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
Openness to Trade opn 
I employ three control variables, in addition to the traditional production function 
variables. These include government spending to GDP, openness to trade and a dummy 
variable that captures coastal provinces. 
 
Openness to trade is a traditional control variable that is used in previous examinations 
of economic growth (Barro, 1991). I provide a discussion on the positive and negative 
effects of openness to trade in Chapter 3.5. 
 
Similar to Chapter 4, in Chapter 6, I measure this by obtaining figures for the total amount 
of exports and imports and divide this figure by the total amount of GDP of the respective 
province. 
 
The figures presented in the summary statistics are in level terms and the figures used in 
the subsequent regressions are log-transformed. 
The total number of observations N is 870 and is measured annually from 1985–2013. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Table A1.6: Additional Details for Chapter 6 (Continued) 
Variable Label Provinces Definition and calculations 
Coast coast 
 I employ three control variables, in addition to the traditional production function 
variables. These include government spending to GDP, openness to trade and a dummy 
variable that captures coastal provinces. 
 
Coast  is a dummy variable for provinces that are coastal and are not landlocked. If a 
province is coastal, it is assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
The following provinces are coastal: Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 
 
The following provinces are landlocked: Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing , Gansu, Guizhou, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. 
Time-trend t 
 I include the traditional variables included in frontier modelling. The time-trend simply 
provides a value for the annual observations. For example, 1985 is assigned a value of 1 
and 2015 is assigned a value of 29. This is then mean-differenced prior to the subsequent 
regressions. 
Interaction terms 
kt and 
lt  
 I include the traditional variables included in frontier modelling. These include the 
interaction terms of real capital stock over time and labour employed over time. 
Squared terms 
k2, l2, 
and t2 
 I include the traditional variables included in frontier modelling. These include the 
squared terms of real capital stock, labour employed, and the time-trend. 
The total number of observations N is 870 and is measured annually from 1985–2013. The data is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn. 
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A1.9: Spatial Weights Matrix Employed in Chapter 6 (Distance Matrix) 
In Chapter 6, I employ a distance-based spatial weights matrix of 30 Chinese provinces, 
dropping Hainan as it is does not face the same constraints to production costs compared to the 
provinces in mainland China. For example, the 30 contiguous provinces all share the same 
transportation mode between provinces via land transportation while moving from Hainan to 
Inner Mongolia requires both land and sea transportation. 
This section presents the distance-based spatial weights matrix employed and the row-
normalisation transformation. I use the distance-based spatial weights provided in Stata by 
Yihua (2009)16 and the distance between any two provinces is defined as the great circle 
distance. The spatial weights matrix is also row-normalised and is carried out using the Stata 
command spmat.  
The following provinces are included and the letter in parenthesis refers to the labels within 
the matrix. 
Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), 
Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), Hubei (W12), 
Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia 
(W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), 
Shanxi (W24), Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), 
and Zhejiang (W30). 
                                                          
16 Yihua Yu, 2009. "CHINA_SPATDWM: Stata module to provide spatial distance matrices for Chinese 
provinces and cities," Statistical Software Components S457059, Boston College Department of Economics. 
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Table A1.7: Distance-Based Spatial Weights Matrix in Chapter 6 
Provinces W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 W20 W21 W22 W23 W24 W25 W26 W27 W28 W29 W30 
W1 0 1019 1207 565 1740 1071 1257 1249 892 2041 576 668 756 145 443 1577 1170 1257 1371 2201 1034 564 219 929 1349 909 3459 2987 1937 243 
W2 1019 0 1462 1555 1266 1910 1903 1681 280 1290 692 1070 1387 971 1326 946 569 431 964 1841 854 457 1070 504 1530 115 2970 2862 2286 1258 
W3 1207 1462 0 1195 1029 973 665 288 1183 2752 861 548 559 1333 938 2379 1958 1293 830 1219 648 1288 1426 971 153 1431 2449 1800 829 1307 
W4 565 1555 1195 0 2011 607 935 1101 1383 2600 970 809 635 677 298 2132 1732 1723 1669 2368 1321 1113 656 1350 1347 1452 3624 2973 1728 388 
W5 1740 1266 1029 2011 0 1972 1694 1311 1078 2375 1168 1202 1451 1802 1713 2156 1830 856 370 578 710 1438 1921 890 951 1320 1751 1638 1561 1943 
W6 1071 1910 973 607 1972 0 423 751 1677 3085 1228 896 566 1208 633 2632 2211 1952 1697 2186 1391 1525 1222 1561 1101 1826 3386 2583 1230 967 
W7 1257 1903 665 935 1694 423 0 390 1640 3153 1214 834 537 1402 830 2728 2297 1848 1475 1828 1225 1591 1448 1475 761 1839 2994 2161 813 1228 
W8 1624 2399 1191 1155 2215 558 537 905 2146 3615 1707 1337 1012 1764 1182 3171 2745 2376 2011 2290 1760 2047 1780 1996 1268 2325 3383 2436 1029 1524 
W9 892 280 1183 1383 1078 1677 1640 1404 0 1570 448 809 1136 884 1127 1216 817 370 741 1639 581 398 998 233 1251 270 2818 2628 2007 1134 
W10 2041 1290 2752 2600 2375 3085 3153 2964 1570 0 1946 2329 2620 1924 2456 475 874 1561 2169 2936 2135 1568 1961 1789 2818 1328 3844 4012 3576 2224 
W11 576 692 861 970 1168 1228 1214 1028 448 1946 0 383 695 636 695 1540 1112 757 798 1654 472 427 754 380 968 625 2901 2522 1683 796 
W12 668 1070 548 809 1202 896 834 660 809 2329 383 0 334 788 512 1918 1488 1057 867 1584 526 787 886 668 684 1007 2846 2320 1335 803 
W13 756 1387 559 635 1451 566 537 506 1136 2620 695 334 0 899 393 2191 1761 1390 1149 1750 829 1055 965 1002 712 1315 2997 2346 1187 790 
W14 145 971 1333 677 1802 1208 1402 1389 884 1924 636 788 899 0 585 1455 1059 1254 1432 2284 1106 517 120 956 1473 858 3536 3101 2077 307 
W15 443 1326 938 298 1713 633 830 895 1127 2456 695 512 393 585 0 2000 1582 1451 1371 2082 1023 910 620 1070 1091 1231 3342 2735 1564 407 
W16 1577 946 2379 2132 2156 2632 2728 2568 1216 475 1540 1918 2191 1455 2000 0 431 1302 1894 2732 1796 1137 1488 1447 2461 952 3757 3784 3208 1753 
W17 1170 569 1958 1732 1830 2211 2297 2140 817 874 1112 1488 1761 1059 1582 431 0 979 1534 2407 1396 707 1108 1050 2045 547 3505 3431 2786 1363 
W18 1257 431 1293 1723 856 1952 1848 1555 370 1561 757 1057 1390 1254 1451 1302 979 0 609 1434 646 762 1368 391 1320 515 2539 2482 2076 1498 
W19 1371 964 830 1669 370 1697 1475 1117 741 2169 798 867 1149 1432 1371 1894 1534 609 0 901 350 1079 1551 533 804 1000 2117 1897 1524 1579 
W20 2201 1841 1219 2368 578 2186 1828 1445 1639 2936 1654 1584 1750 2284 2082 2732 2407 1434 901 0 1182 1977 2400 1434 1085 1891 1263 1081 1420 2377 
W21 1034 854 648 1321 710 1391 1225 911 581 2135 472 526 829 1106 1023 1796 1396 646 350 1182 0 823 1223 350 687 849 2430 2087 1448 1233 
W22 564 457 1288 1113 1438 1525 1591 1445 398 1568 427 787 1055 517 910 1137 707 762 1079 1977 823 0 621 548 1394 345 3188 2909 2108 801 
W23 219 1070 1426 656 1921 1222 1448 1463 998 1961 754 886 965 120 620 1488 1108 1368 1551 2400 1223 621 0 1076 1568 956 3653 3204 2150 269 
W24 929 504 971 1350 890 1561 1475 1209 233 1789 380 668 1002 956 1070 1447 1050 391 533 1434 350 548 1076 0 1029 502 2640 2403 1788 1161 
W25 1349 1530 153 1347 951 1101 761 371 1251 2818 968 684 712 1473 1091 2461 2045 1320 804 1085 687 1394 1568 1029 0 1509 2303 1650 761 1456 
W26 909 115 1431 1452 1320 1826 1839 1635 270 1328 625 1007 1315 858 1231 952 547 515 1000 1891 849 345 956 502 1509 0 3042 2893 2259 1146 
W27 3459 2970 2449 3624 1751 3386 2994 2635 2818 3844 2901 2846 2997 3536 3342 3757 3505 2539 2117 1263 2430 3188 3653 2640 2303 3042 0 1146 2382 3639 
W28 2987 2862 1800 2973 1638 2583 2161 1879 2628 4012 2522 2320 2346 3101 2735 3784 3431 2482 1897 1081 2087 2909 3204 2403 1650 2893 1146 0 1408 3106 
W29 1937 2286 829 1728 1561 1230 813 689 2007 3576 1683 1335 1187 2077 1564 3208 2786 2076 1524 1420 1448 2108 2150 1788 761 2259 2382 1408 0 1970 
W30 243 1258 1307 388 1943 967 1228 1296 1134 2224 796 803 790 307 407 1753 1363 1498 1579 2377 1233 801 269 1161 1456 1146 3639 3106 1970 0 
The labels refer to the following provinces: Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), 
Hubei (W12), Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia (W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), Shanxi (W24), 
Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), and Zhejiang (W30). 
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Table A1.8:  Row-Normalised Distance-Based Spatial Weights Matrix in Chapter 6 
Provinces W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 W20 W21 W22 W23 W24 W25 W26 W27 W28 W29 W30 
W1 0 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 
W2 0.03 0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
W3 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 
W4 0.06 0.02 0.03 0 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 
W5 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
W6 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
W7 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.09 0 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 
W8 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.08 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 
W9 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
W10 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
W11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
W12 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.07 0 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
W13 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.09 0 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 
W14 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 
W15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 
W16 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
W17 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.10 0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
W18 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
W19 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
W20 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 
W21 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.02 0 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
W22 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
W23 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 
W24 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 0 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
W25 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 
W26 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
W27 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0 0.08 0.04 0.02 
W28 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0 0.05 0.02 
W29 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04 0 0.03 
W30 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
The labels refer to the following provinces: Anhui (W1), Beijing (W2), Chongqing (W3), Fujian (W4), Gansu (W5), Guangdong (W6), Guangxi (W7), Guizhou (W8), Hebei (W9), Heilongjiang (W10), Henan (W11), 
Hubei (W12), Hunan (W13), Jiangsu (W14), Jiangxi (W15), Jilin (W16), Liaoning (W17), Inner Mongolia (W18), Ningxia (W19), Qinghai (W20), Shaanxi (W21), Shandong (W22), Shanghai (W23), Shanxi (W24), 
Sichuan (W25), Tianjin (W26), Xinjiang (W27), Tibet (W28), Yunnan (W29), and Zhejiang (W30). 
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A2: Spatial Autoregressive Model with Random Effects 
Table A2.1 reports estimated coefficients and the associate parameters of the spatial 
autoregressive model with random effects. Here the AIC of 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝐼𝐶 <  𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐼𝐶, therefore the 
fixed-effect model was the preferred model. 
Table A2.1: Random-Effects Spatial Autoregression Coefficients and Associated Parameters 
Variable 
Model  
Coeff. 
Direct  
Parameter 
Indirect  
Parameter 
Total  
Parameter 
hi 
0.016* 0.018* 0.016* 0.033* 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.024) 
mp 
−0.005 −0.007 −0.006 −0.013 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.032) (0.068) 
ef 
0.380*** 0.412*** 0.358*** 0.770*** 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
edu 
0.128* 0.140* 0.125* 0.265* 
(0.167) (0.176) (0.156) (0.331) 
wg 
1.380*** 1.511*** 1.309*** 2.819*** 
(0.329) (0.344) (0.280) (0.613) 
ir 
0.196*** 0.212*** 0.185*** 0.397*** 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.073) 
Constant 
0.583***    
(0.132)    
     
𝑾𝜌 0.506 R2-within 0.983  
LL 490.105 R2-between 0.160  
AIC −960.21 R2-overall 0.722  
Definition of variables are in Table 5.1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
 
